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Preface
My ideas about official channels — such as grievance
procedures, ombudsmen and courts — have been developing for a very long time.
In 1980, Michael Spautz, a senior lecturer at the
University of Newcastle, was dismissed from his tenured
position. At the time, I was investigating cases of suppression of dissent. After hearing about Spautz’s experiences, I
began corresponding with him and ended up writing articles
about his case.
Spautz had raised concerns about alleged flaws in the
research carried out by a recently appointed professor in his
department. One of the striking features of his story was
that when he attempted to raise these concerns through the
proper academic channels, they led nowhere. Instead,
university procedures were turned against Spautz himself.
After he was dismissed, Spautz continued to seek
justice through official channels, mainly the courts. For
decades, he was a persistent complainer, one who starts
with a seemingly legitimate concern and then, when
rebuffed, refuses to let it drop.
In 2018, Spautz died. After discussions with his
daughters, I wrote a long blog post about his story.1 In it, I
1 “A disastrous quest for justice,” Brian’s Comments, 29 August
2018, https://comments.bmartin.cc/2018/08/29/a-disastrous-questfor-justice/. This post contains links to many documents about the
Spautz case.

2

Official Channels

commented that it provided me with an important lesson
about the shortcomings of official channels.
Later, as I studied more cases of suppression of
dissent, often the same pattern appeared: formal procedures
to address problems didn’t work, at least not the way you
might expect. After I became president of Whistleblowers
Australia in 1996, I heard from whistleblowers every week.
As recounted in chapter 2, many of them repeated the same
story: grievance procedures and watchdogs (organisations
intended to stop wrongdoing) were unhelpful.
In the early 2000s, I developed the backfire model.
When powerful groups do something seen as unjust, they
regularly use a variety of methods to reduce public outrage.
One of them is to use or set up official channels, such as
government-initiated inquiries, that gave an appearance of
providing justice, usually without much substance. In
formulating this component of the model, I was influenced
by my prior experience with whistleblowers, but soon
discovered plenty of evidence that the same methods are
used in many other circumstances.
One of my collaborators on backfire dynamics, Truda
Gray, left a sheet of paper for me with this note: “A book
about official channels?” At the time, this topic was too big
and too hard, but the idea stuck with me.
One of my other collaborators on backfire was Steve
Wright, an authority on the “technology of repression”:
tools used for surveillance, crowd control and torture. Steve
recognised that regulations to control the trade in torture
technologies often gave only an illusion of protection, but
nevertheless maintained hope that some such regulations
would have a significant beneficial effect. We discussed
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this issue many times over the years. Steve’s comments
helped me remember that official channels are not necessarily ineffective. It was just that often they are.
In 2013, I started writing an introduction to this book,
but before long set the text aside and worked on other
projects. It took quite a few years to think through how to
present my ideas about official channels.
Initially, my plan was to look at the different roles
played by official channels, for example being attackers or
misleading symbols. Then, after figuring out the main roles,
I would describe one or more case studies to illustrate each
role and draw on academic writings about regulatory
capture, which addressed one particular role.
However, this plan never felt quite right. Part of the
problem was that organisations seldom conform to a single
role. They are always more complex. But there was something more. Through conversations and reading, I was
continually reminded that many people have a deep belief
in official channels. When these channels don’t work, then
the feeling is that they should work, so the solution is to fix
them or support them or rebuild them until they do. An
academic analysis would not begin to address this feeling.
Eventually I turned to a writing approach that has
affinities with autoethnography, which involves using one’s
own life experiences to search for wider understanding. For
writing about official channels, this means telling about my
experiences learning about them. I haven’t fully adopted the
autoethnography approach but have used it to help structure
my accounts. Because I have had a longer and deeper
interaction with whistleblowing, that is the longest chapter.
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The main purpose of the book therefore is not to
provide a detailed analysis of official channels, but rather
to provide a plausible case that they are not necessarily the
only or most effective way to deal with problems. Instead,
attention needs to be paid to developing skills, changing
cultures, organising collective action and investigating
alternative ways to achieve goals. This is a simple enough
claim that may seem obvious on the surface. By telling
about my own engagements with these issues, and about
what I’ve learned in some of my studies, I hope to offer
encouragement to think more widely about official channels. The system — the ways things are set up, everything
from courts to elections — is so familiar that it seems inevitable, the only possible way. Examining the shortcomings
of official channels and, more importantly, the shortcomings of relying so heavily on them provides a window into
a different way of seeing the world and what it might be.

1
Introduction
It was March 1993. I came to Canberra for a two-day
conference on intellectual suppression and whistleblowing.
The first day, which I had helped organise, was on intellectual dissent. The second day was on whistleblowing. Afterwards, there was a meeting of Whistleblowers Anonymous,
a group set up just two years previously. At the meeting the
group was renamed Whistleblowers Australia.
I knew about whistleblowing. It means speaking out in
the public interest. A typical whistleblower is an employee
who sees a problem at work, such as corrupt practice or
hazards to the public, and reports it to authorities. This
seems like an honourable thing to do, but it is often
unwelcome to those higher up in the organisation.
I had read about whistleblowing for quite a few years.
But there is nothing quite like hearing whistleblowers tell
their stories. At the meeting of Whistleblowers Australia,
each of those attending — perhaps a dozen people — was
invited to introduce themselves and tell a bit about their
background. I was amazed to hear story after story of
dismaying experiences.
Vince’s story
One of those present was Vince Neary, an engineer who
worked for State Rail, the government body that ran the
railway network for the state of New South Wales. Origi-
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nally from Britain, Vince had years of experience at State
Rail. He spoke calmly and clearly, in a mild, almost
unassuming way. He was the opposite of a firebrand.
Some years previously, Vince had seen two problems.
The first was unsafe signalling practices, which posed a
danger to passengers and crew. The second was misappropriation of funds. He was in charge of projects and large
amounts of money were requisitioned with no work being
done. It seemed to be fraud.
In 1987, Vince complained to his superiors about the
unsafe signalling practices and misappropriation of funds.
What should have happened? If someone of Vince’s experience and seniority said there was a problem, then it makes
sense to imagine that his concerns would be investigated. If
his concerns were correct, then the problems should be
addressed. On the other hand, if his concerns were found to
be incorrect, then the organisation was vindicated.
However, there was no investigation. Instead, Vince
was ignored or ostracised.
Vince continued with his story. Two years later, he
made a complaint to the chief executive of State Rail. This
led to some action. A task force was set up, but it didn’t
support Vince’s claims: it said there were no problems.
However, Vince did not receive a copy of the report, so he
continued to raise his concerns.
In early 1990 he made a complaint to his local member
of state parliament, who referred the matter to the Minister
of Transport, who cited the task force findings. Then Vince
made a complaint to the state ombudsman, who declined to
investigate. Next, in August 1990, he made a complaint to
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the Independent Commission Against Corruption, which in
February 1992 announced an inquiry, but then cancelled it.
Also in August 1990, Vince complained to the
Auditor-General, which undertook an investigation and
produced a lengthy report. However, despite taking the
complaint seriously, the Auditor-General’s report seemed
to have no effect on practices at State Rail.
Vince hadn’t forgotten about the 1989 task force
report that was being used to say everything was okay. In
September 1990, he requested the report through Freedom
of Information legislation. State Rail opposed its release. At
the Whistleblowers meeting where Vince was telling his
story, he hadn’t yet obtained the report, but he eventually
did the next year, in 1994.
In January 1991, Vince made a new complaint to State
Rail. This led to a report being commissioned, and this time
it vindicated him. But it also signalled an escalation of
reprisals. Over the next two years, Vince was demoted,
referred to psychiatrists, attacked in state parliament, had
his pay stopped and finally was dismissed.
It was a horrific story. Vince had tried all sorts of
means to raise his concerns. State Rail management seemed
to do the right thing by setting up a task force, but refused
to show its report to Vince and spent hundreds of thousands
of dollars trying to prevent its release. The various agencies
Vince approached didn’t seem to help. Vince ended up
losing his job. His career was over.
What about all the agencies that he approached? The
ombudsman wouldn’t investigate. The Independent
Commission Against Corruption announced an inquiry but
then cancelled it. In contrast, the Auditor-General made a
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significant investigation and wrote a long report. I later
talked to someone in the Auditor-General’s office who said
it was a bit unfair of Vince to see its report as inadequate.
The problem was that the Auditor-General had no power to
correct problems in State Rail.
So what happened to Vince? In 1995 he reached a
settlement with State Rail. He received a considerable sum
of money, setting him up for the rest of his life. However,
part of the settlement agreement was a silencing clause.
Vince couldn’t say publicly how much he had received, nor
say anything about the matters of dispute.
Is all well that ends well? Vince had some tough years
before he received the settlement, but he ended up with
some financial compensation. But he was hardly a winner.
After all, he lost his job and his career. He never worked
again for a salary.
Actually, Vince was one of the lucky ones. Many
whistleblowers lose their jobs and receive little compensation, or none at all.
What’s the problem?
We heard Vince’s perspective. The other side of the story
was State Rail. What happened with signalling systems?
What happened concerning the alleged corrupt practices,
with a million dollars unaccounted for?
It is common in cases of whistleblowing for nearly all
the attention to be on the whistleblower, with disputes over
whether the whistleblower is doing their job properly, is
mentally balanced, has violated any rules or regulations or
has been treated fairly. The story is about the whistleblower, with the result that the original problem is almost
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forgotten. The end of the story is when the whistleblower is
discredited and ousted, perhaps compensated or very
occasionally vindicated. But seldom does the story, at least
as told in public, include information about whether the
alleged problem in the organisation, the one that the
whistleblower spoke out about, was dealt with.
Organisations are complex entities, so often it is not
easy to determine what is going on. In State Rail, signalling
systems have many features, some working well, some
perhaps not so well. Vince claimed there were problems,
but were they serious ones? What is not publicly known is
what, if anything, State Rail did in relation to signalling
systems. If changes were made, were they helpful? Then
there is the issue of corruption. If Vince’s concerns were
correct and State Rail monies were being siphoned off to
individuals, this was likely to be something bigger than just
what he suspected. However, there is little public information about the scale of corruption in State Rail or about
what has been done to deal with it and prevent it.
Another State Rail whistleblower, Lesley Pinson,
alleged corruption in the organisation. She lost her job, and
for quite a few years was a key figure in Whistleblowers
Australia.
Over the years, I’ve talked with hundreds of whistleblowers. They report all sorts of reprisals, including ostracism (shunning, sometimes called the cold shoulder), petty
harassment, reprimands, referral to psychiatrists, demotion,
dismissal and blacklisting. This is bad enough, causing
financial, health and relationship problems. But in some
ways, one of the worst things is the failure of watchdog
agencies to address their concerns. Just like Vince’s
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experience, whistleblower after whistleblower reports that
these agencies — the ones that are supposed to address
problems in organisations — don’t help.
Official channels
Vince’s story helped me focus on the shortcomings of
official channels, namely the organisations and processes
that are supposed to fix problems. Vince tried a series of
official channels: his boss, State Rail management, the state
ombudsman, an anti-corruption commission, a parliamentarian and the state auditor-general — and none of them
worked, at least not to his satisfaction. If it had just been
Vince’s story, it could have been ignored, because after all
he might have been wrong and State Rail management
right. But there were too many other similar cases to ignore.
Then I started looking at the shortcomings of official channels in a range of other contexts, from sexual harassment to
elections.
Official channels have a great hold over people’s
imagination. When one agency fails in some way, it is seen
as a localised issue, with no implications for agencies in
general. I wanted to point to shortcomings inherent in the
system of official channels, and decided to approach the
topic by telling what I have learned over the years.
Chapter 2 is about whistleblowers in Australia and
their reports of dealing with official channels. The strange
thing is that politicians, journalists and whistleblowers
themselves see official channels as the source of salvation,
yet the goal of protection is like an ever-receding mirage.
In chapter 3, I tell about my experiences on university
sexual harassment committees. It is another story about the
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widespread belief in formal procedures despite plenty of
evidence that these procedures often don’t work very well.
For both adverse treatment of whistleblowers and for
the problem of sexual harassment, I saw a preoccupation
with official channels at the expense of other options. Several other options are worth considering. One is to increase
people’s understanding and skills to address problems.
“People” here refers to everyone, not just whistleblowers
and targets of harassment. A second option is to change the
culture so that reprisals and harassment are simply not done,
because they are implicitly understood as inappropriate. A
third option is collective action: mobilising groups of
people to apply pressure for change, or to change things
directly. A fourth option is to find different ways to address
the problems. There may be other options, too, depending
on the issue.
Chapters 4 through 8 address additional areas where
official channels may give only the illusion of being a
solution, yet where emphasis on them discourages other
options. Chapters 4 and 5 examine plagiarism and Wikipedia. Chapter 6 looks at how official channels can operate to
reduce outrage over police beatings, massacres of civilians,
torture, genocide and other cases in which a powerful group
is the perpetrator of an injustice.
In systems of representative government, elections
serve to legitimise rule by politicians, and deserve special
attention as an official channel, covered in chapter 7. In
chapter 8, I present a variety of examples to show that the
same sorts of issues arise in different contexts, in various
countries. Chapter 9 offers a few summary comments.
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In the appendices I’ve placed some material deriving
from my original conception of this book. Appendix 1
outlines a series of roles that official channels can play.
Appendices 2 and 3 are accounts of two particular Australian regulatory bodies, not intended to laud or condemn them
but rather to illustrate several of the roles they play or
inhabit. I picked these two bodies simply because I’ve
learned a bit about them. My hope is that others will try to
observe the roles illustrated here in other contexts, in order
to gain greater understanding and provide better guidance
for those seeking justice.

2
Whistleblowing
Whistleblowers are people who speak out in the public
interest. A typical whistleblower is an employee who
notices a problem at work — for example, a discrepancy in
accounts, bullying, favouritism in appointments, or
dangerous work practices — and reports it to someone in
authority. Usually the first person notified is the boss. If the
boss doesn’t address the problem, there are other possibilities. Internal to the organisation, there may be grievance
procedures, the human resources unit, the boss’s boss and
the board of management. External to the organisation there
are various watchdog agencies, for example an ombudsman, auditor-general or anti-corruption body, and others
depending on the organisation. Requests can be made to
politicians. Legal actions can be commenced: the courts
constitute a high-prestige formal channel.
The key feature of official channels is that they are
supposed to provide justice. Someone who has a concern is
searching for a person, agency or process that has some
authority to investigate, determine whether there is a
problem and, if there is, to address it.
Whistleblowers sometimes go to the media. The
media, including both mass media and social media, are not
official channels. They have no formal responsibility to
rectify injustices. However, the media are often the most
effective avenue for whistleblowers.
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In chapter 1, I told the story of Vince Neary, a
whistleblower in State Rail. Over the years, I’ve heard
many stories like Vince’s. His is worth telling because it so
nicely illustrates the persistence with which many whistleblowers pursue one official channel after another, despite
each official channel failing to address the original concern.
Whistleblower stories
When I heard Vince’s story, Whistleblowers Australia had
only recently been formed. Initially I was not heavily
involved, but then in 1996 I became the national president.
It was an eye-opening experience.
At the time, awareness about whistleblowing was
surging. The New South Wales branch of Whistleblowers
Australia was quite active, holding a “caring and sharing”
meeting every week in Sydney at which people were invited
to attend, tell about their experiences and receive advice
from experienced members. Some people would come for
just one or two meetings, tell their stories and then depart,
with or without some useful suggestions about how to
proceed.
I attended a few of these meetings, enough to gain a
good impression of the dynamics and to confirm what
regulars told me about the meetings. In the 1990s, the term
“whistleblower” had some level of stigma. It was linked to
the Australian expression “dobber” meaning a snitch or
informer. To dob on your mate (your friend or co-worker)
was seen as a low act. Most whistleblowers were not
dobbing on their mates but reporting problems higher in the
organisation, but the dobber label often stuck. Some of
those who attended the caring-and-sharing meetings started
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their stories by saying “I’m not a whistleblower, but …”,
then proceeding to tell a classic whistleblower story.
Media coverage of whistleblowers, often presenting
them as heroes, gradually changed public perception of
whistleblowing. Years later, the term became for some a
badge of honour, sometimes adopted by individuals who
simply had a dispute with a co-worker, or some grievance
about their treatment.
When I became president of Whistleblowers Australia
in 1996, I thought I knew a fair bit about the issues. Lots of
others assumed I did too! I was contacted by numerous
whistleblowers wanting to tell me their stories.
It is quite common for whistleblowers to start at the
beginning and provide a blow-by-blow account of their
experiences: “I spoke to the manager on Friday 24 July. Ten
days later, I received a letter from the head office. I wrote a
reply on 10 August and arranged a meeting.” And so on.
One feature of these lengthy stories became a recurrent
theme: the shortcomings of official channels. Quite a few
callers from New South Wales said they had made a
submission to the state’s Independent Commission Against
Corruption (ICAC), but their matter was not addressed.
ICAC sometimes referred their complaints to their employers and sometimes their identity was compromised, and
they were worse off than before.
So predictable were the reports about the uselessness
of official channels that occasionally I could anticipate
what a whistleblower would tell me. They might say, “Then
I went to the ombudsman” and I would interject “That
didn’t work, did it?” and they would say “How did you
know?”
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I knew because I had heard it so many times before.
Besides, if an agency had fixed the problem, then probably
this person wouldn’t be ringing Whistleblowers Australia
for advice.
I heard all sorts of stories, but I only heard one side.
Those of us in Whistleblowers Australia are volunteers,
giving advice and information in our spare time. We do not
have the capacity or the authority to investigate complaints
or to even to check out claims by contacting employers. The
people who contacted us might have been telling us
concocted stories. They might have been delusional. They
might have been a source of trouble at the workplace and
adopted the mantle of whistleblower.
We were contacted by all these sorts of people, and
sometimes it was hard to tell the difference. Sometimes I
knew callers were delusional, when they told me that a
device had been implanted in their brain to control their
thoughts. Sometimes I guessed they had a grievance at
work, because that was the only issue they raised. In a few
cases, people who claimed to be whistleblowers turned out
not to be quite what they claimed. One visitor to the weekly
meetings of the NSW branch of Whistleblowers Australia
said he had been to prison. That didn’t automatically discredit him, because in worst-case scenarios whistleblowers
are framed for crimes and imprisoned. However, information emerged that this particular fellow had lied about
the reason he had gone to prison: it was for paedophilia.
In the NSW branch, our policy and practice was to
respond to all enquiries without trying to make a judgement
about the bona fides of the enquirer. In other state branches,
members of the executive would try to determine whether
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someone was a genuine whistleblower before offers of
assistance were made. I liked the NSW branch approach.
By not insisting that enquirers be vetted, we avoided the
risk of causing further harm to individuals who had already
been subject to continued disbelief and repeated reprisals.
We did not set up a hierarchy separating genuine whistleblowers from those who didn’t meet some arbitrary criteria.
We created more good will among those we helped.
Anyway, it usually didn’t matter whether someone was a
whistleblower or actually the cause of problems at the
workplace. Our advice would help whistleblowers but not
do much harm otherwise.
Although in most cases it was impossible to judge the
accuracy of what people told us, nevertheless the commonalities were unmistakable. They usually involved raising
some concerns at work, being subject to various types of
adverse actions (reprisals), going to a person, procedure or
agency to address the problem, and failing to get any
satisfaction. The part about not obtaining satisfaction was
striking. It made me think much more about official
channels and reflect on experiences in other domains
besides whistleblowing.
Some relevant research
If it had only been my personal experience listening to
whistleblowers tell their stories, I would have been cautious
about generalising. But there was some evidence suggesting that what I heard was typical.
In the 1990s, Bill De Maria at the University of
Queensland undertook pioneering research on whistleblow-
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ing.1 He sent out invitations to whistleblowers to participate
in a survey, and obtained a large body of data. One of the
questions on the survey concerned official channels,
namely responses by external agencies to disclosures. The
results were stunning. In one quarter of the cases, the
agency took no action. In 40% of cases, the response was
negative, most commonly because the agency investigation
did not proceed. In about one in six cases, the agency
referred the matter to another agency. Finally there were
positive outcomes, with wrongdoing substantiated and
whistleblowers protected. This occurred less than one out
of ten approaches to an agency. In other words, whistleblowers felt that agencies helped them in only about ten
percent of approaches. Some whistleblowers approached
several agencies, so their odds were improved, but even so
these were discouraging findings.
In some cases, the respondents reported, they were
worse off after going to an agency. How could this be?
Some agencies referred the matter back to the whistleblower’s employer, leading to further reprisals.
Bill wrote several articles based on his research, and
in 1999 his book Deadly Disclosures appeared. It is highly
pessimistic about the prospects for whistleblowers in
Australia. From my perspective, it provided independent
1 William De Maria and Cyrelle Jan, “Behold the shut-eyed sentry!
Whistleblower perspectives on government failure to correct
wrongdoing,” Crime, Law & Social Change, vol. 24, 1996, pp.
151–166; William De Maria, Deadly Disclosures: Whistleblowing
and the Ethical Meltdown of Australia (Adelaide: Wakefield Press
1999).
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confirmation of what I was hearing over and over from
whistleblowers who contacted me. It reinforced my scepticism of the value of official channels.
Perhaps, though, Australia is an exception, and things
are much better elsewhere. The obvious place to check was
the US, which was at least a decade ahead of any other part
of the world in terms of trying to provide protection for
whistleblowers.
The US experience
The term “whistleblower” got its start in the US. Ralph
Nader helped organise a conference in 1971 and a book was
published based on the conference.2 Rising awareness led
to the introduction of various processes and laws for
protecting whistleblowers and addressing their disclosures.
As well, several organisations were set up to support
whistleblowers. Of these, prominent was the Government
Accountability Project (GAP), which took on a small
percentage of whistleblowers cases, providing legal
support. As well, GAP offered advice to whistleblowers
and publicly promoted the cause of whistleblowers.
In Whistleblowers Australia, GAP was best known for
a manual giving advice for whistleblowers. Initially circulated as a booklet, it was later published as a book under the
title The Whistleblower’s Survival Guide: Courage without
Martyrdom.3 The title is revealing. It is a challenge for
2 Ralph Nader, Peter J. Petkas and Kate Blackwell, eds., Whistle
Blowing: The Report of the Conference on Professional Responsibility (New York: Grossman, 1972).
3 Tom Devine, The Whistleblower’s Survival Guide: Courage
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whistleblowers to survive in their jobs, or to maintain a
decent life after losing their jobs or their careers. Whistleblowers need courage to challenge corruption and dangers
to the public, but courage is wasted if it does not lead to
change. All too often, whistleblowers sacrifice their livelihood for little effect: they are martyrs.
The Whistleblower’s Survival Guide offered insightful
general advice. We in Whistleblowers Australia who had
talked to numerous whistleblowers could vouch for all this
advice. The Guide provided this in a cogent way. It also
provided an assessment of the various avenues in the US for
making disclosures. There were so many of these that this
information made up half the book. It was sobering reading,
because none of the avenues was particularly promising. An
example was hotlines offered by organisations. Employees
could ring a phone number and register a concern or
complaint. The problem, according to the Guide, was that
hotlines seldom worked. Nothing would be done about the
matter reported, and the caller sometimes would be marked
out for reprisals. (This was before the advent of anonymous
hotlines.) Hotlines gave only the appearance of addressing
concerns.
And so it went through nearly all the avenues for
reporting problems. They were not promising, according to
the Guide, and were to be used only with caution. The main
exception was the False Claims Act. Dating from the Civil
War and updated by Congress in the 1980s, it allowed whistleblowers to make disclosures when the US government
Without Martyrdom (Washington, DC: Fund for Constitutional
Government, 1997).
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had been defrauded. If the government thought the matter
was worth pursuing, it could join the whistleblower in legal
action to recover monies and, if the action was successful,
the whistleblower would receive a portion of the monies. In
a few cases, this has amounted to millions or even tens of
millions of dollars. Most impressively, the False Claims
Act actually worked, at least for the government, recouping
billions of dollars from corrupt operators.
One sign of the effectiveness of the False Claims Act
was relentless pressure from businesses to neuter or repeal
the act. However, although the act recouped billions of
dollars for the US government and rewarded some whistleblowers handsomely, it was not an easy road, nor for them
quite as wonderful as it might seem. Whistleblowers who
tried to invoke the act faced two obstacles. The first was
getting the government to join them, and this didn’t always
occur. Without government legal support, few whistleblowers can afford to pursue the long legal effort involved. The
second obstacle was time and effort. Legal actions often
took years and required arduous preparation.
For successful cases, the financial reward for some
whistleblowers was generous, but seldom enough to
compensate for what they lost. Nearly all whistleblowers
using the False Claims Act lost their jobs, and often their
careers. They never worked again. Would a $1 million payout compensate for 20 years of salary? More importantly,
work is an important source of meaning. It is a big sacrifice
to lose a career in order to tackle corruption.
The point here is that even the False Claims Act,
undoubtedly the most effective piece of whistleblowing
legislation in the US, is far from providing ideal outcomes

22

Official Channels

for whistleblowers. If you’re going to lose your job in
pursuit of a good cause, it is certainly better to receive
generous compensation than nothing at all. But it is remote
from the optimal outcome, which is to remain in the job and
perhaps receive a bonus or promotion for being a good
corporate citizen.
In Australia, the US False Claims Act has been an inspiration to whistleblower supporters, some of whom have
been agitating since the 1990s to introduce an Australian
version of the act. However, the idea is usually dismissed
out of hand, often with the argument that if people are
acting in the public interest, they shouldn’t receive a private
benefit.4
Problems with whistleblower laws
Introduction of a law protecting whistleblowers sounds like
a great idea. If an employee speaks out about corruption or
hazards to the public, they can claim to have made a
“protected disclosure” and invoke the law to ensure they are
not subject to reprisals. In principle, this should make
whistleblowing much safer. In practice, it seldom does, and
in the worst-case scenario it makes things riskier.
Employers, when they know about whistleblower
laws, can get around them. Employers do not send letters to
workers saying, “You’re being fired because you raised
concerns over corruption.” Adverse actions can be quite
subtle. Rosters are changed, making work more difficult.
4 In contrast, within workplaces, salaries and bonuses are routinely
used to motivate workers, even when their jobs involve serving the
public interest.
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Requests for equipment or leave are lost, delayed or
rejected. Co-workers are less friendly or stay at a distance
(they are afraid for their own jobs). A unit is “restructured,”
causing employees to lose their jobs. In court, proving that
such actions are reprisals for whistleblowing can be
difficult.
In Australia, there are whistleblower laws in every
state and territory, and federally. Yet only in rare instances
have the laws have been invoked against an employer for
taking reprisals against a whistleblower. The laws might be
fine on paper but are useless if they are not actually used as
intended.
In the US, there is a different way in which the intent
of whistleblower laws is frustrated. Judges, when ruling on
whistleblower cases, regularly support employers. The lead
sentence of one article about this summarises the problem:
“A top watchdog investigated 190 cases of alleged retaliation against whistleblowers — and found that intelligence
bureaucrats only once ruled in favor of the whistleblower.”5
Congress, when passing laws, wanted whistleblowers to be
protected, but courts sabotaged this intent.6
Another problem with many whistleblower laws is that
they only offer protection when disclosures are initially
made internally to the organisation, typically to managers
or special units. This sounds reasonable but is a recipe for
5 Kevin Poulsen, “US intelligence shuts down damning report on
whistleblower retaliation,” The Daily Beast, 2 November 2018.
6 On this and several other points, see Robert G. Vaughn, The
Successes and Failures of Whistleblower Laws (Cheltenham:
Edward Elgar, 2012).
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keeping challenges under control. Internal processes keep
information out of the public eye, allowing managers to
cover their tracks.
In many cases, laws are designed to limit the scope of
protection. They might cover only some types of employees, such as government workers but not those in private
enterprise. They might have provisions to penalise employees who make disclosures that are allegedly vexatious. In
Australia, because agencies do not invoke the laws on their
own initiative, the whistleblower may have to go to court to
seek protection or restitution. This is an onerous task,
especially for a dismissed former employee with little
money, who needs to fight a lengthy court battle against an
opponent with plenty of money to cause delays, mount
appeals and in other ways wear them down.
Whistleblower laws, while looking good on paper,
may not accomplish much in the face of other laws that
enable silencing of dissenters. Government employees are
under a legal obligation not to reveal information they
acquire on the job. In Britain, this is called the Official
Secrets Act; in Australia, there is another name, state
services acts, but the effect is the same. These acts are
seldom invoked but they serve as a form of intimidation —
they frighten employees.
Defamation law can inhibit speech. Saying anything
that harms someone else’s reputation is to be guilty of
defamation, called slander when it is verbal and libel when
it is published. Whistleblowers are sometimes threatened
with being sued for defamation. Defamation law is one of a
number of laws regularly used against free speech in what
are called Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation
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or SLAPPs.7 These sorts of actions are a misuse of the legal
system by powerful groups to deter citizens from engaging
in otherwise ordinary activities such as protesting against a
real estate development. In the US, where SLAPPs were
first identified, many states have passed anti-SLAPP laws,
but in Australia there is no legal protection.8
The Australian government passed a law in 2014
making it a criminal offence for national security workers
to reveal information and for journalists to report it. So if a
worker contacts a journalist about corruption in a spy
agency, and the journalist writes a story about it, they can
go to prison for five or ten years.
To make things worse, the Australian government also
passed legislation requiring telecommunication companies
and Internet service providers to retain metadata for two
years. Metadata includes details about phone calls, including caller and receiver numbers and times when calls were
initiated and completed, but not what was said. This
information can be used to figure out who is calling who. If
a journalist publishes a story, police can obtain information
about everyone who called the journalist. This means the
identity of whistleblowers is potentially compromised.
The Australian government touts the country’s
whistleblower laws. Meanwhile, it retains or passes various
7 George W. Pring and Penelope Canan, SLAPPs: Getting Sued for
Speaking Out (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1996).
8 On SLAPPs in Australia, see Greg Ogle, Gagged: The Gunns 20
and Other Law Suits (Sydney: Envirobook, 2009); Brian Walters,
Slapping on the Writs: Defamation, Developers and Community
Activism (Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 2003).
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other laws — official secrets, defamation, national security,
metadata retention — that can easily be used against whistleblowers. This suggests that Australian whistleblower
laws give only the appearance of protection.
The problems go beyond Australia. In January 2020,
Mark Worth, executive director of Whistleblowing International and of the European Center for Whistleblower
Rights, sent an email inviting participation in their global
network of activists. The email started this way:
With the spread of new whistleblower laws being
passed in all regions — including the recently
approved EU Directive — more and more people are
expecting to be protected from retaliation if they report
crime, corruption and public health threats.
Unfortunately, as we very well know first-hand,
a vast majority of whistleblower laws and systems do
not adequately work in real-life cases. They essentially
serve as traps — enticing people to come forward with
inside information, but leaving them defenseless
against being fired, sued, prosecuted, threatened or
attacked.
Official channels: shortcomings
Based on my experience talking with whistleblowers and
reading studies of what happens to whistleblowers, I came
to a preliminary assessment of the shortcomings of official
channels. They:
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• usually focus on technicalities
• rely on experts
• are slow
• give only the appearance of solving problems
• seldom challenge those with the most power.
Official channels usually focus on technicalities. In
other words, they are procedural: they follow rules for
dealing with issues, and this means that much of their work
deals with technicalities. In many cases, the result is that the
central issues become peripheral. Many whistleblowers
most of all want justice to be done, but agencies instead
seek documentation about who said what and when, and
whether a particular regulation was followed.
Official channels rely on experts. Because they are
rule-bound, they depend on specialists in dealing with the
rules. In courts, this means lawyers. Because of the reliance
on experts, non-experts cannot easily understand, use or
effectively challenge the processes and decisions in official
channels.
Official channels are often slow. An agency may take
months or even years to address a complaint. Meanwhile,
the original problem remains unaddressed.
Official channels often give only the appearance of
justice, not the substance. Because of the credibility of
official channels, people think they provide solutions to
problems, but in many cases this may be only an illusion.
Official channels seldom work when they challenge
groups with a lot of power. They may work fine in other
circumstances.
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This catalogue of problems may make it sound like
official channels are totally useless, are fatally compromised or are staffed by incompetents. Not so. Most of the
staff in watchdog agencies and other bodies tasked with
dealing with problems are hard-working and sincere. Many
of them achieve extraordinary results in difficult circumstances. The problems with official channels are not primarily due to failures of people; they are predictable consequences of the way the whole system is set up.
It’s useful to take a step back and ask, “Why would
anyone expect official channels to work?” Whistleblower
laws are a case in point. A whistleblower can be thought of
as a person who speaks truth to power. In the most dramatic
instances, whistleblowers speak out about corruption that
implicates senior management. To speak of justice in such
cases is to expect that some junior figure in an organisation,
by shining the light on a problem, can bring down top
figures and fundamentally change operations. If heed were
taken of whistleblowers all over the place, it would be
revolutionary: systematic corruption would be challenged
and organisational hierarchies jeopardised. From everyday
observation, this rarely happens. Instead, the whistleblowers suffer, with their jobs and careers sacrificed, yet seldom
with much impact on power structures.
It is reasonable to expect that official channels can
operate satisfactorily when low-level operations and
personnel are affected, namely when the power structure is
not at stake. Official channels are least likely to be effective
when major systems and top-level figures are involved. The
trouble is that official channels seldom have sufficient
power to tackle the biggest problems. Therefore, when
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looking at the shortcomings of official channels, it is useful
to keep a focus on power differences. Without sufficient
power to bring about change, it is more likely that official
channels will give only the illusion of justice.9
Organisational power and corruption
The fundamental reason why whistleblower protection fails
so often is straightforward, even simple. However, it is
based on a perspective different from the usual one, and
therefore can be hard to appreciate. Here I present the
reason in simple terms, recognising that reality is complex.
To begin, it is necessary to accept that some people try
to do things that others see as wrong, such as cheating,
stealing, exploiting and even murdering. Some of these
people get caught when they are young and are punished.
Others, though, rise to high places.
For many practical purposes, most people are honest
most of the time. They might cheat a little, for example by
speeding while driving or when declaring their income for
tax purposes. Even if most people are honest most of the
time, that still means some people are not honest. For
example, people with antisocial personality disorder —
commonly called sociopaths or psychopaths — have little
empathy and look out only for themselves. Psychopaths
9 There is a connection here with the work of Murray Edelman —
Politics as Symbolic Action: Mass Arousal and Quiescence
(Chicago: Markham, 1971) and The Politics of Misinformation
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), among others —
who analyses how the symbolic environment, especially political
action, helps maintain elite power.
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have characteristics that are helpful for some worthwhile
purposes, but also can cause immense damage.10 Some rise
to positions of power. Only a few per cent of the population
are psychopaths, but that is enough to mean that some
behaviour is corrupt. To deal with social problems, it is
unwise to rely on the innate goodness of people.
There is also evidence that normal people can do
horrible things, such as hurting others. Being normal
psychologically is not a protection against doing harm.11
For example, most killers in genocides, such as Nazi killers
during the Holocaust, are psychologically normal — few of
them are psychopaths. What people will do, and what they
will let others do without intervening, depends greatly on
the circumstances. Only a few German men who were
drafted into killing squads asked not to participate, even
though there were few penalties for seeking to leave. When
evil behaviour is the norm, only a relatively small number
of people will try to stop it.
To this can be added a feature of human psychology
epitomised by a famous saying by Lord Acton: “Power
tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely.”
Acton’s aphorism has been confirmed by careful research

10 For contrasting approaches, see Paul Babiak and Robert D.
Hare, Snakes in Suits: When Psychopaths Go to Work (New York:
HarperCollins, 2006); Kevin Dutton, The Wisdom of Psychopaths:
Lessons in Life from Saints, Spies and Serial Killers (London:
Heinemann, 2012).
11 Steven James Bartlett, The Pathology of Man: A Study of
Human Evil (Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas, 2005).
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that shows exactly the sort of psychological processes that
operate when one person has power over another.12
In a small group of equals, the corrupting influence of
power is limited, though there still can be personal disputes
and attempts at dominance. The corruptions of power are
minimised in small groups that are voluntary and where
members have a common aim, for example amateur
musicians playing for their own enjoyment.
In large hierarchical organisations, for example
militaries, government departments and corporations, those
higher up have considerable power over those further down.
To this can be added other systems of power, including
male domination, ethnic domination and religious domination, with the result that an organisation can be a seething
interplay of systems of power. Within the organisation,
those seeking power are more likely to rise, and some of
them will have antisocial tendencies. All of them are
vulnerable to the corruptions of power.
In addition, large organisations are set up to limit
accountability of those at the top. Those at the top have the
most power within the organisation — that’s obvious
enough. Only when subordinates combine together do they
have a chance of bringing down those at the top. This
happens only rarely. Trade unions can be thought of as
12 Dacher Keltner, The Power Paradox: How We Gain and Lose
Influence (London: Penguin, 2017); David Kipnis, The
Powerholders (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976);
David Kipnis, Technology and Power (New York: SpringerVerlag, 1990); Ian Robertson, The Winner Effect: How Power
Affects Your Brain (London: Bloomsbury, 2012).
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groups of subordinates who band together. However,
unions usually are only concerned about wages and conditions, not addressing high-level corruption. Therefore, in
most cases accountability is only possible when there is an
equally powerful force acting outside the organisation, one
that targets corruption.
So here is the setting: in a large organisation, there is
almost bound to be bad behaviour, and sometimes there is
systematic corruption. Those at the top are especially prone
to abuse their power. The organisation, to remain stable in
the face of competition and threats from other organisations, is set up to protect those at the top and, even more
importantly, to maintain the system of hierarchy. It is therefore continually vulnerable to corruption.
In this scenario, a lone employee speaks out, saying
there is a problem. If the problem implicates those higher
up — either as perpetrators or as knowingly allowing the
problem to persist — then this lone employee has no
chance. What is involved is truth (about corruption) pitted
against an entrenched system of power. Truth hardly ever
wins in this scenario.
Next: bring in whistleblower protection. Grievance
procedures are introduced within the organisation and
external watchdogs are set up. Now imagine that the procedures and watchdogs actually made it possible for truth to
win over hierarchical power. This would mean that a single
employee could bring down an entire organisation, or at
least bring down a whole swathe of senior managers.
Empirically, this occurs only very rarely. Given that
bad behaviour and systemic corruption are commonplace,
where are the examples of major organisations that have
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been radically reformed solely on the basis of an employee
who spoke out? All the evidence is to the contrary: it is the
lone employee who loses out.
Consider the following examples.
• Massive corruption in military procurement
• Criminal action by pharmaceutical companies in
selling drugs known to be dangerous, falsifying data,
faking authorship of scientific papers
• Involvement of police in criminal activities
• Cover-up of paedophilia in churches
• Intentional killing of civilians during wars.
These are all examples of activities that break laws but
where for years or decades perpetrators were not brought to
justice. Those who challenged abuses were more likely to
suffer.
Even more difficult to challenge are institutionalised
injustices, in which unfairness is officially okay. The
easiest way to protect power and wealth is to promote laws
and processes that serve the interests of the powerful and
wealthy.
• Tax loopholes that benefit the wealthy
• Lack of enforcement of the rules of war
• Copyright and patent systems that mainly benefit
pharmaceutical companies, Hollywood producers,
software manufacturers and genetic engineering
companies
• Laws that exempt companies from social obligations
• Laws and legal traditions that treat white-collar crime
more leniently than petty crime by the poor.
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Only when the employee speaking truth has powerful allies
is there a chance of significant change. These powerful
allies might be other employees, supporters in another
major organisation, campaigning groups or members of the
public agitated by media coverage.
Let’s look at grievance procedures and watchdog
agencies. Do they operate like powerful allies or help
mobilise powerful allies? Usually not. Grievance procedures operate inside the organisation and are normally
confidential, minimising the possibility of mobilising
support. Watchdog agencies usually have limited powers
and operate without publicity, again minimising the possibility of mobilising support. It seems that these procedures
and agencies are set up in a way that ensures that they are
very unlikely to ever be a serious threat to organisational
hierarchies. That’s exactly what is observed in practice. In
most cases, they serve to keep challenges contained.
Strengthening the powers of watchdog agencies seems
like a good solution, and can sometimes be helpful to
whistleblowers and aid corruption prevention. But few of
the agencies see it as their role to mobilise constituencies
that can bring about significant change.
Why whistleblower protection is fundamentally flawed
Anthony Evans provides an insightful framework for
understanding whistleblowing and the failure of official
channels.13 Evans draws on a framework developed by
13 Anthony J. Evans, “Dealing with dissent: whistleblowing,
egalitarianism, and the republic of the firm,” Innovation: the
European Journal of Social Science Research, vol. 21, no. 3,
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anthropologist Mary Douglas using the concepts of grid and
group.
When people are subject to imposed regulations,
“grid” is high; when individuals can freely negotiate, grid
is low. Whistleblowing typically occurs in hierarchical
organisations, where people are subject to rules and a chain
of command. In Douglas’s terms, this is high grid, a place
where free discussion is difficult between those at different
levels in the hierarchy.
“Group” refers to commitment to others in a group.
Whistleblowers are usually people who have a strong
commitment to the organisation: they are “high group.” If
they had little commitment, they wouldn’t bother trying to
do anything about problems.
Here’s the situation: the power structure is based on
domination by those at the top over those below, rather than
being a community of equals. But what a whistleblower
does, when raising an issue of concern, is behave as if the
organisation is actually open to dialogue, as if it were an
egalitarian culture.
Whistleblowers may or may not believe in the chain of
command. The point is that by speaking out, they are
expecting an engagement that is more characteristic of an
equal relationship.

September 2008, pp. 267–279. For a summary of key ideas from
this article, see Anthony J. Evans, “Egalitarianism and the failure
of whistleblower protection,” The Whistle (newsletter of
Whistleblowers Australia), no. 57, January 2009, pp. 8–10,
http://www.bmartin.cc/dissent/contacts/au_wba/whistle200901.pdf.
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Those in command see the whistleblower as a traitor,
someone who has challenged the hierarchy. In fact, the very
fact of this challenge may be sufficient to trigger reprisals,
irrespective of what the whistleblower says, right or wrong.
Actually, the whistleblower has high commitment to
the organisation, just with a conception that is different
from those in command. As Evans puts it, “whistleblowers
are loyal to what they deem to be the principles of the
organisation, or indeed to the wider community with which
they identify.” There is a fundamental difference in
perspective between those at the top and the whistleblower
who is somewhere below.
Evans sees the challenge posed by the whistleblower
as the challenge posed by an expectation of a discussion
between equals — that’s implicit in the whistleblower’s
expectation that their concerns will be examined — that
confronts a system based on command and control. This, at
the root, is the challenge posed by egalitarianism to a
hierarchical system.
What is the solution? Official channels are the mechanism offered by the hierarchy. The idea is that someone in
power will address the problem. However, Evans argues,
this is fundamentally misconceived. Whistleblowing, in
asking for a focus on a concern, is an egalitarian assertion:
it is implicitly a request for looking at the information, at
the problem, rather than acquiescing to those with formal
authority.
Bringing in whistleblower laws, watchdog bodies and
courts means using hierarchical bodies to address a
challenge to hierarchy. They are bound to fail because the
whistleblower is expecting a form of dialogue, of engage-
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ment with the issues on a fair basis, and this expectation
cannot be satisfied by someone in power invoking more
rules.
The implication of Evans’ analysis is that whistleblower protection is a flawed approach because it does not
alter systems of unequal power. To really address the whistleblower’s concerns requires a change to a more egalitarian
system.
Myth system or operational code?
You’re walking along a downtown street, not at an intersection, and cross to the other side to get to a shop. In Australia,
legally, you’re supposed to cross only at an intersection,
when the “walk” light is on. But you decided it was safe
enough to cross. Besides, loads of people were doing the
same thing, and no one is ever charged with jaywalking
(crossing a road when there’s traffic). Or are they?
To understand what’s going on here, it’s useful to
apply some labels. The official rules — the law in this case
— can be called a myth system. The law says jaywalking is
illegal, but most of the time the law is not enforced. The law
on jaywalking is a type of myth or fiction.
What actually happens is that people routinely jaywalk
and are never charged or even warned. This can be called
the “operational code.” People know, from experience or
observation, that jaywalking is not penalised. That is the
way the law is applied in practice — by not being enforced.
If you know the code, namely non-enforcement, then you
know when you can jaywalk without penalty.
Of course, jaywalking might be dangerous or annoy
drivers. That’s a different set of issues, also part of the
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operational code. It’s unacceptable to stand in front of moving vehicles or to shout abuse at drivers. The operational
code doesn’t say anything goes, but rather prescribes
acceptable violations of the law.
A friend of mine in Brisbane was fined $50. His transgression? He was standing at a corner waiting for the
“walk” light to go on, and stepped out onto the street one
second beforehand. For a pensioner, $50 was a big
payment. Half a dozen other pedestrians were at the same
corner and stepped out before him, but they were younger
and faster and got away.
He was outraged and wrote a letter to the newspaper.
He knew the operational code, which was that pedestrians
are not fined for crossing early at a crosswalk. But he was
fined. It turned out that the police applied the law in a
technical fashion. They applied the rules of the myth
system, thereby raising money at the expense of a few
unlucky pedestrians.
You’re driving along a suburban street about 10km/h
above the speed limit. This is nothing special. Most other
drivers do the same. In fact, you become annoyed when the
driver ahead of you goes 5km/h less than the speed limit,
though this is quite legal.
The myth system is that people are supposed to obey
the law and transgressors are subject to penalties. The
operational code is that breaking the law just a little, when
no one is hurt, is okay. This helps explain some drivers’
outrage over speed cameras. They are a challenge to the
operational code, which is that driving safely is acceptable
even when laws are technically broken.
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These thoughts are inspired by a book by Michael
Reisman titled Folded Lies.14 Reisman applied the ideas of
the myth system and the operational code to US corruption
issues, especially bribery.
Folded Lies was published in 1979. I read it a few
years later and took some notes. The book is written in a
rather abstract style, yet filled with numerous examples
from US politics and administration.
Recently I came across my old notes on the book and
thought, “Hey, these ideas are relevant to whistleblowing,”
so I obtained a copy and read it again. Reisman didn’t talk
about whistleblowing but his ideas are directly relevant.
Here’s how he explains the myth system and operational
code at the beginning of his book:
Most people learn early that there are things they can
get away with; from the perspective of an observer,
some social “wrongs” are selectively permitted. An
observer may distinguish, in any social process, a myth
system that clearly expresses all the rules and prohibitions (the “rights” and “wrongs” of behavior expressed
without nuances and shadings), and an operational
code that tells “operators” when, by whom, and how
certain “wrong” things may be done. An operator is
someone who knows the code in his own social setting
— certain lawyers, some police officers, some businessmen, an agent, a kid at school. (p. 1)

14 W. Michael Reisman, Folded Lies: Bribery, Crusades, and
Reforms (New York: Free Press, 1979).
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In many organisations, the operational code allows things
to happen that an outsider would see as wrong or even
terrible. In some families, beatings of children are a routine
occurrence. In some churches, sexual abuse by clergy was
not penalised. In some businesses, siphoning off money for
personal use is accepted. In other businesses, dumping toxic
waste into public waterways is the norm.
In most of these examples, the operational code allows
insiders to do things that outsiders might condemn. The
outsiders are subscribers to the myth system. If they are
informed about the activities, they want them stopped.
In many cases — far from all — whistleblowers
endorse the myth system. They believe in honesty, fairness
and the rule of law. So when they encounter damaging and
dangerous activities, they want something done about them.
Those on the inside, participating in the activities, are
subscribers to the operational code. They can react with
fury when someone tries to invoke the myth system. After
all, the operational code is the way things are done. Anyone
who goes against this is a traitor.
Whistleblowers have a chance of making a difference
when outsiders widely endorse the myth system and
demand that something be done about abhorrent operational
codes. A good example is paedophilia, which over the years
has become increasingly stigmatised. As a result, paedophilia in churches became a massive scandal.
Another example is animal welfare, for which there is
a growing movement and public concern. As a result,
whistleblowers who expose ill treatment of animals, for
example in the live animal trade, can trigger public outrage.
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On the other hand, in areas where there is little public
awareness or concern about issues, the operational code can
continue with little disturbance. An example is cheating on
income tax. The myth is that everyone pays their fair share
of tax. The operational code for big businesses and wealthy
individuals is that tax dodges will be exploited to the hilt,
while governments are lobbied or pressured to maintain or
expand loopholes.
Now and then there are media exposés of large
companies that pay little or no tax, but these seem not to
create a groundswell of rage against big-company tax
evasion. One reason may be that tax avoidance is a national
pastime: minimising one’s own tax is seen as acceptable. In
other words, the operational code is that it is okay to avoid
tax as long as you can get away with it. There are so many
small cheaters that cheating is seen as normal.
Government regulatory bodies are supposed to ensure
laws are followed and that the public is protected from
unfair and dangerous activities. The myth is that these
watchdogs are doing their job well and keeping corruption
and abuse under control. In other words, you don’t need to
worry about injustice because the watchdogs are on guard.
In many cases, regulatory agencies become close to
the enterprises they are supposed to regulate, and become
lapdogs: they are toothless and called “captured bureaucracies.” Another way of understanding lapdogs is that they
have subscribed to an operational code of minimal intervention, cooperation with regulated organisations and facilitation of their activities. The public might believe there is
effective regulatory oversight, but this is a myth.
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Next consider whistleblower protection. The myth is
that whistleblower laws, and the agencies that are supposed
to implement them, actually work. The operational code is
that little will be done that disturbs organisational elites.
Organisations will not be seriously penalised, dismissed
whistleblowers will not be reinstated, and managers who
institute reprisals will not be punished. Reisman writes:
The function of the legislative exercise is not to affect
the pertinent behavior of the manifest target group, but
rather to reaffirm on the ideological level that component of the myth, to reassure peripheral constituent
groups of the continuing vigor of the myth, and
perhaps even to prohibit them from similar practices.
As elsewhere, the mere act of legislation functions as
catharsis and assures the rank and file that the government is doing what it should, namely, making laws.
(pp. 31–32)
Applied to whistleblowing, what Reisman is saying is that
whistleblower laws aren’t intended to affect the behaviour
of employers but rather to encourage popular belief that the
government is looking after whistleblowers. The aim is to
sustain the myth of whistleblower protection while allowing organisational operational codes to continue as usual.
Whistleblowers, perhaps more than most members of
the public, are subscribers to the myth system. They expect
that watchdog agencies will help them and they call for
better whistleblower protection. However, the most that
happens is governments come up with more rhetoric and
pass additional ineffective laws.
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To be effective, whistleblowers need to understand the
difference between the myth system and the operational
code. This isn’t always easy. The myth system is regularly
endorsed by leaders, within organisations and in the media.
So it is possible to hear heartfelt support for whistleblowers
and to think that they will actually be supported. The challenge is to identify the operational code that is relevant to
the situation, especially the code within an organisation.
There is even an operational code within organised crime.
It is the operational code, namely the set of beliefs and
practices that define what is expected and acceptable, that
determines the response to a whistleblower. In general, the
code within organisations is that whistleblowing isn’t
welcome.
This should be obvious. In Australia, governments say
they support whistleblowers, but they also maintain laws
that prohibit public servants speaking out, institute searches
for leakers, pass laws to criminalise whistleblowers and
journalists on national security matters, and do not enforce
whistleblower laws when employers take reprisals against
whistleblowers. To identify the operational code, look at
what people do and set aside what they say.
It is also valuable to understand the power of the myth
system, in particular when it can be used to challenge
wrongdoing. Within an organisation, it might be common
practice to cheat customers, avoid tax, dump chemicals and
appoint cronies. However, outside the organisation there
are two types of people who can help. Some of them are
subscribers to the myth system: they think it’s wrong to
cheat and cause damage, and they want something done
about it.
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The second group of helpers are ones who see an
opportunity to pursue their own interests by invoking the
myth system and triggering a crusade. Reisman says, “…
there may be a point where perception of discrepancy
between myth and operational code becomes so great that
part of the content of the myth system changes, belief in it
wanes, or crusades for reassertion of the myth burst forth.”
(p. 24)
A crusade sounds like it might make a difference. Let’s
protect whistleblowers! However, Reisman says crusades
are sound and fury, a lot of noise about fixing problems, but
never intended to change the basic way things operate.
In a crusade, politicians pass new laws, giving the
appearance that the problem is being addressed. However,
the laws don’t work in practice, and perhaps were never
intended to. There are several ways that new laws can be
neutered. Sometimes it is by narrow writing of the law. For
example, early Australian whistleblower laws gave no
protection to private-sector employees, or when workers
went to the media.
Another way to limit the impact of a new law is to give
inadequate funding to the watchdog body, or burden it with
onerous bureaucratic requirements. In Australia, anticorruption agencies are woefully underfunded. In New
South Wales, the Independent Commission Against Corruption can take up only a few percent of the matters
brought to its attention.15
Another technique is to staff regulatory bodies with
incompetent staff, or ones who are sympathetic to the
15 See appendix 3.
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industry being regulated. The Australian Securities and
Investments Commission, as revealed in the royal commission, was more attuned to the top management of banks
than to the revelations about corruption provided by
whistleblowers.16
In a crusade, a few individuals may be sacrificial
lambs. They are penalised, lightly or heavily, for doing
what hundreds of others did. To the public, it seems like
justice has been done. Sometimes, though, there are no
sacrificial lambs. In the global financial crisis, not a single
US banker went to prison or was even charged, except for
one who was actually a good guy.
What happens in a crusade is a symbolic endorsement
of the myth system. The myth in Australia is that whistleblowers are valued and protected. The song and dance
involved in passing new whistleblower protection laws
encourages the belief that, yes, whistleblowers actually are
valued and protected. Meanwhile, the operational code is
largely unchanged: power structures remain untouched and
routine practices stay the same. This means that it remains
just as risky as before to blow the whistle.
Reisman uses the term “reform” to refer to changes in
the operational code. For him, a reform means that people’s
behaviour changes. This can happen for various reasons.
Sometimes the popular pressure for change is so great that
elites decide they need to change their practices in order to
maintain their money and status.
Reisman says you sometimes can’t tell the difference
between a crusade and a reform until years or decades later.
16 See chapter 8.
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For example, a reform might be quietly reverted, and some
crusades eventually lead to changes in the operational code.
To my mind, defining things this way just makes them
confusing. Nonetheless, Reisman points to an important
issue. To see whether laws are making a difference, check
out the state of play down the track. Reisman:
Even if passed, “reform” legislation, that is, legislation
actually intended to change the operational code, is not
equivalent to reform, for it may be blunted by operators at lower levels of the bureaucracy who may prevent or indefinitely postpone the drafting of rules or
secondary, implementing legislation. If implementing
legislation is actually created, it may be starved to
death by an inadequate budget allocation or emasculated by the assignment of incompetents to positions
of responsibility. If the implementing machinery actually tries to be effective, it may be overwhelmed by
larger and superior legal teams who will mount adjudications protracted even beyond the wildest dreams
of the pettifoggers of Bleak House or conclude settlements that are translated into overhead costs and
passed on to consumers. (p. 114)
Whistleblower laws have been on the books in
Australia since the 1990s. Because it is exceedingly rare for
one of the laws to be invoked against an employer who has
taken reprisals against a whistleblower, this basically
means the laws are not being enforced — one of the typical
ways that crusade-inspired legislation is prevented from
having any impact on the operational code. So, in Reis-
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man’s terms, the entire exercise of passing Australian
whistleblower laws has been a giant façade. It reassures
members of the public that the government is looking after
whistleblowers, while ensuring that there is no substantial
change in actual practices within workplaces.17
An obsession with whistleblower protection
Governments in Australia regularly consider, introduce and
modify whistleblower laws, and this becomes newsworthy.
Because I have a profile in the area, journalists regularly
contact me asking about whistleblower protection. They
nearly always assume that what is needed for protection is
a law, or a better law. It takes a bit of explaining to convey
the idea that the laws often don’t provide protection and that
it might be more useful to help employees develop their
knowledge and skills to effectively challenge problems at
work. It is difficult to explain these points because they are
off the agenda, not part of the regular discourse.
Governments have set the framework for thinking
about workplace problems, so nearly everyone thinks
whistleblower protection is the way to go. Most journalists
go along with this framing of the issues. What then of
whistleblowers themselves? Many, perhaps most, of them
also look to protection from laws or from government
agencies. They believe in official channels.
This is not surprising. Vince Neary’s story is typical.
He reported problems to his boss, then to higher manage17 See also the work of Murray Edelman, noted earlier, especially
Politics as Symbolic Action: Mass Arousal and Quiescence
(Chicago: Markham, 1971).
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ment, then to outside agencies and authorities. He was
searching for someone — in particular, some person in
authority — who would intervene to address his concerns.
If there had been a whistleblower law in the state at the
time, he would have sought protection under it.
For most whistleblowers, their own cases loom large.
They have seen a problem and focus on having the problem
addressed. When they suffer reprisals, they become preoccupied with the unfairness of being targeted for trying to do
the right thing. Due to focusing on their own situation, few
of them spend time learning about the experience of other
whistleblowers or about the dynamics of bureaucratic
systems. In reporting problems to authorities, they display
their trust in the system, and when that trust is betrayed,
they seek other authorities. It is natural to hope that better
whistleblower laws are not just desirable but are the
solution. The contrary idea that such laws give only an
illusion of protection is hard to understand and accept,
because it means revising understandings of how the
system works. Often it is only through bitter experience that
whistleblowers start to question their assumptions about the
proper workings of organisations, laws and regulations.
Whistleblower laws thus are a prime example of the
shortcomings of official channels. They give the appearance of protection but, all too often, this is only an illusion.
More importantly, their existence — and failure — suggests
to people that what is needed is better official protection.
The assumption is that some white knight will come to the
rescue and, if this doesn’t happen, what is needed is more
power to white knights.
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Left off the agenda are other paths: skill development
by workers and citizens, changing organisational cultures,
and democratising workplaces. I will discuss these later in
a bit of detail. Suffice it to say here that they all involve
some change in the balance of power between employers
and managers. Workers who are more skilled at challenging
abuses on the job can use some of those skills to assert their
interests in other ways. Changing organisational cultures to
enable speaking out without reprisals — even to encourage
reporting of problems — threatens those at the top who
enjoy and benefit from exercising their power without constraints. Democratising workplaces, which involves giving
more power to the rank and file, increases the accountability
of managers and bosses.
Compared to these alternatives, whistleblower protection is a safe option, safe in the sense that it provides
relatively little threat to those at the top. The threat is even
less when the protection is an illusion, serving to convince
everyone that the problem is being addressed when actually
nothing much has changed.
Politicians like the approach of whistleblower protection because it keeps whistleblowers under control.
Managers are responsible for dealing with disclosures,
keeping the information inside the organisation. The risk of
mobilising outside constituencies — the media, workers’
movements, action groups — is limited. From the point of
politicians, the message to whistleblowers is this: “We will
make sure you’re protected. Don’t go running around with
your information, just follow the rules we set up and you’ll
be okay. We’ve got everything under control.”

50

Official Channels

For managers in organisations — government departments, militaries, corporations, churches, universities and
others — the thinking is much the same. Grievance procedures, internal ombudsmen, hot lines and other such mechanisms ensure that disclosures are made to management and
thereby kept in-house, away from other groups such as the
media, shareholders, competitors and citizen groups. A
disclosure contained inside the organisation is far less of a
danger than one made to outside constituencies. The
message to whistleblowers is exactly the same as the one
provided by politicians: “We will make sure you’re
protected. Don’t go running around with your information,
just follow the rules we set up and you’ll be okay. We’ve
got everything under control.”
The mass media can be very useful in publicising
whistleblower cases. Indeed, they are often the most
powerful allies a whistleblower can have. However, when
it comes to what to do to help whistleblowers, the mass
media largely follow the cues of government and managers
and emphasise whistleblower protection.
What then about the general public? Few people have
direct experience of whistleblowing; few know whistleblowers as family members or close friends. Therefore,
members of the public are also likely to follow the cues of
mass media reporting. Some may hear about whistleblower
procedures at their workplace.
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Belief in a just world
There is also something deeper at play. Many people
believe the world is just.18 They believe this even though
there is plenty of evidence of both individual and systematic
injustice. Examples include people sent to jail who are later
exonerated, bullying at school and in workplaces, organised
crime and genocide. So how can a person’s belief in a just
world survive exposure to such injustices? One way is to
ignore uncomfortable information. Another is to blame the
victim. If someone is impoverished or homeless, it must be
their fault. If a woman is assaulted, it must be her fault.
Belief in a just world can be all-encompassing but for
practical purposes is most salient in arenas close to a
person’s life, for example when seeing a beggar on the
street or knowing the next-door neighbour has an out-ofcontrol gambling habit. This belief is highly relevant to
whistleblowers.
It is plausible that whistleblowers are especially prone
to believe the world is just — or at least the part of the world
they inhabit. When they decide to speak out, they often
assume that managers will respond reasonably to their
concerns, investigate them and then, if needed, address any
problem. In other words, whistleblowers who report their
concerns through the proper channels assume that these
18 See for example Melvin J. Lerner, The Belief in a Just World:
A Fundamental Delusion (New York: Plenum, 1980); Leo
Montada and Melvin J. Lerner, eds., Responses to Victimizations
and Belief in a Just World (New York: Plenum, 1998); Michael
Ross and Dale T. Miller, eds., The Justice Motive in Everyday Life
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
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channels will do what they are supposed to do. Problems
will be fixed. Justice will be done.
When this doesn’t happen, it can be a terrible shock to
the system. Instead of the problem being fixed, instead the
whistleblower is seen as the problem, and reprisals begin.
For those who believe the world is just, this is a fundamental challenge to their way of understanding the world. With
their own eyes they saw corruption or unfairness at work
but, instead of this being fixed, instead they are targeted
with reprisals.
Some whistleblowers start believing what others say
about them. When they are accused of being poor workers,
of being vindictive or unreliable, they take this to heart.
When they are accused of being crazy, they start believing
it. This may have been especially common before whistleblowing received so much media attention. Jean Lennane,
a psychiatrist, worked for the New South Wales Health
Department. In the late 1980s, she spoke out about lack of
funding for psychiatric services and, as a result, lost her job.
Being a psychiatrist, she was able to set up a private
practice. After Whistleblowers Australia was set up, she
became president in 1993.
In those days, many bosses said whistleblowers were
insane and sent them to psychiatrists, and some of them
ended up in Jean’s consulting office. After hearing their
stories, she would tell them, “You’re not insane. You’re a
whistleblower!”
For someone who believes the world is just, suffering
reprisals for blowing the whistle is especially disturbing.
There are two injustices that are hard to deny. One is the
problem at work, about which nothing is done. The other is
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the reprisals inflicted on yours truly, who only tried to do
the right thing.
Fred Alford wrote a penetrating study of whistleblowers, giving a deep insight into their existential angst.
Psychologically, their worlds were turned upside down. Not
only was their understanding of the world shredded, but
they themselves become the victim. For many, the psychological impact is just as shattering as the loss of income, a
job or even a career.19
For these sorts of whistleblowers, it is attractive to
believe in white knights. Somewhere there is a valiant
defender of truth and justice who will provide vindication
for the beleaguered whistleblower and slay the wrongdoers.
As described earlier, many whistleblowers go from agency
to agency, presenting their case in gory detail, hoping that
someone who knows and cares will act on their behalf.
Another approach used by some individuals seeking
justice is the broadcast message: a plea for help to ten,
twenty or more recipients. Decades ago, before the Internet,
these pleas arrived by post, sometimes large envelopes with
many pages of enclosures. These days, the plea is usually
sent via email, containing a long message, one or more
attachments, and sometimes a lengthy email exchange. The
recipients typically include watchdog agencies (such as
ombudsmen), politicians, journalists — and sometimes
office bearers in Whistleblowers Australia. The sender
imagines that at least some of the recipients are just waiting
to rectify an injustice and will spend however much time
19 C. Fred Alford, Whistleblowers: Broken Lives and Organizational Power (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001).
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and effort are needed to get to the bottom of the story. In
other words, the sender believes in the existence of justice
warriors who will save the day.
For those on the receiving end, it is easy to delete the
email. Watchdog agencies can accept only those complaints
fitting their brief, and they have only a limited capacity to
address all the matters that come their way. Politicians are
overwhelmed by requests of all kinds, and their staff have
no time to try to get to the bottom of a lengthy and
complicated matter. Journalists also have no time to address
every issue brought to their attention. They prioritise what
can be turned into a story: long, complicated and obscure
messages, sent to all and sundry, hardly ever qualify.
Then there are those of us in Whistleblowers Australia.
We don’t act on behalf of whistleblowers, but instead only
provide information, advice and contacts. For those searching for a white knight who will deliver justice, we are not
what they are after, because we turn around and say,
“Here’s what you need to do.” Those who believe in a just
world seldom welcome the suggestion that there’s no one
who will provide salvation.
In summary, there is a widespread assumption that the
solution to the problems faced by whistleblowers is protection by laws, regulations and authorities. This assumption
is manifest in governments passing laws and companies
setting up procedures, and in journalists and academics
focusing their attention on laws and procedures. It so
happens that whistleblower protection is an approach that
provides little threat to established hierarchies in all major
organisations. This is because the protection provided to
whistleblowers is supposed to be provided by authorities,
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while little is done to empower the rank and file. Another
reason for putting trust in whistleblower protection is a
belief that the world is just. If there is wrongdoing at a
workplace and an employee is penalised for speaking out
about it, the solution is assumed to be to find or set up some
process or agency that will provide justice. The possibility
that many systems are unfair and that transgressors go
unpunished is unpalatable.
Linked to the focus on whistleblower protection is a
lack of effort and initiative on other approaches, including
changing the culture of organisations, encouraging workers
to develop knowledge and skills to deal with problems, and
collective action. It is to these options that I now turn.
Changing organisational culture
From the point of view of whistleblowers, the ideal is
working in an organisation in which there is no need for
protection, because speaking out about issues is the norm.
In a hospital, for example, it is common for problems to be
covered up because those involved might be blamed and
punished. A much different approach is for reporting of
problems — including mistakes and mishaps — to become
routine and not subject to reprisals. When this sort of
approach is implemented, more errors are reported, because
previously most were covered up, but outcomes are better.
This is because recognising problems without blaming
enables action to fix the causes of problems.20
20 For an accessible account, see Matthew Syed, Black Box
Thinking: Marginal Gains and the Secrets of High Performance
(London: John Murray, 2015).
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Another approach to improving organisations is called
appreciative inquiry. Instead of focusing on problems and
trying to fix them, workers are encouraged to identify what
things are being done well and what enables them to be
done well, and to strengthen the enabling factors. A key part
of appreciative inquiry is involvement of the entire
workforce in the process of inquiry and change. There are
many inspiring stories of this approach bringing about
better workplaces and improved performance.21
These options sound wonderful and they make sense.
So why don’t all organisations set up no-blame monitoring
systems or institute a process of appreciative inquiry? There
are many reasons. One of them is the hierarchical structure
of most large organisations. As noted earlier, power tends
to corrupt. When top managers have lots of power, and
when economic and political inequality in society is
extreme, corruption is a constant risk.
When organisations are pitted against each other, top
managers see success in competition as more important
than ensuring a supportive culture internally. For companies in the marketplace, success can mean a larger market
share and higher profits. For churches, success can mean
21 See for example David L. Cooperrider, Diana Whitney and
Jacqueline M. Stavros, Appreciative Inquiry Handbook
(Brunswick, OH: Crown Custom; San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler,
2005); Sue Annis Hammond, The Thin Book of Appreciative
Inquiry (Plano, TX: Thin Book Publishing, n.d., c. 1998); Jane
Magruder Watkins and Bernard J. Mohr, Appreciative Inquiry:
Change at the Speed of Imagination (San Francisco: JosseyBass/Pfeiffer, 2001).
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more members and more donations. For universities,
success can mean more students and higher status.
However, you might think that eliminating corruption
would make an organisation more successful. True, at least
in the long term. But in the short term, acknowledging
corruption has costs to reputation. Church leaders didn’t
want outsiders to know about paedophile clergy because
this would damage the church’s reputation. And as soon as
organisation leaders tolerate corruption, they are implicated
in it and are likely to resist taking action.
There is also an in-group dynamic. Members of the
organisation are seen as family or as team members, to be
supported without question. Breaking ranks and exposing
internal shortcomings is to be disloyal.
Putting all these factors together, the result is that
changing organisational cultures is very difficult. That
should be obvious simply by looking at the history of major
scandals, by looking at surveys showing the prevalence of
bullying, and by looking at the persistence of toxic organisational cultures.
This is true despite evidence that greater worker
participation improves productivity.22 Imagine that salary
differentials were quite small, or even that managers were
paid less than subordinates. This could be justified on the
grounds that the jobs of subordinates are less fulfilling, so
they deserve more money to compensate for lower satisfaction. Or imagine that everyone automatically receives a
22 A classic treatment is Seymour Melman, Decision-making and
Productivity (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958).
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wage, enough to live on, whether they work or not.23 This
would enable workers to leave without drastic sacrifices:
they would be in a much stronger position to resist toxic
organisational cultures. And they could speak out more
easily.
Skill development
Imagine that all the workers in an organisation were given
a booklet on how to be effective in challenging corruption,
abusive behaviours and dangers to the public. Rather than
saying “report the problem to your boss or to a designated
authority,” instead it would tell about the possibility of
reprisals, how to figure out whether managers are implicated, the need to collect information to document the
problems, how to communicate with journalists and how to
contact others with experience in dealing with problems.
This and other information is already available, but is little
known to employees.
Imagine that an employer (government or private
enterprise) commissions production of a leaflet on “How to
be an effective leaker.” It would describe the ways to collect
and distribute documents and other information to journalists, action groups and other recipients without being
tracked or identified. It would give examples of effective

23 A cogent articulation of this option is Rutger Bregman, Utopia
for Realists (London: Bloomsbury, 2017).
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leakers and of leaks gone wrong. It would give advice on
when it is ethical to leak.24
In Australia, this is a fanciful idea, because employers
don’t want workers to leak. Instead, they want to control
access to inside information, including information about
shady practices. When there’s a leak, employers often
institute a search for the leaker, sending the signal to all
workers that they will be penalised severely if caught.
Employers would not need to worry about leaks if they
always operated ethically and listened receptively to reports
from workers about possible problems.
If the organisational culture is less than ideal, what can
be done? Without relying on authorities to fix problems,
workers can develop their skills to become more effective
change agents. The aim is not necessarily to become a better
whistleblower — that can help — but more to get better at
figuring out how to make things better and go about doing
this. There are actually quite a few skills involved, and it’s
useful to discuss them under several categories. Here, I
outline six important skills. These are based on observations of what successful organisational activists have been
able to do and on what unsuccessful ones seem to have
lacked. Others might come up with a somewhat different
list of skills. That’s fine. The key point is that skills are
important.

24 My own treatment: “Leaking: practicalities and politics,” The
Whistle, no. 81, January 2015, pp. 13–18,
https://www.bmartin.cc/dissent/documents/rr/leaking.pdf.
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Collecting information
If there is a problem in the organisation, it is essential to
obtain lots of documentation about it. This is one of the first
recommendations in many whistleblower advice manuals.
Documentation is essential because managers and agencies
will try to explain away, discredit or destroy threatening
information.
Chris worked for a government department. She
noticed that contracts were being given to a friend of a
senior manager named Jones, even though other contractors
provided better value for money. So she reported the issue
to her immediate superior, Helen, who said “Don’t you
worry, because we always award contracts to the best
offer.” Then the reprisals began, subtle at first.
If you see a problem and report it, you might be lucky
if everyone agrees it’s a problem and starts addressing it.
However, in a whistleblower scenario, reporting the
problem is a trigger for cover-up and reprisals. Therefore,
if there’s a chance that your reporting of a problem will be
unwelcome, it’s vital to obtain as much high-quality
information as possible. What this involves depends a lot
on the problem, the organisation and the circumstances.
Imagine that you hear the boss say that surplus
chemicals can just be put down the drain (a known health
hazard). Twenty co-workers were there, so you think you
can report this to the regulator. But the boss denies saying
it, or says it was a joke, and all the co-workers say the same.
You need a signed statement from several co-workers, or
an audio recording, or a video of chemicals being put down
the drain. Actually, you probably need much more than this,
enough to convince even the most sceptical person, and
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enough to stand up in the face of blatant lying, falsification
of records and imaginative methods of explaining things
away.
Collecting information thus is not a simple matter. It
involves knowing what sorts of information are most
revealing and credible, anticipating attempts to evade
responsibility, and being prepared for efforts to destroy or
falsify data.
There are several functions for the information you
collect. One is to make sure there’s actually a problem. It’s
not smart to make allegations when a bit more digging
would reveal you’ve been mistaken. A second function is
to provide solid documentation, sufficient to stand up
against denials and destruction of evidence. A third function is to convince others that there is a problem that needs
to be addressed, one serious enough to warrant attention.
Collecting information may sound obvious and
straightforward, but actually it seldom is, because it is often
undertaken in circumstances when others are trying to hide
or obfuscate the information. Auditors are trained to study
accounts, but seldom are they trained about collecting
evidence of fraud when the fraud is being committed by
those who employ them.
Chris still had her job. Luckily the reprisals were not
serious. She kept a low profile and gathered lots more
information about the contracting issue.
Preparing accounts
My phone rings. It’s about whistleblowing. The caller, who
says her name is Chris, wants to tell me her story. I say go
ahead. It turns out to be a very long story — a blow-by-
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blow account of events that started several years ago. That’s
fine if I have the time, but often I don’t, and in any case
when I’m listening I’m trying to figure out what it’s all
about. I’d like to know answers to some basic questions:
what was the problem, what did you do that triggered
reprisals, who’s trying to shut you down, why, and who else
have you approached about this? What I’d like most is a
short summary so I can orient myself and be in a position
to offer advice.
An email arrives. It’s someone who’d like me to help.
The attachment is a 100-page transcript from a court
hearing. Yes, I can read the transcript and try to identify the
key issues. It would be so much easier if the correspondent
listed them in dot-point form.
At some watchdog agencies, parcels regularly arrive.
Thick parcels, with hundreds of pages of documents. Or
they might contain a CD or DVD with hundreds of files.
To be effective in getting advice and winning support,
it’s very useful to be able to tell your story or to explain the
issues in a short understandable form. Writing is usually the
best: a one-page or one-screen summary providing the
context (who, what, where, when, why and how), what
happened, why it’s important and what needs to be done.
After months or years in a highly stressful situation,
it’s not easy to write a short summary. To do so requires
skill in thinking and in expressing thoughts. Practice helps.
So does getting feedback.
I advised Chris to write a short summary of the issues.
She sent me a draft and I offered some comments. After a
few more drafts, she was ready to show it to others. Which
ones?
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Understanding organisations
I ask Chris which of her co-workers she thinks are involved
in the scam: Obviously the senior manager Jones. What
about her immediate superior Helen: is she just covering for
Jones, or is she getting some additional personal benefit?
Chris isn’t sure.
I ask her whether there are any co-workers she can
trust. Are there any experienced and wise individuals who
are honest and who can give her advice? She doesn’t really
know.
Chris needs a better understanding of the place where
she works: who has power, how people are connected, who
works hard and is honest, who has favours to offer, who has
insight and experience. She needs to get an idea of what
happened to others who spoke out about problems. She
needs to know some of the history of the organisation, and
how workers reacted to events. With this sort of understanding, she is in a much better position to decide on a course
of action. She will know who is worth consulting, who to
trust (maybe no one!) and how people will respond to
actions she might take.
She would also benefit by understanding how other
organisations operate, for example contractors, other
government departments, and outside bodies that might
take action.
Many workers just do their jobs, and many take pride
in doing good work. They read policy announcements, meet
other workers and hear some gossip. This is fine for doing
what is required but may not be enough when there is a
serious problem that needs addressing. It’s valuable to learn
how the organisation works: the distribution of power, the
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relationships between key individuals, the incentives and
disincentives in play. It’s valuable to learn some of the
history of the organisation, because the same patterns of
individual and collective behaviour are likely to recur.
One of the best ways to learn about organisational
dynamics is to talk with experienced and wise members of
the organisation. They might still be working there, or they
might be at another job or be retired. If you can track down
a few such individuals, you can learn from their stories. If
you decide you can trust them, you can ask for advice.
This is what Chris did. She found a senior figure,
Alice, who was just about to retire. Alice enjoyed telling
stories of what had happened in the department in previous
years and decades. Chris asked whether anyone had ever
tried to address favouritism in awarding contracts. Alice
realised Chris needed guidance.
Building support
Alice told Chris about the only time there had been a major
challenge to favouritism, one that made a difference. A core
group of four workers started the process. They planned a
campaign that involved talking to others to collect more
information, raising awareness about the problems, using
social media to circulate relevant articles and comments,
and organising a petition and a delegation to management.
It wasn’t easy but it did have an effect. Chris realised she
needed to convince some co-workers to join her, and for the
group to develop a strategy and follow through on it.
To bring about change in an organisation, it is far more
effective when many people are involved. This includes
overcoming corruption, abuses, bad policies, toxic culture
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and many other challenges. A single worker who speaks out
is vulnerable and usually has a low prospect of fostering
change. Half a dozen workers acting together are less
vulnerable to reprisals and have better prospects of success.
Half the workforce acting together has even better odds.
Thus, when a single worker wants to promote change,
it is useful to acquire and practise skills in building support.
This means winning over others by talking to them, writing
accounts, organising meetings, identifying and fostering
others’ skills, and thinking strategically.
Few workers have such skills. Labour organisers often
do — and they are not necessarily union officials. Community organisers have these sorts of skills.25 To develop skills
in building support, it’s worthwhile to identify organisers,
observe what they do and, if possible, adopt them as
mentors.
Some people have organising skills through their nonwork activities, for example in political parties, sporting
clubs, religious groups and fund-raising efforts. These skills
need to be adapted to the challenge of addressing problems,
which is often difficult.

25 The classic reference is Saul D. Alinsky, Rules for Radicals
(New York: Random House, 1971). See also Chris Crass, Towards
Collective Liberation: Anti-racist Organizing, Feminist Praxis,
and Movement Building Strategy (Oakland, CA: PM Press, 2013);
Robert Fisher, Let the People Decide: Neighborhood Organizing
in America (Boston: Twayne, 1984); Eric Mann, Playbook for
Progressives: 16 Qualities of the Successful Organizer (Boston:
Beacon Press, 2011).
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Using media
Chris found a couple of others willing to work with her on
a campaign. Their initial efforts helped raise consciousness,
but their talks with other workers made them realise that
bringing about change would probably require bringing
some outside pressure to bear. Knowing that management
was highly sensitive to the organisation’s reputation for
fairness, they thought about contacting a journalist. But
who? And how could they trust a journalist to be helpful?
If they found a suitable journalist, what should they say?
Being able to use various types of media effectively is
a valuable skill for anyone trying to address a problem.
Media here refers to virtually any method of communication. Let’s say you’ve written an account of the problem,
and you want to recruit some allies to help deal with it. You
can talk to co-workers face-to-face, which is fine. You can
also invite them to read your account and then discuss it.
You can send the account to individuals via email or texts.
You can post it on Facebook or some other platforms. You
can set up a website and post it there, along with supporting
documents. You can send it to journalists.
For using media effectively, it is important to understand how they operate. If you want journalists to take an
interest, you need to know how media companies operate,
what sorts of stories are run, what sorts of examples and
information should be highlighted, when to make contact,
and so forth. If you decide to leak information anonymously, you need to know about leaking platforms, how to
maintain your anonymity, how to check what’s happening,
and how to lie convincingly about not being the leaker —
if anyone asks.
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For using the media effectively, it is useful to learn
from experienced practitioners, whether this is Twitter or
television. As much as possible, it’s valuable to practise. If
you are going to use Facebook, it’s worth having experience
with making posts, publicising them, dealing with
complaints and perhaps dealing with threats to sue.
Mass media are not necessarily the solution. Some
whistleblowers are frustrated because journalists are not
interested or because their revealing website is ignored. Or
there might be stories published but the problem is not
fixed. Part of understanding media is knowing their limitations and knowing when some other approach is more
promising.
Understanding yourself
Chris had to decide whether to be the one to talk to a
journalist. This was a sensitive issue. She wanted to remain
anonymous, but the journalist would probably want to
include a personal profile — of Chris — because a story
with a human interest is much more engaging.
Chris wasn’t sure about this. How would she fare if
she became the centre of attention? What about reprisals?
Could she cope with losing her job? What was really most
important for her?
To be effective in challenging problems, selfunderstanding is crucial. You need to know what drives
you. Is it anger? Self-esteem? Altruistic concern for others?
You need to know your own skills, namely what you
can do and what you can’t do. You need to understand your
capacity to win support through personal connections.
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You need to understand how tenacious you are, and
what you’re willing and likely to do in a crisis. You need to
understand how you’ll cope with reprisals, including when
co-workers shun you, when you are denounced in media
stories, when you receive abusive messages, when you lose
you job and when your relationships come under stress.
Part of self-understanding is knowing your own
personality. Are you calm, conscientious, agreeable,
curious and open to new ideas? These all sound good, but it
depends on the circumstances. If you’re excessively conscientious, you may be obsessive. If you’re too agreeable, you
may not be able to stand up against the crowd. The point is
that self-understanding is vital.
I’ve outlined six important skills for anyone who wants to
take action about problems in an organisation. Many of
them are relevant for activism more widely. With these
skills, workers can make better judgements about identifying problems and knowing how best to go about addressing
them. What is striking about the discourse about whistleblowing is how seldom anyone talks about skill development as an approach to dealing with organisational
dysfunctions. It’s as if the people in charge — in organisations, in government — were saying, “You don’t need to do
anything except speak out. We’ll protect you.” One of the
key skills needed by workers is to see that this implicit
message is misleading and dangerous.
Collective action
In India, many public officials expect to receive a bribe in
order to do their job, for example to process an application.
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Campaigners in the anti-corruption group 5th Pillar decided
to produce a consciousness-raising piece of currency, the
zero-rupee note.26 It looks like a regular piece of currency
except that it says zero rupees and gives the source as 5th
Pillar, which is well known. The group produced large
numbers of these notes in five languages and encouraged
people to hand over one of the notes in situations where a
bribe is expected or demanded, for example at weddings
and birthdays.
As the name indicates, the zero-rupee note has no legal
standing or value but it does convey a powerful message:
“I’m not going to pay a bribe.” In nearly all cases reported
to 5th Pillar, officials given one of the notes backed off from
their demands for bribes. As the campaign developed, some
services displayed zero-currency notes. This is a convenient
way of saying that they do not expect or accept bribes. A
reputation for honesty can be a powerful magnet.
The zero-rupee note is just one of 5th Pillar’s initiatives. Others include training citizens in making right-toinformation requests that help to hold public officials to
account, running education workshops for young people,
organising protest actions, holding information stalls, and
cooperating with social service camps in rural areas. The
aim is to broaden involvement in efforts against corruption.

26 5th Pillar, Zero Rupee Note,
https://5thpillar.org/programs/zero-rupee-note/, described as “a
non-violent weapon of non-cooperation against corruption.”
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This example is taken from Shaazka Beyerle’s revealing book Curtailing Corruption.27 She studied anti-corruption campaigns in 15 different countries. The message from
these campaigns is that collective action by local communities can be a powerful force against corruption, including
in places where it is dangerous to oppose authorities. When
the authorities are deeply implicated in corrupt activities, it
is obviously futile to appeal to them to fix the problem.
Collective action has several advantages. It harnesses
the skills of many different individuals, draws on a variety
of personal networks, reduces the danger of reprisals
against individuals, and provides inspiration for others.
When collective action becomes widespread and persistent,
it is possible to talk of a social movement, in the tradition
of anti-slavery, feminist, peace and environmental movements. If corruption is a serious problem, then the best
antidote is an anti-corruption movement.
All of Beyerle’s examples are from so-called developing countries, not the affluent industrial or post-industrial
societies of Europe, North America, Japan and Australasia.
This does not mean corruption has been eliminated from
these societies.
Beyerle’s treatment is especially important because
there are remarkably few investigations into the power of
collective action against corruption. Similarly, there is

27 Shaazka Beyerle, Curtailing Corruption: People Power for
Accountability and Justice (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2014).
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relatively little research into workers’ challenges to
oppressive organisational structures.28
Whistleblowers, as isolated individuals, may be
powerless to bring about change, but can do a lot more by
providing assistance to action groups. Imagine a worker
inside an energy company or a government immigration
department who wants to challenge some of the paths being
taken. Speaking out internally is one option, likely to be
disastrous. More effective would be providing information
and advice to an outside action group, doing this separately
from the job. Depending on the circumstances, the dissident
worker might remain anonymous, providing information
and advice via encrypted emails or phone calls.
The combination of insiders and outsiders can be
powerful. The insiders have information about what’s
happening and about responses to campaigning efforts. The
outsiders have much more freedom to act because they are
relatively safe from reprisals.

28 There is a body of writing about workers’ control. See for
example Immanuel Ness and Dario Azzellini, eds., Ours to Master
and to Own: Workers’ Control from the Commune to the Present
(Chicago, IL: Haymarket Books, 2011). Sociologist Deena
Weinstein likened bureaucracies to authoritarian states, lacking
freedom of speech and the right to form opposition movements.
See Bureaucratic Opposition: Challenging Abuses at the
Workplace (New York: Pergamon, 1979). For a nonviolent-action
perspective, see Brian Martin, Sharon Callaghan and Chris Fox,
Challenging Bureaucratic Elites (Wollongong: Schweik Action
Wollongong, 1997).
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There are at least four approaches for dealing with social
problems, in particular problems in organisations, the ones
most commonly encountered by whistleblowers. The first
is whistleblower protection, the second is changing the
culture of organisations, the third is skill development and
the fourth is collective action. Looking at these options, it
is striking that there is so much emphasis on whistleblower
protection when it has such a poor track record. This is no
surprise, because whistleblower protection keeps workers
in a more dependent position. Changing the culture means
empowering subordinates, and so do skill development and
collective action. The message is there should be less
reliance on official channels and more emphasis and effort
towards empowering workers and citizens.
Four options for challenging problems compared on a
number of dimensions
Official
channels

Culture
change

Skill devel- Collective
opment
action

Justice
provided
by

Official
bodies
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Individual
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After
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Learning
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Official
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Conclusion
A worker reports some problem, something that serves the
public interest. Instead of the problem being addressed, the
worker becomes the target of reprisals, ranging from the
silent treatment through to dismissal and blacklisting. Then
the worker goes to some watchdog agency or other official
avenue for relief: a hotline service, an ombudsman, an
auditor-general, an anti-corruption agency, a politician or a
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court. Sometimes the official channel is helpful, but often
not. Even the most supportive agencies and processes are
slow and focus on technicalities. Furthermore, even when
they provide some redress for the whistleblower, hardly
ever do they bring about change in the organisation. The
drawn-out processes of whistleblower protection thus serve
to prevent or delay action against the problem while giving
the appearance that justice is being served.
Meanwhile, many dedicated members of watchdog
agencies do what they can to help badly treated workers.
But the capacity of agencies to fix deep-seated problems is
limited. They are constrained by limited budgets, narrow
mandates, and bureaucratic rules for processing complaints.
Whistleblower protection is the mantra from managers
and politicians, taken up by journalists and hence many
members of the public. The experience of whistleblowers,
if noticed at all, is seen as evidence that protection needs to
be improved. Decades of legislative attempts to improve
protection have not been enough to make a great deal of
difference, but rather than this triggering a rethink, past
shortcomings are seen as the rationale for continuing down
the same path.
A few critics have pointed out that there are inherent
flaws in the idea of whistleblower protection. Corruption
and other serious problems in organisations often implicate
higher management as either perpetrators or as knowing
bystanders. So it seems idealistic to imagine that higher
management should be the ones to provide protection to
those exposing wrongdoing.
More deeply, it is implausible that any mechanism can
allow a lowly worker, with only truth on their side, to
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overcome powerful managers. If such a mechanism became
available, it would overturn organisational hierarchies. The
whole system, which involves power inequalities and the
associated corruptions of power, would be in jeopardy. This
suggests that whistleblower protection, while good when it
occasionally works, is inherently flawed.
The persistence of the belief in whistleblower protection might make sense if it were the only option. But it isn’t.
Other options are changing organisational cultures, developing the skills of workers, and engaging in collective
action. Each of these involves more power for workers.
However, few managers want subordinates to be so
empowered that they could challenge management. No
wonder whistleblower protection is the desired option.
The lesson from the experience of whistleblowers is to
be sceptical of official channels, and instead look to worker
empowerment as a more promising path.
Appendix: Perpetual complainers
I have described how some whistleblowers seek justice
through official channels. They might start by reporting a
matter to their boss, then the boss’s boss, then the board of
management, then outside bodies such as ombudsmen,
auditors-general, anti-corruption agencies, administrative
appeals tribunals, politicians and courts. Whistleblowers
who go to one agency after another, never being satisfied,
see the shortcomings of official channels.
However, there’s another sort of individual who does
exactly the same thing, an individual who has a personal
grievance that hardly anyone else thinks has merit. It might
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be an imagined or mistaken issue. Some people are
delusional.
Then there are those who start off with a real issue, but
make it into something much too large. They are cheated
out of a few hundred dollars and pursue the matter through
successive courts.
How do you tell the difference between those who
have raised a serious public-interest matter and those who
are pursuing a mistaken or pointless quest? Aren’t official
channels the ones entrusted to figure this out?
There’s no easy answer to this. One option is an
independent assessment by someone with no stake in the
matter. Even better would be multiple independent assessments. After the company Enron went bankrupt in 2001, the
consensus by informed observers was that top management
was corrupt, so Enron vice president Sharron Watkins, who
had reported problems to the CEO, was seen as a whistleblower. The judgement about whistleblowing is made
through a collective process involving many observers.
Sometimes this judgement is a long time coming. For
example, in some cases involving paedophilia by members
of the clergy, complaints were made at the time but nothing
was done until decades later, after major exposés.
In contrast to these prominent examples are some
other types. A homeowner is distressed when his neighbour
builds a wall half a metre higher than allowed by regulations. The homeowner puts in a complaint about his view
being affected, but it is dismissed. (The application of the
regulation is a matter of interpretation.) He then goes to an
appeal body, which also dismisses his complaint. He next
takes the matter to a court, and then to a higher court.
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Eventually, frustrated by his lack of success, he puts a giant
sign in his front yard accusing his neighbour of fraud and
accusing higher authorities of being corrupt. After further
escalation, the homeowner is arrested and charged with
various offences. Decades later, the standoff continues.
(This example is modelled on an actual case.)
An undergraduate student is dissatisfied with a mark
on an assignment, requests reconsideration, and is given a
slight increase. Then he questions his mark for participation
in class and is unhappy with the result. Next he appeals his
overall mark in the class and, when unsuccessful, appeals
the decision based on process. Having an occasional
success isn’t enough. He claims that he was misinformed
about the requirements for a major and demands that an
exemption be granted. Eventually, despite a poor record, he
is allowed to graduate. Even that is not enough: he puts in
an appeal to be recorded as having a double major. The
academics involved with his case say that if he had put as
much energy into his studies as into his complaints, he
would have graduated sooner with higher marks. (This
example is also modelled on an actual case.)
I’ve talked with quite a few individuals who are have
tried every possible avenue of appeal. In a few cases, they
had been unsuccessful in court and tried to appeal, but the
upper court refused to hear their case. From the materials
they sent me, I could understand why: their matters were
fairly minor. The next step: they were going to appeal to the
Privy Council in London, something possible in principle
because the British monarch officially remains the monarch
of Australia. I always advised against appealing to the Privy
Council because it was a waste of time. What would the
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Privy Council care about some trivial legal dispute in
Australia?
I’ve talked with a few individuals who make sweeping
allegations about corruption, naming individuals and
expecting me, and others, to follow up. All I can do is refer
them to my book Whistleblowing and perhaps make a few
specific suggestions. Then I start receiving copies of emails
sent to dozens of politicians, watchdog agencies and
journalists — and the emails keep coming, for weeks or
months. Sometimes, receiving numerous emails every day
from the same individual, I set up a filter to send their
emails to trash.
Imagine looking at these sorts of issues from the point
of view of high-level authorities. A senior government
bureaucrat is not going to want to bother about a neighbour
dispute over an alleged variation in a building. A senior
academic administrator will not want to be involved in a
student complaint concerning a few marks on an assignment. Politicians, ombudsman’s offices and journalists will
not want to deal with repetitive emails making numerous
allegations about corruption.
Perpetual complainers can take up much of the time of
senior officials. These complainers are one reason why
official channels are set up with complicated sets of rules.
Unless there are ways to screen out or deal with these sorts
of complainants, agencies would be overwhelmed by
relatively few such individuals, leaving insufficient time
and energy to deal with more important matters.
What is the most useful way to understand the
relationship between official channels and perpetual
complainers? The usual thinking is that these individuals
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are responsible for a monumental waste of time and
resources. They demand attention and divert efforts from
more worthy issues.
Another perspective is that official channels are
especially needed to deal with perpetual complainers, who
are in a desperate but fruitless search for acknowledgement
and support. Official channels provide a convenient way of
justifying a judgement that the quest has little or no
substance. If official channels were not available, these
complainers would just bother others, and there would be
no end to the process. Because official channels are slow
and highly procedural, they are ideal for slowing down
these complainers and trapping them in technicalities,
dampening their ardour.
Yet another perspective is that official channels, by
promising to provide justice, give false hope to perpetual
complainers. If there were no appeal bodies, in other words
no one to whom to make a formal complaint, these individuals would have to address the issue closer to its source, or
perhaps simply to set it aside and get on with their lives.
This is speculative, because no studies have been done
comparing communities with and without particular
agencies to see whether complainants are more or less
active. A plausible hypothesis is that complaints will
increase or expand to fill the capacity of grievance systems.
Could it be that perpetual complainers are intentionally gumming up the system so genuine complainants do
not obtain a fair hearing? Although perpetual complainers
may be deluded about their cases and their chances of
success, there is little evidence that they are cynical manipulators of the system.
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Undoubtedly, perpetual complainers need help. When
their complaints are serious and legitimate — according to
some impartial judgement — they should be listened to.
When their complaints are imaginary, misguided or grossly
inflated, they need help to find more productive ways to
spend their time and energy. This might involve counselling, friends, a supportive community or other outlets for
their efforts. It might involve different rules and systems so
that their initial grievance does not arise. It’s hard to
propose a comprehensive solution because there are so
many different sources of complaint. What is apparent is
that the system is not working for them.

3
Sexual harassment
From 1976 to 1985, I worked in Canberra at the Australian
National University and became interested in dysfunctions
of academic life. One of them was academic exploitation:
some academics take credit for the work of their students,
subordinates and wives. I read about a few cases and heard
various stories.
One day in 1982 I was talking about this with a friend,
Robert, who said he knew someone I should talk to. I did,
on 2 December, the one and only time I met her. I’ll call her
Kay and call the professor she worked for Hill. Here is an
edited extract from my notes taken immediately afterwards.
Kay did four years of an undergraduate degree, then
worked as a research assistant with Professor Hill in
1981. He was over 60 years old. She had a 25-hour per
week job funded by a research grant. Hill has had these
grants for years, but has never completed the work
intended, and some of Kay’s work was on one of these
old projects. Hill expected her to read up on subjects
on which he knew little, and write up summaries so he
could understand the subject (or she could just tell him
what he needed to know). Apparently he hasn’t
published anything for years. In many cases Hill is far
out of date, but doesn’t want to read the material that
is current, preferring Kay to do this for him. In other
cases, he wants to present a particular perspective, and
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asks Kay to find a quote to illustrate it. The same thing
has happened to previous research assistants, but there
is no indication that any of them will receive any
scholarly credit.
All of this is tied up with sexual dynamics. The
three-hour discussions are partly to enable Hill to
enjoy female company, and he asks about her private
life, in particular when she was breaking up with her
husband, a masters student in the same department.
Hill would tell Kay things her husband had said, and
tell her husband things she had said, and actively
encouraged their separation. Eventually he reached the
stage of overt sexual proposition. At this, Kay decided
to leave, but returned so she could receive all her
salary and bonus in lieu of sick leave.
Hill had also used physical affection, for example
hugging. This has been going on for years with
students and research assistants. In one case a women
became pregnant by Hill. He paid half the expenses for
an abortion in Sydney (and naturally did not go along),
and broke up the relationship afterward. Kay didn’t
really consider doing anything about this, since
undergraduates have complained for years, and nothing has been done. Hill has been removed from the
headship of the department, but continues his activities
nevertheless. Women would have to speak out to
expose him, and this might mean losing any opportunity for doing a PhD in the department. In other
cases, although their careers are destroyed or diverted,
they do not want to do anything to hurt Hill. It is clear
that in this case academic exploitation is closely tied
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up with sexual exploitation: the academic power
hierarchy is congruent with male dominance.
Kay’s story was about academic exploitation, but it
included a sexual element. Was this sexual harassment?
Sexual harassment refers to actions such as leering,
offensive jokes, unwanted touching, requests for sexual
favours, rape and sexual assault. To determine whether
behaviour should be called harassment, it is helpful to
consider three criteria: sexual harassment is unwelcome,
unsolicited and unreciprocated.
Sexual harassment has been occurring for a very long
time, but for centuries it didn’t have a name. Many women
simply put up with it and tried to avoid it, but there was no
organised campaign to oppose it. Then in the 1970s came
the second wave of the feminist movement. Women were
empowered and spoke out about harassment at work. In the
US, laws were passed. Sexual harassment was treated as a
form of discrimination.
Most cases involve men harassing women, but there
are other combinations: women by women, men by men
and men by women.
The effects of sexual harassment can be severe. It can
cause stress and drive some targets out of jobs and careers.
Harassment has been especially bad in male-dominated
occupations such as truck driving and engineering.
At a university, there are several situations of concern:
interactions between teachers and students, between staff
and staff, and between students and students. Sexual
harassment occurs in all these relationships, but with somewhat different patterns and dynamics. Power differences
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are often involved. For example, a teacher might seek
sexual favours from a student in exchange for giving a good
mark (“an A for a lay”). In student residential colleges,
harassment of female students can sometimes be a sort of
game.
One common problem occurs when an individual is
not told that their behaviour is unwelcome. If a man touches
a woman, it is often a sincere gesture of support or affection. If a woman finds the touch unwelcome, she needs to
communicate this to the man, but sometimes doesn’t
because it is awkward. A department head might lean over
the secretary while she sits at the desk. She finds this
uncomfortable but is reluctant to say anything because he is
her boss. She might think that her body language — recoiling at his touch or presence — is enough, but some men do
not notice.
The aims of campaigning about sexual harassment
have included helping targets gain understanding and skills
to resist and complain and helping potential perpetrators
become more aware of the implications of their behaviours.
There is a lot more that can be said about sexual
harassment. My focus here is on what I learned about
official channels.
After becoming more aware of the issue, in 1983 I
joined with another member of my trade union, the Health
& Research Employees Association, to undertake a survey
of sexual harassment among members. Peta and I obtained
quite a bit of information and wrote a report. In retrospect,
the survey was as much about raising awareness as obtaining information.
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The next year, 1984, sexual harassment came onto the
official university agenda. There were two main orientations to sexual harassment, exemplified by the two committees that were set up. One committee, mainly composed of
academics and administrative staff, worked on developing
procedures for handling formal complaints. Later, it set up
the panel that would receive and handle complaints, and
arranged for training of the panel members. This committee
was oriented to formal procedures. Its task was not easy. It
needed to provide redress for harassment but also to provide
procedural fairness for those complained about. The
committee procedures required all parties to maintain
confidentiality. There had to be an appeal process for
complainants and defendants alike.
The other committee, of which I was a member,
focused on raising awareness. This small committee was
mainly composed of undergraduate students, research
students and me as a research associate. We produced and
distributed a leaflet, produced posters, wrote articles and
gave talks.
The two committees epitomised the contrast between
official channels and what might be called publicity or
education. The official-channel committee was heavy with
procedures and protections. It was based on the assumption
that, once the committee’s existence was known, complaints would come to it, and addressing these complaints
would operate to address the problem.
The publicity committee was based on the assumption
that the most effective way to address sexual harassment
was through heightened awareness and skills throughout
the university community. We set out to explain what
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sexual harassment is, how it affects targets, and the
importance of opposing it. Our message was designed for
everyone, including targets, perpetrators and bystanders.
We wanted staff and students to be aware of the problem,
for potential harassers to rethink their behaviours and for
possible targets to be aware of ways to respond.
Ideally, these two committees would be complementary. The publicity committee would stimulate awareness
with the result that complaints would be made to the official
committee. The existence of the official committee would
provide reassurance that something could be done about
harassment.
It’s not possible for me to provide any data about the
effectiveness of these two committees. Members of each
were each doing what we thought was important and no one
was monitoring the impact of our efforts. So far as I know,
the official committee received no formal complaints.
For many, perhaps most, targets of sexual harassment,
making a formal complaint is highly stressful. Often,
episodes of harassment are embarrassing. After all, they
involve sexual matters, often humiliating. It is a further
humiliation to describe these to others. Another obstacle is
that many targets blame themselves, even though this might
be illogical.
The reluctance of women to report sexual harassment
is well known in the case of rape. Surveys show that a
relatively small percentage of rape victims make reports to
police, and fewer still end up testifying in court. When they
do, and are vigorously cross-examined, they can find this as
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distressing as the rape itself. The court experiences of rape
survivors are sometimes called the “second assault.”1
For same-sex harassment, there is an additional complication. Because of the stigma attached to homosexuality
in some circles, making a formal report about harassment
can reveal an aspect of one’s behaviour that would otherwise remain private.
For men harassed by women, there is the risk that
others will not take their concerns seriously. A common
joke by men dismissive of sexual harassment is to say, “I
wouldn’t mind being harassed by her!”
Some instances of sexual harassment are quite serious,
enough to justify going to the police and making charges of
rape or assault. However, behaviours in the majority of
cases, such as continued touching, requests for sex, stalking
and sending of pornographic materials, are not recognised
as criminal. In quite a few cases, to make a formal
complaint escalates the issue, potentially breaking down
relationships at work or in the classroom and sometimes
making things worse for the complainant. This is another
1 Elizabeth A. Stanko, Intimate Intrusions: Women’s Experience
of Male Violence (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985).
Angela K. Lawson and Louise F. Fitzgerald, “Sexual harassment
litigation: a road to re-victimization or recovery?” Psychological
Injury and Law, vol. 9, 2016, pp. 216–229, reported that
“participation and persistence in litigation played a consistent role
in psychological outcomes across time, over and above the impact
of harassment itself. However, litigation did not appear to be the
cause of psychological outcomes as posttraumatic stress disorder
(PTSD) symptomatology, in particular, was the result of the
original harassment experience.”
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reason why so many women and men report being sexually
harassed but not making a formal complaint.
Another problem with formal procedures occurs when
there is a malicious complaint. Quite a few men fear being
charged with harassment even though they haven’t done
anything. This occasionally happens, though it is rare. More
common is that a misjudged touch or proposition is taken
badly, a complaint is made, leading to a process that for the
alleged perpetrator is lengthy, arduous and damaging. The
formal process turns what might have been sorted out fairly
easily into an something excruciating for all involved.
A deeper problem is that nearly all sexual harassment
laws and procedures are complaint-based. If a complaint is
made, it is addressed. If there is no complaint, nothing is
done. There is no mechanism to ensure or even to determine
whether the complaints are about the most serious problems. Ironically, targets who are more confident, articulate
and secure in their positions are in a stronger position to
make formal complaints. Those who are the most vulnerable and powerless may be left without support.
The two approaches
To have two approaches to sexual harassment — procedures for handling formal complaints, and publicity and
education — seems sensible. I was always comfortable with
there being these two approaches, which complement each
other. Publicity and education can help discourage harassment and empower possible targets, while formal procedures can deal with serious cases and apply penalties for
serious or persistent harassment. In addition, the formal
procedures offer an important symbolic statement about the
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institution’s stand against harassment. My own personal
preference was with the publicity side, whereas others
ensured the operation and credibility of the procedures.
What I have observed over the years, though, is a
continual emphasis on formal procedures and a neglect of
efforts for individual empowerment and cultural change.
The implication, for me, is that more effort needs to be put
into prevention compared to procedures for dealing with
harassment complaints.
Because of my involvement with sexual harassment, I
started reading whatever I could find about it. There are
numerous books and articles about the extent of the
problem, patterns within occupations and the driving forces
behind harassment. When it came to what to do about it, I
found numerous treatments of laws and procedures. In
contrast, there was hardly anything written giving advice to
women about the practicalities of dealing with harassment.
The assumption in most writing is that they should make
complaints so that someone else can address the problem.
Here, I look at several books that, in contrast, focus on noninstitutional responses.
Georgie Porgie
Sue Wise and Liz Stanley are feminist researchers. They
wrote a book titled Georgie Porgie: Sexual Harassment in
Everyday Life, published in 1987.2 This was very early in
2 Sue Wise and Liz Stanley, Georgie Porgie: Sexual Harassment
in Everyday Life (London: Pandora Press, 1987). Today’s feminists
might disagree with Wise and Stanley in some regards. My focus
here is on insights their work provides about official channels.
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the emergence of sexual harassment as a social issue. The
title of the book refers to a nursery rhyme, reproduced on
the front cover:
Georgie Porgie, pudding and pie —
kissed the girls and made them cry.
When the boys came out to play
Georgie Porgie ran away.
Wise and Stanley’s basic theme is that sexual harassment
has been defined in a narrow fashion that leaves out the
harassment of women in everyday life: the Georgie Porgies
of the world. They use an approach called the “archaeology
of knowledge” to show how sexual harassment has been
packaged in a framework that assumes it can be understood
as occurring in workplaces, that it involves blatant acts, and
that it can be addressed through formal mechanisms. They
use anecdotes and arguments to focus attention on more
commonplace forms of harassment and some practical
ways of responding to them.
One of their examples is Peter Sutcliffe, known as the
Yorkshire Ripper, a feared killer of 13 women in the period
1975–1980. The attention given to the Yorkshire Ripper
made it seem like sexual violence was something done only
by unusual men. Wise and Stanley think this is misleading,
drawing attention away from violence by ordinary men.
They assert that sexual harassment is part of everyday life
and that many women are doing effective things to oppose
it. Salvation does not come through male-designed formal
procedures.
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… we think that women’s experiences show very
clearly indeed that actual sexual harassments range
from the most subtle and ambiguous male behaviours
to the most obscenely and grossly grotesque; and that
“sexual harassment” is simply what women’s experience of life within sexist society consists of for much
of the time.3
Wise and Stanley describe four strategies against
sexual harassment. The first is active resistance. In 1974, in
California, Inez Garcia was raped by a man while another
held her down. Soon after, she went after the men, shooting
and killing one while failing to find the other. (She was
initially convicted of murder and went to prison, then
released on appeal.) Wise and Stanley use this example to
illustrate that sexual violence can sometimes cause anger
and trigger a fierce response.
A second strategy is “joining in,” which in practice
means giving the harasser a dose of his own medicine. Here
is one of Wise and Stanley’s examples:
Some women employees at a jewellery factory had
many problems with a “randy Romeo” businessman
who dished out “smutty jokes and nudge-and-wink
suggestions” all the time accompanied by much grabbing and grappling and pinching. They felt they had to
put up with him because he commissioned a lot of
business from the factory and was therefore important
to their continued employment. But “revenge came at
3 Ibid., p. 62.
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an office party” to which he brought his wife. What
the women did was spend the whole evening giving
him a taste of his own medicine; they made lewd
suggestions which were accompanied by many “sexy
nudges,” and all very carefully arranged so as to be
almost within earshot of his wife. Their plan to get
their own back and teach him a lesson worked, and
“now he is a changed fella” when he appears at the
factory.4
A third strategy is to ignore the harassment. This can be for
any of several reasons, including being too busy with other
priorities to bother, being too tired to respond, and deciding
it is a safer option. When women are routinely harassed, it
requires effort to oppose inappropriate behaviours. Furthermore, after a while this becomes boring. When someone
tells a sexist joke, sometimes it is easier just to let it pass
without comment.
Wise and Stanley tell of a time when one of them —
they didn’t say which one — was on a train late at night.
She was the only passenger in a carriage until a large man
came in, sat near her and put his dirty feet on a seat. In other
circumstances she might have challenged him but given his
behaviour and demeanour she decided that ignoring his
actions was the safer course of action.
Wise and Stanley’s fourth option is avoiding situations
when harassment is likely. This includes not going into
pubs where most patrons are drunken men, avoiding certain
streets at night, and not drawing attention to yourself with
4 Ibid., pp. 167–168.
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provocative clothes. This option might seem like capitulation to male domination. After all, feminists often assert
that they should be able to go where they want and wear
what they want without having to put up with men’s
unwanted attention. Wise and Stanley, however, argue that
often it is better for women to avoid risk. They tell about an
Iranian friend who found voluntarily wearing the veil was
liberating because it freed her of unwanted advances from
men.
Wise and Stanley give an example from their own
experience. They tell how they do not wear skirts, in part
because trousers are more “practical and comfortable” and
can make a statement in some circumstances, like a
courtroom.
But at least as important in this positive selection of
clothing is the certain knowledge that a show of calf,
no matter how fat and hairy, would lead to hassles
from intruding male eyes and comments. Jeans and
dungarees are therefore a deliberate avoidance strategy and constrainment, as well as being a positive
choice.5
In summary, Wise and Stanley offer four strategies for
dealing with sexual harassment in everyday life: actively
resisting it; engaging in mimicking behaviour to neutralise
it; ignoring it; and avoiding it. They see sexual harassment
as a day-to-day occurrence for many women, and therefore
routine methods are needed for dealing with it. Having
5 Ibid., p. 172.
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formal procedures for reporting harassment seems nice but
is ineffectual or too burdensome for the bulk of harassment.
The preoccupation with official channels can make people
think the problem has been addressed and divert attention
from skills and strategies that are far more relevant to
women’s experiences.
Back Off!
In 1993, Martha Langelan’s book Back Off! was published.6
I had been reading many books about the problem of sexual
harassment and about laws and procedures. In contrast,
Back Off! was a systematic presentation of techniques by
which women can oppose harassers. Langelan describes
verbal techniques of dealing with sexist and demeaning
comments and collective action by women to confront
harassers. This approach seems to have a lot of promise: it
gives women skills and confidence to directly deal with
harassment.
A key insight of the book is that simply standing up
and opposing harassment is remarkably effective. Group
actions are immensely powerful. Collecting information
and building support are important.
Langelan describes three types of harassment, and in
all cases harassment is a learned behaviour. Sexually
predatory harassment involves seeking sexual thrills via
the act of harassing, as in the cases of flashing and making
obscene phone calls. Harassment via social media could fit
into this category. Some predatory harassment involves
6 Martha J. Langelan, Back Off! How to Confront and Stop Sexual
Harassment and Harassers (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993).
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sexual extortion, rape-testing (seeing whether a woman is
likely to resist) and rape.
Male-dominance harassment is an attempt to bolster
the harasser’s male ego. Men seek to “assert their status,
and reassure themselves that their masculinity commands
respect and female deference.” Langelan says that, according to women’s accounts, this is the most common sort of
sexual harassment.
Strategic harassment serves to maintain male privilege in jobs, facilities and elsewhere. “At the crudest level,
the goal of strategic harassment is to force women out, to
protect a male monopoly on jobs, educational opportunities,
community facilities, or other economic resources.”7 When
a woman is successful in a male domain, for example as an
electrician or a surgeon, she may be targeted with rumours
or have her work sabotaged.
According to Langelan, most harassers don’t try to
justify their actions. They just say it’s all in fun and doesn’t
do any harm. Only a few aim to humiliate their targets.
Langelan traces the roots of resistance to sexual
harassment to nonviolent action by women, the US civil
rights movement and feminist self-defence theory. She
presents four criteria from feminist self-defence theory that
can be used to judge action against sexual harassment.
1. Does it reflect the realities of women’s lives?
2. Does it build on and expand women’s abilities?
3. Does it widen women’s mobility?
4. Does it aid independence?
7 Ibid., p. 45 and pp. 48–49.
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These criteria can readily be applied to different responses
to harassment. Avoidance and passivity don’t satisfy the
criteria, but confrontation does. Confrontation is an immediate response. It can surprise the attacker and creates
maximum effects for minimum effort. Langelan: “a woman
who confronts a harasser goes directly to the abusive
behavior, labels it publicly as harassment, and holds the
man accountable for it.”8 Langelan’s guidelines for selfdefence are to be alert, trust your instincts, be prepared, rely
on your own resources, yell for support and help others
under attack.
With this framework, Langelan proceeds to describe
success stories of resistance to harassment, including
resistance by children, in the workplace, in male-dominated
jobs, against construction workers and other public harassers, ministers, academics, landlords, muggers and
rapists. She gives examples of men who are allies against
harassment. She also tells of cases in which groups of
women confronted harassers, to powerful effect.
In one example, Martina arrived at a bus stop and
witnessed the only man there making comments to each of
the women waiting, directly in their faces, such as “Hey,
mama, hey, bitch, you look good, I sure would like to lick
you …” She asked the women whether he was harassing
them. After they nodded yes, she confidently stood up to
him, looking him in the face, and said “Stop harassing
women! I don’t like it, no woman likes it! You get out of
here!” Countering his responses, she kept up, ever more
8 Ibid., p. 106.
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strongly, until he moved away. The women at the stop
cheered, and the group had a short intense discussion of
self-defence against harassment.9
Langelan gives dozens of examples, showing how it is
possible to have an immediate and effective response to
harassment. To undertake this sort of response is not easy
or automatic. It greatly helps to have been through selfdefence training, just like Martina had.
Why managers neglect skill development
Why has Langelan’s approach been neglected by organisation managers when they are developing and implementing
policy? There are several explanations. One is a reluctance
to put the onus on women to address harassment, because
this seems like blaming the victim. It seems like blaming
women who are raped for dressing provocatively, drinking
alcohol and walking outside late at night. Feminists for
many years have argued that, rather than blaming women,
men must take responsibility for their behaviour.
This is a good point. However, Langelan’s approach is
not about blaming women but giving them confidence and
skills. Yes, it encourages them to take responsibility. The
implication of the admonition against blaming the victim is
to provide training for men too, especially in how to
intervene against harassment and support targets.
Another reason why organisation managers have not
adopted Langelan’s approach is that it takes power out of
the hands of managers. By being expected to rely on laws
9 Ibid., pp. 230–231.
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and procedures, women need to put their trust in the
institution.
Laws and regulations provide protection for the organisation. If harassment occurs and a women goes to court
demanding compensation, she can sue individual harassers
or the organisation for having a hostile environment. Managers can defend charges against the organisation by saying
that policies have been adopted, procedures are in place,
notices have been sent to all staff and posters placed on
walls. By setting up policies and procedures, the organisation reduces its legal liability. It doesn’t matter all that much
whether the policies and procedures are actually effective.
What counts is that they are visible in case there is a
complaint.
Grievance procedures are an easy option for administrators because they do not entail cultural change in the
organisation. However, cultural change may be just what is
needed. Carol Bacchi says that sexual harassment procedures tend to place the responsibility for using them on
individuals, yet when they do use them, they are put in the
position of being attackers, of being complainers. Meanwhile, there seems to be no need to address cultures that
facilitate harassment. Bacchi argues that some ways to
change the usual masculine university culture and the
power imbalance that underpins sexual harassment include
increasing women’s representation throughout university
structures, improving child care facilities, including more
content on women in curricula, addressing the way peda-
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gogic practices affect women, and reviewing staff-student
relationships.10
Heterophobia
Daphne Patai, in her book Heterophobia, provides a very
different perspective on sexual harassment.11 As she
describes in the preface, she is no stranger to harassment,
having been pawed and propositioned on numerous occasions, in several countries. While not dismissing these
experiences as trivial, she nevertheless didn’t let them
affect her too much.
Patai identifies as a feminist, but as a feminist who
challenges what she calls the “sexual harassment industry.”
She decries the way that the institutionalisation of sexual
harassment rules has turned many organisations into notouch zones where men (and some women) are terrified that
an incorrect gesture or word might bring down the wrath of
some offended woman, leading to investigations and penalties. She also decries the impact of the alarm about sexual
harassment on many woman, making them think of themselves as victims or “survivors,” as if they had survived a
major disaster.
10 Carol Bacchi, “Changing the sexual harassment agenda,” in
Moira Gatens and Alison Mackinnon, eds., Gender and Institutions: Welfare, Work and Citizenship (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1998), pp. 75–89. See also Carol Lee Bacchi,
Women, Policy and Politics: The Construction of Policy Problems
(London: Sage, 1999), chapter 10.
11 Daphne Patai, Heterophobia: Sexual Harassment and the
Future of Feminism (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998).
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Patai is aware that rape and sexual assault are major
problems. Her concern is with forms of harassment not
deemed criminal and the way that procedures for dealing
with harassment have become tools in power struggles. Her
argument is that the sexual harassment industry has been
turned into an operation that is anti-male and antiheterosexual, hence the title of her book, Heterophobia.
Her main focus is on university campuses, where she
sees these dynamics in starkest form. Most of her examples
are from the US and may not be relevant elsewhere. Some
of the examples are revealing. A non-criminal matter
between two individuals becomes, after complaint procedures are invoked, a major issue, sometimes leading to drastic consequences for the alleged harasser, most commonly
a man. Patai raises the issue of false allegations of sexual
harassment, something she says is seldom addressed in
feminist writings on the topic.
Patai’s perspective is open to question, of course.
Here, I don’t propose to try to sort through the arguments
pro and con, but only to comment on the implications of
Patai’s views for understanding the role of official
channels.
What Patai calls the sexual harassment industry is
essentially the institutionalisation of the official-channel
response to a social problem. Patai points to an important
issue that is seldom mentioned in other accounts: that
formal processes can have damaging impacts. One impact
is that relationships between people in organisations, and
beyond, are continually on edge because of the risk of being
accused of harassment. Another is escalation of minor
incidents into major issues. Then there is the encourage-
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ment for women to think of themselves as victims or
survivors rather than as powerful. Yet another impact is that
feminism is discredited because of the excesses of the
sexual harassment industry.
Even without agreeing with all of Patai’s arguments,
it’s possible to recognise that official channels can have
damaging impacts. These need to be taken into account.
More importantly, it’s worth looking into alternatives.
The Revolution Starts at Home
Consider this story. In a small town in Oklahoma, a highly
conservative US state, there is a factory. Most of the
workers are immigrant women without good English, and
many of them are undocumented.
Their problem is sexual harassment, assault and rape
by local men. The women fear going to the police because
they may be deported. Furthermore, many members of the
local community are racist, so the prospects for sympathy
are limited. This is a situation in which the official channels
won’t work, and their likely failure is apparent to all.
This situation comes to the notice of a social justice
group, MataHari. A young trainee in the group documents
the problem and takes the issue to a meeting of representatives of several national advocacy organisations. After
explaining the issues, the trainee and her ally are horrified
that the discussion turns to how to organise the workers for
better pay. The national organisations are so oriented to
pushing for equal pay that they cannot focus on the more
pressing issue of sexual assault.
In this case, there was the failure of a different sort of
official channel: higher-level advocacy organisations. In
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some cases, such organisations have their own agendas and
are not responsive to issues with which they have limited
experience.
This story is one of many in the book The Revolution
Starts at Home: Confronting Intimate Violence within
Activist Communities. It is an edited collection of accounts
of US activists dealing with abuse, exploitation and
violence within their own ranks, and of groups developing
their own ways of handling problems.12
Another case described in the book involved a couple.
The man was a prominent figure in an ethnic community in
the US. In the midst of a dispute between the couple, their
son called the police. The wife, with poor English, was
unable to clearly explain her position. The husband, a suave
and articulate operator, blamed events on his wife, who was
taken away in handcuffs. She would have been almost
totally helpless except for a support network mobilised to
provide legal and personal assistance, through court cases
about assault (the charges against her were dismissed) and
custody of the children (she lost).
When a group of women organise a feminist collective, it is typically designed to provide support for members, for example to address discrimination, exploitation
and harassment. But what should members do when these
same problems occur inside the group, for example when
one member is abusive, manipulative and violent with
12 Ching-In Chen, Jai Dulani and Leah Lakshmi PiepznaSamarasinha, eds., The Revolution Starts at Home: Confronting
Intimate Violence within Activist Communities, 2nd edition (Chico,
CA: AK Press, 2016).
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partners? They all know that reporting problems to the
police or other agencies is unlikely to be effective. Furthermore, being committed to feminism, they are worried that
speaking out about internal problems may hurt the cause.
This situation has led some groups to seek other ways of
responding.
Within activist communities, marginalised and stigmatised groups — including women, queers, transsexuals,
immigrants, ethnic minorities, sex workers, people with
disabilities, and Native Americans — are especially vulnerable to abuse, yet cannot reliably turn to authorities for help,
because the authorities (especially police) are unsympathetic and may take action against the complainant. Furthermore, when the abusers are part of the same community,
reporting them to the police may lead to arrest or deportation of the abusers — yet they too have suffered in their
circumstances. In this situation, targets of violence (called
here survivors) have to develop their own methods of
coping. An important method is collective support and
action, helping survivors and occasionally dealing with
perpetrators.
However, this isn’t easy, not least because intimate
violence committed by activist comrades is covered up: “…
domestic and sexual violence is a prevalent cancer, weakening, limiting, and threatening to destroy our social justice
movements. We know anecdotally that when it becomes
known that intimate violence has been perpetrated by our
activist comrades and committed within our activist
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communities, silence, denial, and organizational and
community self-protection often rise to the forefront.”13
The movement against violence within US activist
communities has been influenced by anti-prison activists.
There is an enormous prison population in the US, the highest in the world per capita, and there is a prison-abolition
movement that challenges what is called the prisonindustrial complex. This abolition movement encourages a
view that activist and marginalised communities are under
threat from authorities, and therefore should not be relying
on official systems to address their internal problems.
The keys to activist communities doing this are
awareness of problems and collective support for survivors.
The challenge is enormous. Although official channels —
including police, courts and large NGOs — are often
ineffective or part of the problem, they have established
procedures and people experienced in using them. Some
activist networks set up their own processes for dealing
with intimate violence, using principles of restorative
justice. Yet, as described in some of the accounts in The
Revolution Starts at Home, activist alternatives are not
necessarily effective or reliable. Just because you’re not
using a flawed official system doesn’t mean everything is
rosy.
The inspirational aspect is that there is hope in collective action, and some important successes. That is more
than occurred before, when intimate violence within activ13 Meiver De la Cruz and Carol Gomez, “Ending oppression:
building solidarity. Creating community solutions”, in Chen et al.,
pp. 24–55, at p. 27.
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ist communities was covered up or, when reported to
authorities, the cause of damage.
One of the implications of the accounts in the book is
that neither official channels nor alternative processes are a
full solution. The deeper problems are the inequalities,
exploitation and systemic oppression in the wider society.
Looking specifically at sexual abuse, there is no fundamental solution while social institutions based on systems of
domination remain dominant.
Harassment online
With the advent of the Internet and social media, harassment moved online — in a big way. Targets receive abusive
messages, that they are ugly, useless and should be raped
and murdered. Some attacks come from a single individual.
Others involve a mob.
Some people say, “Words can’t hurt you. Just delete
the messages and get over it. Don’t turn on social media.”
That sounds plausible on a superficial level, but is totally
unrealistic in practice.
One of the attack techniques is called doxxing. It
involves posting personal details — name, address, phone
numbers, employer, details about family members — and
encouraging others to join in harassment. Another attack
technique is posting “non-consensual intimate images”
(NCII), sometimes called reverse porn: the attacker uploads
photos or videos of nudity or sexual activity. The target
might or might not have agreed to having the images taken,
but definitely did not agree to posting them online. Yet
another technique is to hack into someone’s accounts and

106

Official Channels

send messages and make posts that seem to come from
them.
Imagine this. Your ex-partner initiates a vendetta
against you. He posts a rant accusing you of vile behaviour
and convinces a whole group to join in an attack. Some of
the attackers hack into your email account and send nude
photos of you to your family members and your colleagues
at work. Half of the calls you receive on your phone are
abusive threats to rape and murder. Manufactured claims
about you are sent to your employer. Your family members
also receive abusive messages. Anyone who stands up for
you on social media is subjected to the same treatment.
Their family members are targeted.
You are scheduled to speak at a conference. The
attackers say they are going to kill you at the conference.
You think this is unlikely, but you can’t be sure that one of
the unhinged members in the mob might actually attempt
murder.
In the US, there’s an attack technique called
SWATting. An attacker calls the police and says that there
is a hostage situation, or a big drug operation, at your house.
The police sent a heavily armed SWAT team to your home.
There’s no knocking on the door. People in the house are
assumed to be involved in dangerous criminal activity and
treated accordingly. It is a terrifying experience.
Meanwhile, the attackers think you deserve it. They
are just having fun. Fooling the police to send a SWAT
team is a success for them.
Who are the targets? Anyone, potentially, but some
sorts of people are especially likely to be harassed. Any
woman who becomes prominent, especially in a domain
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that men consider theirs, is a prime target. So is any prominent person who is openly lesbian, gay, transgender, ethnic
minority, disabled … Then there are individuals who are
not prominent who are targeted by an antagonist who is
envious, offended or otherwise aggrieved.
Some attacks are limited and brief. Others develop a
momentum, with new participants in the mob, so that
attacks continue for years.
Harassment online is not always sexual harassment,
just like harassment offline is not always sexual harassment. On the other hand, most sexual harassment in the
Internet age involves some online component.
There is much more that could be said about online
harassment. Here I focus on the role of official channels.
There are various official channels to which a target might
appeal for remedies, including the police, social media
companies, and politicians. A number of writers who have
studied the problem in depth, with a focus on harassment of
women by men, have examined the role of official
channels.
Danielle Keats Citron is a US lawyer who has written
extensively about online abuse. Her 2014 book Hate Speech
in Cyberspace is a superb treatment of online harassment.
She describes the problem and looks especially at legal
options. Among other things, she says targets of cyber
mobbing seldom go to the police because they expect not to
receive support, and they’re right. Police may not have
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sufficient training to give appropriate advice, or lack skills
to track down perpetrators, or find it’s all too difficult.14
Bailey Poland, who was an online target, wrote the
book Haters. It is a comprehensive treatment of cyberharassment, covering the problem, major cases, rationales for
harassment (and counters to them), impacts on targets,
Poland’s own personal experience, shortcomings of official
channels, and insights from cyberfeminists on responding.
She writes that reporting abuse online is a thankless task
because either the process is so automated as to be useless
or there’s excessive work required to make a complaint.15
About going to the police, Poland writes, “Local law
enforcement agencies simply are not trained in how to
respond to threats sent online — a threat sent via the mail
or even made over the telephone is, at least, a known
quantity. To many police officers, however, the Internet is
a total mystery, threats are ephemeral, and they are unable
or unwilling to do anything about it.”16
Emma Jane tells about misogyny online via her own
experiences and via research findings, including her own.
As an Australian journalist, she received hostile correspondence for many years. In 1998, having included her
email address with her articles, she started receiving grossly
offensive messages, with rape and death threats/fantasies.
At first she didn't know what to make of this but started
14 Danielle Keats Citron, Hate Crimes in Cyberspace (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 2014), p. 20.
15 Bailey Poland, Haters: Harassment, Abuse, and Violence
Online (Lincoln, NE: Potomac Press, 2016), p. 175.
16 Ibid., p. 195.
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saving the messages and gradually accumulated a huge file.
There were great similarities in the messages: they threaten
rape while calling the target a slut and ugly and even
unrapeable. Many messages are internally contradictory.
Jane later became a researcher and wrote a number of
insightful scholarly articles. Her book Misogyny Online
provides the most graphic treatment of the sort of abuse
women receive via the Internet. In a chapter titled “Epic
institutional fails,” she describes how institutions have
failed to deal adequately with online abuse. This includes
police, policy-makers, corporations (especially those
running social media) and academics.17
Zoë Quinn is a US video game developer. An expartner of hers began a campaign against her that developed
into the world’s most famous, or infamous, online abuse
saga, called Gamergate. Quinn wrote a book, Crash
Override, in which she tells her personal story and tells
about her efforts to obtain relief and justice for herself and
other online targets.18
Like other knowledgeable writers about online abuse,
Quinn was frustrated with the failure of official channels.
She had more experience than most. She went to the police,
but that required enormous efforts for little result. She went
to court to seek an order against harassment by her ex, but
this turned out to be counterproductive because he used the
17 Emma A. Jane, Misogyny Online: A Short (and Brutish) History
(London: Sage, 2017), pp. 89–111.
18 Zoë Quinn, Crash Override: How Gamergate (Nearly)
Destroyed My Life, and How We Can Win the Fight against Online
Hate (New York: PublicAffairs, 2017).
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court process to interact with her more. She was trying to
get him out of her life and the court interactions did the
opposite.
By being the face of Gamergate, Quinn became
prominent and so had access to tech companies. She found
that they seemed sympathetic but their actions accomplished little. She even testified at the United Nations.
Many authorities appeared to be concerned. But they
weren’t taking the strong steps Quinn had hoped for. Maybe
the authorities were content with appearing concerned, but
not prepared to change their normal operations.
Quinn, in the space of a few years, had an intense
personal experience of the failure of official channels. She
writes:
I appealed for help through official channels, early and
often. I spent countless hours documenting everything
that was happening in reports to tech platforms, only
to be shrugged off. I talked to lawyers and took out
restraining orders, only to find myself beating my head
against the brick wall of a legal system ill-equipped to
handle the idea that anything real happens on the
internet. In courtrooms and judges’ chambers, I was
told that my life online doesn’t really matter and that
if I want to live without this treatment [harassment], I
should abandon the career I worked so hard for and get
offline.
About companies such as Facebook and Google, she writes:
When I started out as a newly hatched activist, I
thought tech companies simply didn’t know how to
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combat abuse on their platforms. I know now that they
do know, or have the ability to learn, but the people in
power who need to act just don’t care. The problem is
not unique to tech; this apathy continues to be an
unfortunate recurring theme in our interactions with
other institutions.
In summary, concerning police, legislators and corporations, she says:
The longer I spent trying to change these systems from
within, the more I found that they were constructed
from the ground up to resist effective change. You can
hear the same nonexcuses from people in power only
so many times before realizing that they know how
broken things are, and that they’re not going to
change.19
Because she became so well known, Quinn also heard from
numerous others who were targeted online. Their experiences were similar: massive abuse, highly damaging
effects, and little support from authorities.
While never giving up on the possibility of change in
the system, Quinn then decided on another option. She set
up Crash Override, a network to support targets of online
abuse. Much of the work, at least initially, was by Quinn
and her ally Alex.
One of the most important supports provided by Crash
Override was to help targets protect themselves online.
Quinn would guide them through the steps needed to
19 Ibid., pp. 19–20, 145 and 6.
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change and improve their password protection, shut down
accounts, make applications for demeaning images to be
removed, and (if desired) prepare documentation for the
police. This service was especially valuable in the initial
stages of a mobbing attack, when targets often were so
distraught that they found it difficult to think how best to
respond.
Quinn knew all about the psychological impacts of
persistent online harassment. As she recounts in her book,
she was never particularly strong mentally, which is why
the subtitle to Crash Override begins How Gamergate
(Nearly) Destroyed My Life. One of the great benefits of the
Crash Override support network was the reassurance that
someone understood and cared about what was happening.
Crash Override, born out of abuse, is an alternative or
supplement to official channels. It provides practical
advice, helping clients to protect themselves and helping
them acquire skills. It also provides the immensely
important psychological support possible from others who
have a detailed knowledge of the dynamics of online hate.
Such support is rare within police, courts and tech companies — they are unlikely to have come under serious attack.
Some of the advice provided by Crash Override is
about how to deal with official channels. For example,
Quinn says that if you’re under attack and there is a risk of
being SWATted, then it can be worthwhile contacting the
police beforehand. But, she says, don’t mention the
Internet, which can make them switch off. Instead, just ask
them to be wary if they receive a call about nefarious
dealings at a particular address: it might be a prank.
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Quinn is quite aware that Crash Override and similar
support networks are not the full solution. They do not
change the social and technical systems that give rise to
online abuse. Ultimately, she hopes for cultural change. Her
efforts to raise awareness, to talk to authorities and to
support targets of abuse are just part of the wider change
she sees as necessary.
Conclusion
Sexual harassment is a longstanding problem. Women, and
some men, are harassed as an exercise involving power and
sex. With the rise of the second-wave feminist movement,
sexual harassment was named and stigmatised, yet in many
places it continued.
In universities and many other workplaces, the
primary means of addressing sexual harassment has been
policies. However, complaint procedures are cumbersome
and slow, and using them can make interactions more toxic.
Also, as in the case of courts and rape, the procedures can
be traumatising. So, despite formal procedures being available, few women make complaints. This suggests the
procedures simply do not work very well. They are a
symbol of the institution’s concern, but the symbol may not
be an accurate representation of on-the-ground reality.
It is widely said that what needs to change is culture:
organisational culture and the wider culture of interpersonal
relationships. Undoubtedly there has been considerable
change. Publicity about abuses plays a powerful role.
As well as gradual cultural change, there is a role for
empowerment of individuals and groups. Individuals —
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possible targets and bystanders20 — can learn skills in
recognising harassing behaviours, warding them off, documenting ongoing problems and working with others in a
collective response.
Postscript: #MeToo
How does #MeToo relate to official channels?
In 2017, Hollywood actresses spoke out about sexual
harassment and exploitation by movie mogul Harvey
Weinstein. The initial claims triggered an outpouring of
allegations. It was as if permission had been granted to
speak out about something that had long been known to
insiders but never openly challenged. This unleashing of
willingness to name harassers spilled out across the country
and the world and became identified by the Twitter handle
#MeToo.
Although there had been laws against sexual harassment for decades, it seemed that nothing had changed.
#MeToo did change one thing: awareness that women were
more willing to do something about it.
#MeToo showed the failure of official channels. If
they had been working, more specifically if they had been
20 On the value of bystander training, see for example Victoria L.
Banyard, Elizabethe G. Plante and Mary M. Moynihan, “Bystander
education: bringing a broader community perspective to sexual
violence prevention,” Journal of Community Psychology, vol. 32,
no. 1, 2004, pp. 61–79; Ann L. Coker et al., “Evaluation of the
Green Dot bystander intervention to reduce interpersonal violence
among college students across three campuses,” Violence Against
Women, vol. 21, no. 12, December 2015, pp. 1507–1527.
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effective in changing cultures of entitlement and harassment, #MeToo would have been unnecessary.
#MeToo showed the power of collective action.
Initially just a few women spoke out; this empowered
others to do the same. There was power in numbers. One
allegation might be dismissed, but a dozen were too many
to ignore. In addition, many of those speaking out were
prominent actresses. Their fame gave credibility and
visibility to their claims.
The focus of #MeToo was on taking down perpetrators. There was relatively little attention given to sharing
the skills of those who had successfully resisted.
A damaging side effect of #MeToo was trial by
allegation and by media. Some men may have deserved to
be discredited, but the media’s feeding frenzy for stories
about prominent harassers opened the door to a highly
erratic set of claims and formal charges. Because the
problems had not been addressed for so long, there was no
consistency when the bubble of impunity finally burst.
Critics of #MeToo could legitimately argue that media
discrediting, without formal procedures, was unfair.
One positive effect of #MeToo — though this remains
to be evaluated fully — is a change in culture. When women
(and men) feel empowered to speak out and resist abuse,
potential perpetrators were deterred.
Whether this applies outside high-profile arenas is
unknown. Some targets of harassment, in organisations and
venues out of the public eye, might feel they will have
support if they make a complaint. Will they?

4
Plagiarism
Official procedures for dealing with plagiarism have toxic
effects when applied to students but are feeble when applied
to powerful individuals.
Lord Acton famously wrote, “Power tends to corrupt
and absolute power corrupts absolutely.” Imagine a young
student Chris, in high school, assigned to write an essay on
power. Chris, not knowing any better, simply copies
Acton’s sentence, including it in the essay without any
quotation marks or any indication that it was originally
written by Acton. As a result, it would seem to a reader —
one unfamiliar with the quote — that it was Chris’s original
idea. A reader familiar with the quote will realise that Chris
copied the sentence and failed to give a suitable acknowledgement.
In scholarly writing, it is considered important to give
acknowledgement to authors whose writings and ideas are
used. Chris didn’t give a suitable acknowledgement and is
technically guilty of plagiarism, a failure to give such an
acknowledgement.
Using Acton’s sentence is an example of word-forword plagiarism, the type that is easiest to identify. Suppose
Chris wrote (without quotes), “Power corrupts and absolute
power corrupts absolutely.” This draws on Acton, but is not
an accurate quote. (Actually, it is a very common

Plagiarism

117

misquote.) It also counts as plagiarism, because it is too
close to the original.
Suppose Chris writes (without quotes), “A little bit of
power corrupts, more power corrupts more, and overwhelming power corrupts the most.” This is a quite
different wording than Acton’s original, so it avoids wordfor-word plagiarism. However, it draws on Acton’s ideas,
so it counts as plagiarism if Acton is not mentioned. It is
plagiarism of ideas: taking the ideas of another writer and
using them as if they were your own original ideas. A
correct way to make this statement would be “Developing
Lord Acton’s aphorism, it might be said that a little bit of
power corrupts, more power corrupts more, and overwhelming power corrupts the most.”
When Chris grows up and becomes an academic, it
would be possible, in an academic treatment of power, to
reproduce Acton’s statement without mentioning Acton,
because it can be assumed that readers know it’s by Acton,
so explicit acknowledgement is not needed. Still, academics
will usually put the sentence in quotes or otherwise make it
clear they realise it is not their own original formulation.
These examples show that giving appropriate
acknowledgement is not easy or automatic. It is a practice
based on scholarly conventions, often involving considerable subtlety. It is a practice that needs to be learned,
analogously to the way that table manners are learned. The
correct way to acknowledge texts and ideas depends on the
circumstances, such as the venue and likely readers. Even
experienced writers can make mistakes in giving acknowledgements.
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In writing, there are many conventions and expectations, varying somewhat according to the genre and context. In scholarly writing, there are quite a few different
referencing styles, ways of constructing sentences and
approaches to structuring an article. For example, in some
fields it is conventional to include, at the beginning of an
article, an abstract, which is a summary of what’s in the
article, and then to have a number of sections with headings.
In essay style, there is no abstract and sometimes no
sections. How to write in the appropriate style in a field
needs to be learned.
Acknowledging sources is just one of the things to be
learned, and would not be a very important issue except for
one thing: it carries a heavy moral component. In the minds
of many academics and others, not giving appropriate
acknowledgement for the use of others’ words and ideas is
seen as a serious transgression, as a mortal sin. It has a
special name: plagiarism. It is often treated as equivalent to
cheating.
In universities, students are warned against plagiarism.
Serious penalties can be imposed, including given no credit
for an assignment, failing a course or even being expelled.
This is a heavy burden for some students who never learned
conventions for referencing and quotation.
Two approaches
There are two contrasting approaches to plagiarism by
students.1 One is the learning approach, in which copying
1 There is a huge amount of research and commentary about
student plagiarism, as well as a smaller amount about plagiarism in
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of text without proper acknowledgement is seen as a
problem to be rectified by learning the correct way to do
things. In Australia, this is especially seen as an issue for
international students from countries where it is believed
there is more emphasis on repeating the ideas of the teacher
and less on having original ideas, so that copying the words
other arenas. Furthermore, plagiarism is just one aspect of a wider
domain called “academic integrity,” which includes studies of
honour codes, motivations for cheating, the impacts of
commercialisation of education, and policy development and
implementation. For research in the area, see Tracey Bretag, ed.,
Handbook of Academic Integrity (Singapore: Springer, 2016). See
also, for example, Judy Anderson, Plagiarism, Copyright Violation
and Other Thefts of Intellectual Property: An Annotated
Bibliography with a Lengthy Introduction (Jefferson, NC:
McFarland, 1998); David Callahan, The Cheating Culture: Why
More Americans Are Doing Wrong to Get Ahead (New York:
Harcourt, 2004); Robert A. Harris, The Plagiarism Handbook:
Strategies for Preventing, Detecting, and Dealing with Plagiarism
(Los Angeles: Pyrczak Publishing, 2001); Rebecca Moore
Howard, Standing in the Shadow of Giants: Plagiarists, Authors,
Collaborators (Stamford, CT: Ablex, 1999); Marcel C. LaFollette,
Stealing into Print: Fraud, Plagiarism, and Misconduct in
Scientific Publishing (Berkeley, CA: University of California
Press, 1992); Thomas Mallon, Stolen Words: Forays into the
Origins and Ravages of Plagiarism (New York: Ticknor and
Fields, 1989); Wendy Sutherland-Smith, Plagiarism, the Internet
and Student Learning: Improving Academic Integrity (New York:
Routledge, 2008). In the context of the vast amount of research and
writing in this area, my treatment here is intended is illustrate a
perspective on the role of official channels, namely formal
processes for dealing with plagiarism.
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of esteemed writers is seen as obeisance rather than
stealing. A cultural shift is required.
In the learning approach, acknowledgement practice is
taught as a craft or convention, and shortcomings are dealt
with as matters to be addressed until the correct methods
are followed. If a student hands in an assignment that
contains paragraphs copied from a text without attribution,
the student is shown how to paraphrase the text and give a
citation, and this process is repeated until the assignment is
satisfactory.
The second approach to plagiarism is punitive. Harsh
penalties are applied to assignments containing significant
passages not correctly acknowledged. For example, the
assignment might be given a mark of zero. In serious cases,
a formal process is initiated that potentially can lead to
disciplinary action.
Detecting plagiarism
To implement the punishments, it is necessary to detect and
document instances of plagiarism. In years gone by, before
the Internet, teachers would act on their suspicions. If much
of an essay was poorly written but some paragraphs were
eloquent and sophisticated by comparison, copying was
suspected and a search would begin for the source of the
well-written paragraphs. If such a source could be found, it
would provide proof of plagiarism.
These days, it is more common to search for sources
online. One method is to paste a passage into Google and
see if there is a source of the exact sequence of words. More
systematically, there are now available several services,
most prominently Turnitin, that enable searches of vast
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databases looking for identical passages. These are
sometimes called plagiarism checkers but they are better
described as text-matching software. If there is a match
between a paragraph in a student essay and a paragraph
from Turnitin’s database, this might not be a problem. It
might be that the student has explicitly quoted the
paragraph and given a citation for the source.
In some classes, all assignments are put through
Turnitin as a means of detecting plagiarism. One of the
problems with using text-matching software is that it treats
students as potential cheaters. A student, positioned as a
cheater rather than as a learner, may decide to try to beat
the system. It is certainly possible.
One of my colleagues, who does some tutoring of
individuals, described the method some students use to
write essays. They take a series of paragraphs from
published works — hopefully relevant to the essay topic —
and modify them so they aren’t exact quotes, for example
by using the online thesaurus function to replace some
words with synonyms. Another method is to run the
paragraphs through Google translate into some other
language and then back again (or perhaps into a third
language first). This messes up the text, putting it into
different words. Then it has to be edited to make it sound
sensible.
This is an unfortunate perversion of the purpose of
writing an essay, which is to develop a student’s capacity to
understand the topic and to write text in their own words,
without relying on published texts. When writing original
material, I recommend doing it largely from memory, not
having any published texts open at the time. This ensures
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that none of what is written is copied from someone else’s
writing. However, this is just a side benefit. The primary
advantage of writing one’s own original words is that it
develops thinking skills. Writing is a form of thinking.
Using someone else’s text eliminates much of the valuable
thinking that occurs during writing.
I’m not sure why some students originally start writing
essays by taking published text and modifying it, but textmatching systems to check for plagiarism can perpetuate it.
The point of using a thesaurus to change some words or of
translating text and then back again is to disguise the use of
someone else’s writing: it is a way of fooling Turnitin. A
better way of avoiding copying is to write original text, but
somewhere along the way this is not learned. I have even
met a few university graduates who use this method of
starting with published text and modifying it so it is not
quite the same as the original.
There is another way to fool Turnitin: purchase an
essay written by someone else. Students can go online and
order essays written to order, on specified topics and even
at a requested grade level, because if an essay is too good,
it might be suspicious. An advantage of purchasing an
essay, from a student’s point of view, is that it will not show
up as copied.2
Ironically, honest students who simply don’t understand acknowledgement conventions are more likely to be
accused of and penalised for plagiarism than students who
cheat by purchasing essays.
2 Buyer beware: some contract cheating companies attempt to
blackmail students who buy their essays.
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Some teachers are kind and considerate and will try to
help students to learn. When they discover that a student is
copying text, they will offer opportunities to revise the
assignment so that it is satisfactory in terms of originality
and acknowledgements, without making students feel
ashamed. However, other teachers take a more punitive
approach, seeing plagiarism as evidence of cheating,
especially when students are more advanced in their
studies.
Formal processes
Being subject to formal processes for addressing plagiarism
can be intimidating. A student may receive a written notice
to attend a meeting at which they are confronted with
concerns about their work. I have called a few such
meetings and soon learned that they can be traumatising for
students. Being accused of being a cheat is distressing and
can make students break down in shame or become
defensive. Whatever the response, it is unlikely to be
conducive to learning. Depending on the student’s response, there can be further stages in the process, perhaps
involving a disciplinary committee. Some of my colleagues
complain that the process is too soft: students may be let off
lightly, claiming they didn’t understand requirements or
giving some other excuse. However, the outcome of the
formal processes is less important than the impact on both
students and teachers. Not following the expected conventions for writing, in particular in quotation and citation, are
seen as disciplinary issues. Even for students who are not
cheating, this can cause fear and inhibit learning. Teachers
are put in the role of being cheat-detectors.
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Quite a few teachers dislike the formal procedures.
Teachers who are not full-time permanent employees are
seldom paid for the extra time and effort involved. The
result is that many teachers will not bother filing formal
complaints about plagiarism. The procedures can end up
being symbols of institutional concern about cheating
without doing much to address the problem.
Meanwhile, the existence of procedures to address plagiarism, because they seem to address the problem, do little
to encourage creative approaches that help students learn.
My own approach has been to try to design assignments that
are both interesting and that make copying difficult. For
example, I sometimes request that assignments be written
in the form of a dialogue between two individuals, in the
style of a play. This requires students to express their ideas
in a format different from what is available in the usual
writings on the topic. However, this does not prevent
students submitting assignments written by friends or paid
essay-writers. To deal with cases of suspected plagiarism,
my course outlines state that I retain the option of requesting an additional oral examination on any assignment.
However, I never felt the need to exercise this option.
Formal procedures for dealing with student plagiarism
focus largely or exclusively on copying of words without
proper acknowledgement. The related problem of presenting someone else’s ideas as one’s own, namely plagiarism
of ideas, is seldom addressed. It might be argued that
students aren’t often expected to have original ideas, but
this is unfair. In some cases, students have thoughts original
to them, even if they have been expressed by others previously. In any case, when a student draws on ideas from
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published authors but doesn’t give proper acknowledgement, this hardly ever leads to sanctions. The reason is that
it is difficult to prove plagiarism of ideas, whereas proving
word-for-word plagiarism is straightforward and relatively
easy to document. This results in a curious inversion:
plagiarism of text, which is often a fairly superficial type of
copying, is prioritised over the more serious plagiarism of
ideas.
One of the problems with mass education is classes so
large that it is difficult for teachers to get to know all their
students personally. Without personal knowledge, it is
tempting to resort to text-matching and other schemes to
detect cheating. Students who are treated as potential cheats
then may feel it is fair to try to game the system. The goal
of learning is displaced by the goal of getting passing
grades, so the symbols of learning become more important
than actual learning.
To pick just one study out of many that make the same
point, consider a paper about the use of Turnitin at universities in South Africa.3 The authors examined policies at
several universities and found wide variations between
them. They also interviewed academics on plagiarism
committees. What they found is that Turnitin was often
used in a crude way, with text similarity scores used as
surrogates for plagiarism, while education of students into
proper acknowledgement practice was usually secondary.
3 Amanda Mphahlele and Sioux McKenna, “The use of Turnitin in
the higher education sector: decoding the myth,” Assessment &
Evaluation in Higher Education, vol. 44, no. 7, 2019, pp. 1079–
1089.
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Most policies gave far more attention to penalties for
plagiarism than to ways to help students learn. The plagiarism policies sent the wrong message to students, suggesting that their aim should be to reduce Turnitin similarity
scores, which sometimes can be done by substituting
synonyms for words used — and there is computer software
that can do this. In short, policies ended up putting learning
second to compliance with text-matching scores.
In this context, formal procedures may provide only an
illusion of achieving educational goals. When applied, they
can traumatise students who are not trying to cheat but who
simply do not understand how to reference properly. In
other cases, students know their assignments are improper
but are nonetheless offended when they are caught and
singled out for penalties when they know many classmates
are doing the same thing. Meanwhile, anti-plagiarism
policing can promote defensive styles of writing in which
escaping alerts in text-matching checks becomes more
important than developing a confident approach to writing.
Institutionalised plagiarism
So far, I’ve been describing problems with formal procedures for dealing with student plagiarism. There is a related
problem when it comes plagiarism by professionals such as
academics, lawyers, politicians, doctors and judges.4 Procedures often don’t work at all.
4 Brian Martin, “Plagiarism, misrepresentation, and exploitation
by established professionals: power and tactics,” in Tracey Bretag,
ed., Handbook of Academic Integrity (Singapore: Springer, 2016),
pp. 913–927.
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Consider the case of a university president who gives
a talk or writes an article. Some presidents do their own
work, but many rely on support staff to undertake research,
prepare slides, and write speeches and articles. When a
university president or other official gives a speech or is
listed as the author of an article, and someone else prepared
part or all of the text, this is plagiarism: the taking of the
ideas of another and using them as one’s own. There are no
penalties for this form of plagiarism. Instead, it is standard
practice, sometimes seen as a double standard given that the
same behaviours by students are treated as serious transgressions.
Plagiarism by university presidents is one example of
what has been called institutionalised or bureaucratic
plagiarism.5 It is a feature of organisational hierarchies. In
government departments, it is commonplace for top officials to sign their names to work done by subordinates. At
a trivial level, a letter signed by a department head may
actually have been written, in part or whole, by lower-level
employees. The same thing happens in companies, in
churches and many other organisations. Because it is standard practice, there are no procedures for dealing with
institutionalised plagiarism.
Then there is “competitive plagiarism,” which can
occur in domains in which credit for ideas is normally
5 Brian Martin, “Plagiarism: a misplaced emphasis,” Journal of
Information Ethics, vol. 3, no. 2, Fall 1994, pp. 36–47; Gavin
Moodie, “Bureaucratic plagiarism,” Plagiary: Cross-Disciplinary
Studies in Plagiarism, Fabrication, and Falsification, 2006, pp.
66–69.
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expected, such as scientific research and creative writing.
Consider this scenario: you are a research student and have
been giving drafts of your thesis chapters to your supervisor. You and your supervisor attend a conference and you
listen to your supervisor give a keynote address. Lo and
behold, he uses your ideas and findings but never mentions
your name. Or you are looking through a journal and
discover an article authored by your supervisor, drawing on
your research but only mentioning you in the acknowledgements. Or you discover that a grant application draws on
your work, but you aren’t mentioned in it. What do you do?6
You could raise your concerns with your supervisor,
but that could be risky, because completing your degree
depends on his support. If, after you’ve sought advice, you
conclude that your supervisor has for years been exploiting
research students and then not even helping them complete
their degrees, you may decide to make a formal complaint.
But to whom? There are no standard procedures to follow.
You might write to the organisers of the conference where
he gave the talk you heard, to the editor of the journal where
his article appeared, or to the grant body where he submitted his application. However, these are unlikely to address
your concerns. They are not set up with investigatory
powers and seldom have protocols for tackling plagiarism
allegations. Furthermore, they may be unwilling to support
a student against an established researcher, especially if he
is prominent in the field.
6 Brian Martin, “Countering supervisor exploitation,” Journal of
Scholarly Publishing, vol. 45, no. 1, October 2013, pp. 74–86.

Plagiarism

129

You might approach senior administrators in your
university. Good luck. They are unlikely to take action.
Your supervisor can claim he is responsible for the ideas
and findings, even though you know they are the result of
your own efforts. After all, a supervisor is supposed to be
providing guidance, which means being involved with the
ideas. So it sounds plausible when the supervisor says that
actually he had all the original ideas and that you were just
incorporating them in your drafts. Having talked to a
number of research students whose work has been
expropriated by their supervisors, my impression is that
hardly any of them make formal complaints and that even
when they do, the response from university officials,
journal editors and research grant administrators is seldom
helpful.
Consider a different scenario. You are a published
author and you discover that another author has used your
ideas, but not your exact words, in their own stories. This
wouldn’t bother you so much except that the other author is
getting a lot of recognition for originality. What can you do
about it? The answer is “very little.” If challenged, the other
author can say that they developed the ideas independently.
This is plausible because creators often have similar ideas.
Because you know your work intimately, you are able to
see the similarities, but they will not be so obvious to others.
Now imagine you are a scientist who has published a
respectable number of papers. You submit a manuscript to
a leading journal. The review process takes unusually long
and then you are surprised to receive a rejection notice with
picky comments from the reviewer. Meanwhile, an article
appears in a rapid-publication journal presenting the key
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ideas in your submission. Your research findings are no
longer original and are more difficult to publish, and
anyway the prior article will get nearly all the credit for the
idea. You ask around and discover that the author of the
published article, a prominent figure in the field, is
suspected of being a repeat offender, taking ideas from
submissions he reviews and publishing them quickly. What
can you do? In one case I know about, the main response
by scientists was to avoid this person: never send him
articles in draft, never reveal new ideas at seminars he
attended, and warn others about him.
To deal with the problem of “guest authorship” —
when a scientist is made co-author of a paper despite having
done little or nothing towards the research — some journals
now require that authors sign a statement specifying what
each co-author has contributed to a paper. Unfortunately,
this process often gives only the appearance of overcoming
the problem, because co-authors simply lie about the
contributions of guest authors, thereby compounding the
deception. Junior co-authors may do this to keep in good
graces with senior figures with power over appointments
and promotions. Few journals requiring co-author contribution statements have any reliable way of verifying their
truth. The statements thus provide an illusion of protection,
reducing the urgency of addressing the underlying power
imbalances behind the problem.
Often the only way to effectively challenge plagiarism
by professionals is through publicity. In a famous case, the
Vice-Chancellor of Monash University, a major Australian
university, was accused of plagiarism in writings going
back decades. Reporting to the university’s governing body
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did not produce any results. It was only after the allegations
were taken to the mass media that the VC was pushed to
resign.7 The implication is that official channels are
unlikely to work unless prodded by publicity or the threat
of publicity.
Conclusion
When writing, it is a courtesy to acknowledge the contributions of others who have come before. When using the ideas
and words of others, there are conventions for the way to
express acknowledgements. In the scholarly domain, these
conventions can require time and effort to master. Failure
to fully acknowledge prior work is commonplace. In many
cases this simply represents lack of understanding. In some
cases it is due to sloppiness or laziness. In a few cases it
results from a conscious attempt to claim credit where it is
not due.
Failure to follow acknowledgement conventions is
given the label “plagiarism,” and has acquired severely
negative connotations. For some, plagiarism is a grievous
sin, in the same league as scientific fraud. The formal
procedures for addressing plagiarism are a curious mixture
of intimidation and omission.
Students who are just learning acknowledgement
conventions are most likely to be guilty of plagiarism. A
few of them are subject to accusations and penalties.
Unfortunately, the punitive approach to plagiarism has
7 Brian Martin, “Plagiarism struggles,” Plagiary: CrossDisciplinary Studies in Plagiarism, Fabrication and Falsification,
vol. 3, 2008, https://www.bmartin.cc/pubs/08plagiary.html.
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several damaging consequences. It humiliates students who
are accused and encourages a mentality of not getting
caught. Text-matching software can pick up superficial
copying but often misses the most serious method of cheating: buying essays. The worst consequence of the punitive
approach is to trap students in poor ways of writing that
limit its educational value.
Meanwhile, outside the student context, there are no
formal penalties for plagiarism. When one author uses ideas
from another, without acknowledgement, there is seldom
any way to obtain redress. Only when text is copied can
action be taken, but even then it can be difficult to get
publishers to do anything. The most potent method of
addressing this sort of plagiarism is publicity. The most
common sort of plagiarism occurs in hierarchical organisations, when superiors take formal credit for the work of
subordinates. This is treated as standard practice and is
seldom stigmatised. It is not normally called plagiarism.
Consider three roads to improving appropriate
acknowledgement practice. The first road is skill development, which means helping people learn the conventions
for giving acknowledgement for the work of others. The
second road is changing cultures so good acknowledgement
practice is valued and expected, and hence everyone feels it
natural to aspire to best practice. The third road is relying
on procedures for detecting and penalising plagiarism.
The downsides of the third road are many. Focusing
on plagiarism detection positions students as cheaters,
encouraging a mentality of beating the system. Worse than
this, focusing on plagiarism undermines the alternatives of
skill development and fostering a culture of respectful
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acknowledgement. Finally, procedures against student plagiarism leave completely unaddressed the serious problem
of institutional plagiarism: the most powerful plagiarisers
escape censure, and indeed their actions are not even called
plagiarism.
Imagine an alternative world in which students are
trained both in how to give appropriate acknowledgements
and in how to expose and confront institutionalised plagiarism. That would be a double whammy of skill development, but one that would be threatening to many of those in
positions of power.
What can be done about institutionalised plagiarism?
A system-level approach is to promote egalitarian institutions, with fewer power differences, but this has to be a
long-term project. In the short term, it can be worthwhile to
give credit to speechwriters and ghostwriters whenever
possible, and to expose exploitation of the work of subordinates. To do this, collective action is the safest option and
usually the most effective.

5
Wikipedia
Wikipedia, the online encyclopaedia, is a remarkable
achievement. It is produced entirely by unpaid volunteers
who add text and references, revise or delete previously
posted text, and negotiate their disagreements. Within a few
years of its creation, Wikipedia was larger than traditional
encyclopaedias written by experts, and far more dynamic.
In some current affairs, Wikipedia editing occurs more
rapidly than mass media coverage. Wikipedia has versions
in dozens of languages. It has become one of the most
frequently visited sites on the web.1
Behind the scenes, however, there are problems. The
idea behind Wikipedia is that the contributions of different
editors will lead to information that is accurate and reliable,
without serious biases. In many areas, where facts put out
by authorities are hard to contest — like populations of
cities or the atomic weights of elements — Wikipedia is
usually quite reliable. Problems can arise, though, in areas
1 On Wikipedia generally, see for example Dariusz Jemielniak,
Common Knowledge? An Ethnography of Wikipedia (Stanford,
CA: Stanford University Press, 2014); Andrew Lih, The Wikipedia
Revolution: How a Bunch of Nobodies Created the World’s
Greatest Encyclopedia (London: Aurum, 2009); Joseph M. Reagle,
Jr., Good Faith Collaboration: The Culture of Wikipedia
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2010); Nathaniel Tkacz, Wikipedia
and the Politics of Openness (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 2015).
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where there are disagreements about the importance of
topics and the perspective from which they are approached.
Most people who read Wikipedia don’t bother with
several of the tabs on each page. There is a “view history”
tab through which you can look at every edit ever made on
a page. There is a talk tab that allows you to look at discussions among editors about a topic. Exploring these sides to
Wikipedia reveals a landscape quite different from the
calm, authoritative exterior. Wikipedia is not as easy to
understand as it might seem at first.
Anyone can edit Wikipedia. All you have to do is click
on the edit tab and make changes. You can set up an account
if you wish, so there is continuity to your profile and edits.
However, very few users of Wikipedia ever try to edit even
a single entry. Those who do quickly learn that making
lasting changes is not as easy as it might seem.
Most Wikipedia editors, including those with wellestablished profiles, are anonymous, in the sense that they
are not linked with a clear offline identity. Despite anonymity, many editors put in large amounts of time and are proud
of their contributions. Quite a few of them, in addition, have
strong views about the topics they edit. This is a source of
problems.
Think of a topic about which there is serious disagreement, such as abortion, euthanasia, feminism, inequality,
population control, socialism or vaccination. How can
Wikipedia produce an entry that is accurate and impartial?
It might be said that it is not possible to be impartial, so the
most that could be done is to present different perspectives
on a topic, each given appropriate space and fair treatment.
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But obtaining agreement on appropriate space and fair
treatment is not easy.
One consequence of disagreements on Wikipedia is
editing wars. One editor adds a sentence to a page. Another
one deletes it. The first editor adds it again. The second one
deletes it again. Then other editors become involved. It can
seem like a free-for-all. But it isn’t, because some editors
have more power and authority than others. Experienced
editors can be promoted to be administrators, and these
admins can overrule lower-level editors.
Peake’s story
Bryce Peake was alarmed about incidents of sexual assault
at the University of Oregon. He decided to help raise awareness of the problem by setting up a Wikipedia page listing
all US universities under investigation for sexual violence
policy violations. After a great deal of effort investigating
the issue and making changes to Wikipedia, within a few
hours all his edits were reversed.2
Peake pursued the issue through Wikipedia talk pages.
What he encountered was a sustained and sometimes
vehement hostility to any content supportive of women or
feminism. Peake was a white male, but this didn’t help his
cause. He described what was happening on Wikipedia as
the domination of anti-women viewpoints or, in his delightful terminology, as “misogynist infopolitics.”
2 Bryce Peake, “WP: THREATENING2MEN: misogynist
infopolitics and the hegemony of the asshole consensus on English
Wikipedia,” Ada: A Journal of Gender, New Media, and Society,
Issue no. 7, 2015, https://adanewmedia.org/2015/04/issue7-peake/.
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Perhaps this was not surprising given that a large
majority of Wikipedia editors, perhaps 80% or 90%, are
male. But editors do not necessarily edit according to their
demographics. Peake noted that information about alleged
racism was quickly added to Wikipedia pages, without
challenge, although most Wikipedia editors are white.
However, information about alleged sexism was met with
resistance.
The way in which content supportive of women or
feminism was excluded was via the invocation of rules.
Wikipedia has a great number of rules that editors are
supposed to follow. A prominent one is to maintain a neutral point of view (labelled WP:NPOV). Others are not to
give too much emphasis to recent events (WP:RECENCY)
and to use reliable sources (WP:RELIABLE). Each of these
rules seems sensible, in the abstract. Trouble arises when
rules are applied selectively in order to achieve a preferred
outcome.
Peake encountered editors who referred to this rule or
that rule, all to justify opposing his additions. But there was
a double standard. These same rules weren’t applied to
entries on other topics. The rules were tools of censorship,
applied to edits disliked by the misogynist editors but not
applied to other edits, even including their own.
Peake was dismayed to find that Wikipedia editors
were not very concerned about reality, namely whether
sexual assaults actually occurred. The editors instead
focused on whether there were sources they could cite to
support statements made in the text. For Wikipedia editors,
what counts is not whether something actually happened
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but whether there is a credible source they can cite to say
that it happened.
Sexual assault has been occurring on university
campuses for decades. However, for a long time it was
largely undocumented. Only with the rise of the feminist
movement did sexual harassment and assault become a
public issue, and even then there were various processes
that dimmed awareness. In response to Peake posting information about sexual assault investigations on the Wikipedia
pages of universities, editors justified removing the additions by citing policies, including that the information was
not “defining” of the university (WP:UNDUE), came from
an unreliable source (WP:RELIABLE) or was written in a
seemingly biased way (WP:POV).
The editors ignored research indicating that sexual
assault was a longstanding problem, instead demanding
citations of actual assaults in an institution over its history.
The fact that the problem had not been publicly visible was
treated as irrelevant. That Wikipedia didn’t report the
problem was seen as definitive.
From Peake’s point of view, Wikipedia was dominated by editors hostile to any questioning of male
privilege. The editors wrote entries on the histories of
universities that did not mention sexual assault. Then these
Wikipedia histories were invoked to say that evidence
suggesting sexual assault on campus today is unrepresentative of the universities and so shouldn’t be included. In this
way, misogyny on Wikipedia became a self-referential
system, because Wikipedia itself was treated as a reality to
justify continued misogynist representations of reality.
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Why are Wikipedia editors so fixated on following
rules? Peake and others note that most editors are not
experts on the topics they deal with. In an argument with an
actual expert on sexual assault, they would have no special
credibility. However, experienced editors become experts
in using Wikipedia policies to defend their edits. They can
increase their status and exercise power by turning editing
into a contest over the application of rules rather than a
discussion about the reality supposed to be represented on
the encyclopaedia. Here is how Peake summarises this. He
says that the “lawyeristic manoeuvres” by editors —
namely the ways they use the rules to get their way —
are the most effective weapons for individuals who do
not know very much about facts, as they allow
Wikipedia editors to replace expertise about subject
matter with expertise about Wikipedia’s rules. The
image of Wikipedia I describe here, through empirical
grounding in my work writing campus sexual violence
into Wikipedia, is a space where the primary focus is
on the mastery of policy as a tool for domination —
and not on the production of, or debates about, verifiable facts and actually existing knowledge.
WP: NOR
One of the important rules on Wikipedia is that there should
be no original research. Albert Einstein made numerous
pioneering contributions to physics, but the Wikipedia
entry on Einstein, according to the rules, should not cite
Einstein’s publications to make this statement but instead is
supposed to cite someone else saying Einstein’s work is
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important. Einstein is an easy case because numerous others
have written about him, but for others, especially in more
contentious areas, finding what someone else says may not
be straightforward.
The no-original research rule is a powerful deterrent to
people who might like to edit Wikipedia in their own areas
of expertise. They are not supposed to cite their own works,
because that would be a conflict of interest, so they have to
find someone else who has commented on their works.
Taking the conflict-of-interest rule to a greater extreme, no
expert should edit Wikipedia on what they know best,
because knowing a lot about a subject means you are
biased. This is one way that editors who are not subjectmatter experts can hold sway over those who are.
Suppose there is some disagreement, in published
comment, about what someone believes. By selecting some
comments rather than others, it’s easy to create a bias in a
Wikipedia entry.
A personal experience
My own interest in Wikipedia politics and bias was stimulated when the Wikipedia entry about me was massively
rewritten and turned into an attack piece. This was in
January 2016, as part of a massive attack on the PhD thesis
of my PhD student Judy Wilyman. Here I won’t try to give
the whole story but just mention one small element that
shines a light on the dynamics of Wikipedia editing.
Here is one of the statements added to my Wikipedia
entry:

Wikipedia

141

and Agence Science Presse reports Martin “also
defends the idea of a vaccine-autism link.”
Actually, I have never defended this link, and Agence
Science-Presse provides no evidence to back up its statement. A Wikipedia editor can add this claim because it’s
made by a third party, namely not by me and not by the
editor. So how can this sort of false claim be challenged?
It’s unrealistic for me to have to publicly deny every
false statement that someone might make about me, and
even more unrealistic to expect to find some other source
that reports my denial.
I decided to write an article analysing persistent bias
on Wikipedia using my own entry as a case study.3 Publication of the article led to renewed interest in the entry.
Some editors wanted to delete the passage about the Agence
Science-Presse report, but others tried to keep it, saying it’s
a credible source. Then some editors argued that a citation
should be given to my denial of the Agence Science-Presse
claim, with others opposing this.
The battle over this one passage consumed time and
effort by various editors, all waged in terms of Wikipedia’s
rules. The rules prevent original research, such as analysing
my writings to assess my views about vaccines and autism.
Other rules were cited to argue for or against including the
passage.

3 Brian Martin, “Persistent bias on Wikipedia: methods and
responses,” Social Science Computer Review, vol. 36, no. 3, June
2018, pp. 379–388, http://www.bmartin.cc/pubs/18sscr.html
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It would also be possible to refer to a Wikipedia policy
to say that this particular issue — whether or not I defend a
link between vaccines and autism — is not central to a
balanced treatment of my life and work. But this angle did
not succeed because too many editors, including a powerful
administrator, were intent on denigrating me via my
Wikipedia entry.
Conclusion
Disagreements on Wikipedia are waged via interpretations
of rules, and there are so many rules that can be interpreted
in different ways that editors who are persistent can often
get their way even though they do not know all that much
about the topic.
As Peake and others have argued, Wikipedia’s rulebased system has been used by those who are experts at
using the rules to dominate over those who are content
experts. The result, in some cases, is information that
diverges from Wikipedia’s own goal of being neutral and
balanced.
There are two ways of looking at Wikipedia in relation
to official channels. The first is to say that there aren’t any:
there is no appeal body with the authority to adjudicate
disputes or to handle complaints. It is possible to write to
the Wikipedia Foundation, but this is unlikely to have any
effect on disputes over particular entries.
The second way of looking at Wikipedia in relation to
official channels is to say that Wikipedia rules operate as de
facto official channels. In editing an entry, you can cite a
rule to justify your action. In this sense, Wikipedia editing
is about negotiating your way using or getting around the
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rules. This has the two consequences that reflect the shortcomings of official channels in other domains. First, the
development of people’s skills becomes secondary: specifically, knowledge of the topic becomes secondary to operational use of Wikipedia rules to promote one’s preferred
treatment of the topic. Second, the task of cultural change
on Wikipedia is marginalised. The focus on following the
rules, and the investment of experienced Wikipedia editors
in learning and deploying the rules, means that putting more
emphasis on cooperative enhancement of learning and
recognition of expertise is off the agenda.
In the case of Wikipedia, as in many other areas, there
is nothing inherently wrong with official channels. Problems arise when they become seen as the only avenue for
fixing problems.

6
Backfire
In 2001, I had one of the best insights in my research career.
In part, it drew on my understanding of official channels
and then it led to new angles on their roles.
Two colleagues and I had written a paper about repression and resistance in Indonesia. We looked at three case
studies: the 1998 popular resistance to Suharto’s repressive
government that led to the downfall of Suharto and the
introduction of elections; the struggle in East Timor; and
the 1965–1966 genocide. The point of the case studies was
to point out that studies of nonviolent action normally
focused on situations where there was significant resistance
to repression but that it was also important to study situations where there was little or none.
We sent the paper to the journal Pacifica Review. In
our original submission, we had written that during the
genocide there was no resistance. However, the reviewers
didn’t like this, saying that there is always some form of
resistance. To address this, we changed our phrasing to
refer to “lower-profile resistance.” In the revised version of
our paper, I added a discussion of “political jiu-jitsu.”1
1 Brian Martin, Wendy Varney and Adrian Vickers, “Political jiujitsu against Indonesian repression: studying lower-profile
nonviolent resistance,” Pacifica Review, vol. 13, no. 2, June 2001,
pp. 143–156.
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Political jiu-jitsu
Political jiu-jitsu refers to when violent attacks on peaceful
protesters lead to greater support for the protesters. The
term was introduced by nonviolent-action researcher Gene
Sharp in his epic book The Politics of Nonviolent Action. In
part three of the book, Sharp laid out a set of stages or facets
of nonviolent campaigns that he called “the dynamics of
nonviolent action.” The first three stages are laying the
groundwork, challenge brings repression and maintaining
nonviolent discipline.2
Sharp had observed that in campaign after campaign,
the first requirement was to build support, networks and
capacity, before taking action. This is the stage of laying the
groundwork. Then, when ready, activists would challenge
the opponent, for example with a rally, strike or boycott.
This was the stage of “challenge brings repression,”
because authoritarian governments usually attempted to
squash any expression of resistance. If campaigners used
violence in response, they were usually crushed, quite
easily, because governments have an overwhelming
advantage in armed struggle. Therefore, to be effective,
campaigners needed to remain nonviolent, namely not to
use violence when attacked.
This set the stage for political jiu-jitsu. When police or
troops attack peaceful protesters, this can be seen as grossly
unfair. The attack can lead to greater support for the
protesters from what Sharp calls the “grievance group”
(people who share the same concerns as the protesters),
2 Gene Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action (Boston: Porter
Sargent, 1973).
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from people not involved, and even from some on the side
of the government.
East Timor
In 1975, East Timor, formerly a Portuguese colony, was
invaded and occupied by the Indonesian military. The East
Timorese mounted an armed resistance and in the following
decade perhaps one third of the population died from
famine or Indonesian military attacks. In the late 1980s, the
East Timorese resistance movement changed strategy,
downplaying armed resistance in the countryside and
emphasising peaceful protests in urban areas. From the
point of view of a nonviolent campaign, this was laying the
groundwork.
In 1991, following clashes in which a young East
Timorese man was killed, there was a funeral procession in
Dili, the capital. The mourners used the occasion to express
their political views. Indonesian troops surrounded the
procession, which remained peaceful. As the procession
entered Santa Cruz cemetery, the troops opened fire, killing
large numbers of East Timorese. The funeral protest and the
killings fit into Sharp’s stage “challenge brings repression.”
Throughout the protest, the East Timorese refrained from
violence. In Sharp’s terms, they maintained nonviolent
discipline. This set the stage for political jiu-jitsu.
Western journalists were present at the protest. They
witnessed the killings and took photos. Filmmaker Max
Stahl recorded the massacre on video. Their testimony and
visual documentation enabled a powerful communication
to outside audiences. This gave an enormous boost to
international campaigners for East Timorese independence.
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The massacre, intended to repress the independence movement, inadvertently increased its support dramatically. This
counterproductive result is the essence of political jiu-jitsu.
So far so good: political jiu-jitsu is an important part
of many nonviolent campaigns. However, having written a
paper about repression by the Indonesian government that
did not lead to a jiu-jitsu effect — especially the genocide
of 1965–1966, when perhaps half a million people were
killed — I asked myself what was different between these
two sorts of cases. Why did some massacres lead to political
jiu-jitsu and some not?
My insight was to think of reasons in terms of what the
perpetrators did. I identified several methods that perpetrators could use to reduce public outrage and thereby make
political jiu-jitsu less likely. These methods included
covering up the action, devaluing the targets, reinterpreting
what happened, and using intimidation and rewards. There
was one other important method, probably inspired by my
experiences with whistleblowers: using official channels to
give an appearance of justice but without the substance.
Pursuing this insight, which was initially inchoate and
incomplete, I started looking at case studies. One of them
was East Timor.3 Reading various accounts of the history
of the Indonesian invasion and occupation, I learned that
there had been other major massacres of East Timorese
civilians. However, these were little known outside East
Timor. The only surviving witnesses were East Timorese,
and only later did some of them leave the country. For
3 Brian Martin, Justice Ignited: The Dynamics of Backfire
(Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007), pp. 23–33.
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Western audiences, their stories lacked the credibility of
journalists: in a war, the accounts of those on one side or
the other may be suspected of being self-serving. Most importantly, the East Timorese witnesses had no photographic
evidence. For these little-known massacres, cover-up was
the primary tool used by the Indonesian government.
If cover-up is enough to prevent political jiu-jitsu, then
other techniques need not be deployed. So I thought, let’s
look at the Dili massacre to see what techniques the
Indonesian government used to dampen public outrage.
Although the massacre turned out to be counterproductive
for the Indonesian government, that doesn’t mean it didn’t
try to prevent outrage. Ironically, by studying cases of
dramatic political jiu-jitsu, I found the most evidence of
efforts to prevent this outcome.
After the Dili massacre, Indonesian authorities tried to
prevent information about it getting out of the country.
Australian officials assisted: they searched Max Stahl’s
baggage looking for the videos he had taken. Cleverly, he
had hidden them in the cemetery, later returning to retrieve
them and give them to a supporter to smuggle out of
Indonesia. The Indonesian government tried to cover up the
massacre, and creative means were needed to expose it.
The next technique was devaluation. Indonesian
government and military leaders disparaged the protesters.
However, this had little impact in other countries.
The technique of reinterpretation involves explaining
away events by lying, minimising, blaming and framing.
Indonesian officials initially claimed only 17 East Timorese
lost their lives, later increasing the figure to 50. A
subsequent independent investigation said the total was
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271. Indonesian officials claimed that East Timorese
protesters had weapons and had initiated violence. This was
denied by surviving protesters and Western journalists.
The technique of intimidation was also used. After the
massacre, Indonesian troops rounded up independence
supporters and assaulted them. Within East Timor, repression became even worse. However, this had no impact on
Western audiences except to increase their concern.
This brings me to the technique of official channels.
What formal procedure or official body could address a
complaint about mass murder? The East Timorese had no
access to appeal bodies. But there was no need for them to
act, because the Indonesian government and military each
set up inquiries into the massacre. This can be understood
as a response to international concern about the killings.
After previous massacres that were unpublicised, the Indonesian government had never set up an inquiry. The purpose
of the inquiries established following the Dili massacre thus
seemed to be to address international concern.
The two inquiries actually found a few officers guilty
and sentenced them to a few years in prison. This symbolically showed that the government and military were following procedures designed to provide justice. The officers
served just part of their sentences before release: it was very
lenient treatment for mass murder. They were scapegoats
for higher authorities.
There is a revealing contrast between the ways perpetrators were treated. Higher authorities were responsible for
years of bloody repression in East Timor, causing a scale of
death that some have called genocide. However, no action
was ever taken against these higher authorities. Only after
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the international outcry following the Dili massacre was
any official investigation undertaken into any of the killings
in East Timor. The implication is that the official investigation and the token penalties meted out to a few individuals
were seen as helpful in reducing outrage.
In summary, the Dili massacre is a prime example of
political jiu-jitsu: it stimulated greater resistance from the
East Timorese and their international supporters. The response to the massacre also shows the importance of
protesters remaining nonviolent. The images of unarmed,
defenceless protesters being shot in cold blood were crucial
in triggering outrage. Previously, thousands of East
Timorese had been killed during the guerrilla war against
the Indonesian invasion, but this did not cause the same
outrage because deaths are expected in wartime, even when
the war is between highly unequal sides.
The Dili massacre triggered political jiu-jitsu, but
there was more to it than just a counterproductive outcome
for the Indonesian government. The government had used
five techniques that can reduce outrage over injustice:
cover-up, devaluation, reinterpretation, intimidation and
official channels. However, in this case, these methods
were not enough to prevent a huge increase in international
support for East Timor’s independence.
If the Indonesian government could use five methods
to reduce public outrage from the massacre, then it makes
sense that others — East Timorese, their supporters,
journalists — could try to counter each of these methods. In
other words, corresponding to the five types of methods for
reducing outrage are five types of methods for increasing it.
These are exposing the action, validating the target,
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interpreting the events as an injustice, avoiding or discrediting official channels, and resisting intimidation and
rewards.
All of these methods were used following the Dili
massacre. The massacre was exposed to wider audiences
via eye-witness testimony, photos and video. For audiences
outside Indonesia, the East Timorese were just as deserving
of human rights as anyone else: the Indonesian government’s attempts at devaluation had little international
resonance. The massacre was presented to outside audiences as a gross injustice, and the claims by the Indonesian
government about protesters being violent and only a few
dying were countered. The East Timorese continued to
resist: they were not thwarted by intimidation.
Consider especially the role of official channels. The
Indonesian government and military had set up inquiries
into the massacre, giving the appearance that justice was
being done. However, for outside observers these were
quite inadequate, because they were carried out by the
groups responsible for the killings. It would have been more
credible for the Indonesian government to invite a respected
international organisation, for example Amnesty International or the United Nations, to hold an inquiry. However,
this would not have served the purposes of the Indonesian
government, because the findings would most likely have
been damning. The in-house inquiries were not going to be
so damning, but they also had little external credibility in
the face of the eyewitness and photographic evidence.
The setting up of inquiries in the aftermath of the Dili
massacre is an example of the use of official channels in
response to a sudden injustice. Rather than rely on existing
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procedures, special-purpose ones are created. This suggests
that when there is some urgency in countering perceptions
of injustice, official channels are brought into being.
So far, I’ve told just about the Dili massacre. Equipped
with a framework for making sense of outrage management, I started looking at all sorts of injustices. Remarkably, I found the same sorts of tactics being used in all sorts
of areas, from sexual harassment to genocide. Because this
framework, with the five types of methods to reduce
outrage and five types to increase it, was more elaborate
than Sharp’s political-jitsu, and applied to injustices well
outside the violence-versus-nonviolence template studied
by Sharp, I gave it a new name: the backfire model. In
retrospect, it might be more accurately called the outrage
management model.
The Sharpeville massacre
Sharp described several cases of political jiu-jitsu. To see
whether the backfire framework applied, I looked in more
detail at the 1960 Sharpeville massacre in South Africa,
during the era of apartheid when the white minority ruled
over the majority black population. In 1960, there were
nationwide protests against the pass laws, a type of internal
passport system used to control the black population. This
was during a period when the opposition was committed to
nonviolence. Due to a combination of circumstances, police
opened fire on a peaceful protest in the town of Sharpeville,
killing perhaps a hundred blacks, many of them shot in the
back while running away. White journalists were present,
and the story became front-page news internationally,
puncturing the illusion that the South African government
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was a respectable parliamentary democracy committed to
the rule of law.
On reading more about the massacre, especially Philip
Frankel’s authoritative book,4 I discovered evidence of all
five methods for reducing outrage: cover-up, devaluation,
reinterpretation, official channels and intimidation.5 Of
special interest here is the role of official channels. After
the massacre and the massive adverse publicity, the South
African government set up a commission of inquiry. This
gave the appearance of providing an independent assessment that would deliver justice. According to Frankel,
though, the inquiry was selective in the way it collected
evidence, assessed it and came up with findings. The
commission gave the appearance of being neutral while
delivering a report that largely exonerated the police and the
government.
The beating of Rodney King
I also started examining case studies that were well outside
of Sharp’s domain of violence versus nonviolence. One of
them was the 1991 beating of Rodney King by Los Angeles
police.6 King was driving, probably drunk, and speeding,
4 Philip Frankel, An Ordinary Atrocity: Sharpeville and its
Massacre (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001).
5 Brian Martin, Justice Ignited: The Dynamics of Backfire
(Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007), pp. 9–21.
6 Brian Martin, “The beating of Rodney King: the dynamics of
backfire,” Critical Criminology, vol. 13, no. 3, 2005, pp. 307–326.
For an expanded version of this article, see Martin, Justice Ignited,
pp. 43–64.
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and was followed by police in a long chase late at night.
When King’s car was finally stopped, King was arrested,
but only after being tasered and then brutally beaten. This
would not have been anything special except that the
commotion — including a police helicopter hovering above
and shining a light on the proceedings — awoke many
people living nearby, including George Holliday, who had
just bought a video camera. He recorded four police hitting
King dozens of times, and kicking him. Eventually
Holliday took the videotape to a television station. The
broadcast stunned viewers. The pressure on the government
and the police was immense.
Along the way, the police used the predictable ways to
reduce outrage, seeking to cover up the beating (that was
before the video was broadcast), to discredit Rodney King
(at the time and for years afterwards), to explain the beating
as legitimate and to intimidate witnesses. My focus here is
on official channels.
Immediately after the broadcast of the video — it was
screened repeatedly — the Los Angeles Police Department
set up an inquiry, and the city government set up its own
inquiry. Soon they were merged into what became known
as the Christopher Commission.
It’s useful to pause here and ask why inquiries were
set up. As known to anyone familiar with police matters in
Los Angeles, there had been numerous previous police
beatings, some of them far worse than King’s. There had
even been some citizens killed by the police in circumstances that warranted criminal investigation. However, the
police and the city government did not set up inquiries
concerning any of these cases in which police allegedly
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used excessive force. The usual official channels could be
used: police complaint procedures and the courts. Only
after the King beating were special inquiries set up.
The obvious explanation is the television broadcast of
the videotape of the beating. For previous beatings and
shootings, the police version of events was dominant. The
police and government officials had the advantage of being
authority figures, usually given more credibility than those
who were labelled or positioned as lawbreakers. Furthermore, the mass media normally reported the police version
of events, which meant that police beatings were seldom
reported at all, or just as arrests.7
After the beating of King, but before the video was
broadcast, King’s brother went to a local police station to
report it. Making a report or complaint to the police is a
typical official channel. However, the officer at the station,
instead of filing a report, started asking questions of King’s
brother, implying he had been in trouble. In the end, no
report was filed. So far as the police incident file was
concerned, the beating of King would never have been
included except for the video.
The broadcast of the videotape changed everything.
Members of the public, instead of having to rely on media
reporting to make a judgement, could view the video
themselves — and many were shocked. It was the shockwave that led the leaders of the police and the city govern7 Regina G. Lawrence, The Politics of Force: Media and the
Construction of Police Brutality (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 2000).
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ment to set up inquiries. It was a way, intuitively grasped,
of letting people know that justice would be done.
As well, there were other official channels deployed:
the courts. Without the videotape, King would have had no
prospect of suing the police. With the videotape, lawyers
took on his case. In addition, and more importantly, there
was a criminal case launched against the four officers
directly involved in the beating.
Because the King beating received saturation media
coverage, it led to a great expectation for justice to be done.
The court case against the four officers involved dragged
on for a year, with machinations that are a story in
themselves. Everyone, even the defence lawyers, expected
a jury verdict of guilty. When the actual verdict of not guilty
was announced, this triggered rage in the black population,
which can be interpreted as due to justice denied. People
had seen the video and made up their own minds, so the notguilty verdict was incomprehensible. In South-Central Los
Angeles, a massive three-day riot ensued, resulting in over
50 deaths, hundreds of buildings burnt and nearly a billion
dollars of damage.
Government officials felt the need to act to deal with
the perception of injustice. Their response: set up another
official channel. As the riot proceeded, President George H.
W. Bush announced a federal trial of the same four officers.
This time the government did what it could to ensure a
different outcome. Two of the officers were found guilty
and went to prison. There were no riots after this verdict
was announced.
The beating of Rodney King shows the importance
and limits of official channels. The clamour for justice was
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extraordinary because people saw for themselves what they
believed was a gross injustice, the beating of a defenceless
black man by white police officers. (Blacks and whites, on
average, responded differently to the beating.) The police
used methods of cover-up, devaluation, reinterpretation and
intimidation to reduce outrage, but these were not enough.
The Christopher Commission was set up, but the greatest
expectations were put on the court case against the police
officers. When it came up with an unacceptable outcome,
rage boiled over. This suggests that official channels, to
effectively reduce outrage, need to provide sufficient
symbolic redress for the perceived injustice.
For many viewers, the beating of King exemplified the
longstanding racism of the Los Angeles police. The
Christopher Commission, by making recommendations to
counter this racism, arguably addressed the underlying
feelings of the black population, but whether the commission’s findings would result in actual change was not easy
to determine. In contrast, justice for King himself was more
tangible, hence the expectations for the trial.
The story of the King beating suggests that the role of
official channels in reducing outrage from injustice is most
significant when other methods for reducing outrage —
cover-up, devaluation, reinterpretation and intimidation —
are inadequate.
Conclusion
Backfire analysis involves studying injustices in which the
perpetrators are powerful, and looking at the methods used
by the perpetrators to reduce public outrage. The most
commonly observed methods are cover-up, devaluation,
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reinterpretation, official channels and intimidation/rewards.
Of these five types of methods, the one most counterintuitive for most people is official channels. After all,
official channels are supposed to provide justice, and many
people turn to them to address obvious injustices. Yet in
case after case, powerful perpetrators use or create official
channels that serve to reduce outrage.
The key to this apparent discrepancy is that although
most people expect official channels to provide justice, in
practice they often do not, especially when perpetrators are
powerful.
In the case of the Dili massacre, the Indonesian
government used all five types of methods to reduce
outrage, including instituting inquiries, which led to limited
sanctions against a few scapegoat soldiers. What is revealing is that no inquiries had been set up after previous
massacres. That was because other methods, especially
cover-up, were sufficient to reduce outrage.
In the case of the beating of Rodney King, the Los
Angeles police and city government used all five types of
methods to reduce outrage. Several official channels were
pursued subsequently: a commission of inquiry was set up
and there were multiple trials. There was a widespread
expectation that the first trial of the four police officers
would lead to a guilty verdict. When this expectation was
dashed, a major riot ensued, which can be attributed to
collective outrage over injustice. This is a powerful
emotion, pointing to the importance of methods used to
reduce anger.
There are numerous other examples, in all sorts of
domains, of powerful perpetrators and their allies using
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methods to reduce outrage from their actions.8 My focus
here has been on the use of official channels. They dampen
outrage by promising justice but then, due to slowness,
technicalities and dependence on experts, doing little to
deliver it. The slowness of most official channels gives time
for outrage to die down. The technicalities and dependence
on experts mean that most people do not take the effort to
try to understand the proceedings, instead often just accepting or rejecting the outcome.
In terms of understanding the role of official channels,
the study of backfire dynamics offers several insights. The
first and most obvious is that when perpetrators are more
powerful, official channels are more likely to be useful to
them, especially by reducing outrage over injustice. A
second insight is that official channels may only be brought
into play when other methods of reducing outrage — coverup, devaluation, reinterpretation and intimidation/rewards
— are inadequate. When these methods are falling short,
authorities may sometimes set up special official channels
just for the occasion. In the case of the beating of Rodney
King, the establishment of the Christopher Commission
was an instance. Police racism and police assaults had
persisted for years, with no need for a special commission.
What triggered a need to invoke formal processes was the
broadcast of the video of the beating.

8 See “Backfire materials,” https://www.bmartin.cc/pubs/backfire.html.
Topics include censorship, climate change, corruption, defamation,
lying, protest, refugees, sexual harassment, torture, war, whistleblowing and workplaces.
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The implication is that understanding the role of
official channels requires understanding the wider patterns
of power and how power is exercised, and wider patterns of
belief and how belief can be transformed.
The backfire model can be thought of as a way of
looking at outrage management. It is most obvious when
there are sudden instances of apparent injustice that come
to public notice, such as the King beating and the Dili
massacre. However, the same processes occur in less
dramatic circumstances. Official channels can dampen
outrage over minor injustices, ones that seldom generate
widespread publicity, in much the same way.
Increasing outrage
Given that powerful perpetrators of injustice regularly use
five types of methods that reduce outrage, it makes sense
for people concerned about injustice to take countermeasures. The aim is to increase outrage, to a level that is
enough to trigger action for justice. How to do this? In terms
of tactics, it is worth looking for ways to counter each of
the methods used by perpetrators. For most of the methods,
this is straightforward.
• To counter cover-up, expose the actions.
• To counter devaluation, validate the targets.
• To counter reinterpretation, interpret the actions as
unjust.
• To counter intimidation and rewards, resist.
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In each of these cases, the way to increase outrage is to
directly counter the outrage-reducing tactics. However, for
official channels, the counter is not so obvious.
• To counter the use of official channels to reduce
outrage, what should you do?
One option is to try to discredit the official channels.
Another is simply to ignore them. However, neither of these
options directly fosters outrage. My preferred option is to
mobilise support.
Official channels serve to put the issue in the hands of
official or expert bodies, giving the impression that they
will handle the problem. In contrast, mobilising support —
encouraging people to become concerned and take action
themselves — does not rely on official channels. It means
people take matters into their own hands. To do this, they
need to have information and skills, for example in
communicating, networking, protesting and building
alternatives.
The backfire model thus provides a basis for formulating tactics against injustice. But does it imply that official
channels should never be used? No — there are often
practical or strategic reasons to appeal to or apply pressure
on official channels. What the backfire models says is that
to increase outrage about injustice, it is usually better to
mobilise support.

7
Elections
It’s election time. There’s lots of news coverage of the
upcoming election, and advertisements for candidates and
parties. You talk to some of your friends about the
prospects. The social media are filled with views. If you’re
conscientious, you read the statements made available by
candidates and parties in order to understand the options
and make a reasoned choice. Perhaps you’re even more
active, campaigning for your preferred candidates.
On election day, you attend the polling booth and cast
your vote, along with many others. Afterwards, you might
watch media coverage of the election results. On the other
hand, you might be one of those who don’t really care, and
don’t bother to vote, because the parties are all the same and
you can’t trust politicians. However, even if you’re indifferent or cynical, at election time it’s hard to avoid the
pervasive attention to voting and politicians.
Even if there’s no election imminent, there’s usually
plenty of media coverage of politics. Indeed, it is one of the
staples of news, along with crime and sports. Politicians
make pronouncements that are reported. Maybe there is
speculation about power struggles within parties, or about
new policies.
When there is some sort of crisis — a financial
meltdown, involvement in a war, or a natural disaster — all
eyes turn to the response of the government. Even in normal
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times, the government is often the focus of attention. People
are supposed to pay taxes, but many try to limit their
payments. On the other hand, people expect the government
to provide services, including schools, hospitals and roads,
and get upset when these are not as good as they could be.
It is reasonable to say that there are two official
channels involved here. One is the government itself,
including legislative and executive branches, plus all sorts
of government departments and agencies. The other official
channel is elections, which provide a process for changing
the government. Indeed, elections are touted as the essence
of democracy. They are said to give a mandate to governments to implement policies, and to give voice to “the will
of the people.”
Elections as liberating
In Britain, elections were introduced in the 1600s as a
restraint on the power of the monarchy. In the beginning,
only a few people were allowed to vote: men who were
property owners. This was a very restricted franchise.
However, after elections were introduced, the idea of voting
became associated with opposition to arbitrary rule. The
result was that as other groups mobilised and demanded fair
treatment, one of their expectations or demands was to be
able to vote.
The result has been a gradual expansion of the
franchise. The feminist movement exerted pressure to allow
women to vote. Associated with this expansion of the vote
was pressure to allow any man or woman to run for office.
Elections are threatening to powerful groups that want
to maintain their power, so various means have been used
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to control outcomes. One method is the gerrymander:
electoral boundaries are drawn to advantage one party over
another. The counter to the gerrymander is an independent
electoral commission that draws boundaries in a fair, nonpartisan manner. Gerrymandering continues to be important
in some countries, notably the US.
Another way to rig outcomes is to prevent or discourage some people from voting. This includes legal restrictions (for example to deny prisoners the right to vote),
difficult or confusing processes for registering to vote, and
the use of guile or force to prevent some people from
voting.
The presence of fair elections is often taken as an
indication of how free a society is. However, there is a
curious blinkering of views of the relevance of elections.
Many people work in large organisations with hundreds or
thousands of employees. This includes corporations,
government departments, hospitals, universities, churches,
militaries and international bodies. These organisations are
as large as the electorates of many towns, yet these large
organisations do not have elections. The contrast is stark: if
you are a citizen, you are entitled to vote for rulers, but if
you are an employee, you have no such right. Furthermore,
in many large organisations there are no political parties nor
rights of free speech.1
1 Elizabeth Anderson, Private Government: How Employers Rule
Our Lives (and Why We Don’t Talk about It) (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2017); Bruce Barry, Speechless: The
Erosion of Free Expression in the American Workplace (San
Francisco: Berrett-Koehler, 2007); David W. Ewing, Freedom
Inside the Organization: Bringing Civil Liberties to the Workplace
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Nearly all large organisations are bureaucracies: they
are structured as hierarchies with a division of labour, in
which workers are interchangeable cogs. “Bureaucracy”
here refers to a system of organising work, and is not
restricted to government. Corporations are just as bureaucratic as government departments. Sociologist Deena
Weinstein argued that bureaucracies are like authoritarian
states: they restrict free speech and assembly, do not have
elections for senior positions and do not allow groups to
campaign against the leadership. The main difference is that
bureaucracies operate without the use of physical violence:
there are no organisational police or troops used to quell
criminals or rebels.2
If having elections is a liberating process, the absence
of elections in large organisations shows liberation has a
long way to go.
Challenging unfair elections
Compared to dictatorship, representative government is a
great leap forward towards citizen participation and government accountability. Although some dictatorships are
benevolent, in many cases they lead to exploitation,
economic stagnation and denial of human rights, in line

(New York: Dutton, 1977); Alan F. Westin and Stephan Salisbury
(eds.), Individual Rights in the Corporation: A Reader on
Employee Rights (New York: Pantheon, 1980).
2 Deena Weinstein, Bureaucratic Opposition: Challenging Abuses
at the Workplace (New York: Pergamon, 1979).
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with Lord Acton’s saying, “Power tends to corrupt and
absolute power corrupts absolutely.”3
Even short of dictatorship, governments can be authoritarian and repressive. In some cases they are sham democracies, holding elections that are rigged in various ways, in
order to give legitimacy to their rule. Sham elections are a
classic example of official channels as facades.
Around the world, citizen campaigners seek to
challenge authoritarian governments, and some of the most
striking successes have been challenges to fraudulent
elections. In 1986, Philippines president Ferdinand Marcos
called an election, intending to legitimise his authoritarian
rule. Supporters of his opponent, Cory Aquino, refused to
accept the official result, apparently obtained by falsifying
voting returns. In the capital Manila, hundreds of thousands
of citizens joined a massive rally demanding that Marcos
resign — and eventually he did, when it became apparent
that police and troops were defecting to the opposition.4
In the late 1990s, Serbian president Slobodan
Milošević ruled with an iron hand, suppressing opposition
through a combination of techniques. Opponents of
3 For research that supports Acton’s aphorism, see David Kipnis,
The Powerholders (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976);
David Kipnis, Technology and Power (New York: SpringerVerlag, 1990); Ian Robertson, The Winner Effect: How Power
Affects Your Brain (London: Bloomsbury, 2012).
4 See for example Stephen Zunes, “The origins of people power in
the Philippines,” in Stephen Zunes, Lester R. Kurtz, and Sarah Beth
Asher, eds., Nonviolent Social Movements: A Geographical
Perspective (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), pp. 129–157.
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Milošević, led by the group Otpor, stimulated resistance
through broadcasts and protests, including humorous
stunts, and building grassroots opposition throughout the
country. In 2000, Milošević called a snap election to
legitimise his presidency in the face of opposition. He then
claimed victory, apparently through falsifying the results:
independent observers recorded a different outcome.
Following strikes and rallies, opponents from across the
country mobilised in a massive march to the capital
Belgrade. Troops were no longer willing to support
Milošević, and he was ousted.5
The pattern in the Philippines and Serbia was repeated
elsewhere, including in the Ukraine and Georgia. In each
case, struggles over elections played a crucial role. Governments used, and often manipulated, elections to give
themselves legitimacy. Challengers monitored the voting,
questioned the election results and used claims about
electoral fraud to mobilise popular resistance.
In these cases, honest elections served as an opportunity for social change. Elections are an official channel
for political decision-making, and active citizens see them
as crucially important. That is why they put so much effort
into all sorts of activities connected with elected politicians:
lobbying, fundraising, meetings of political party branches,
media commentary, candidate selection, opinion polling,
advertising and encouraging supporters to vote. Aside from
5 See for example Janjira Sombatpoonsiri, Humor and Nonviolent
Struggle in Serbia (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press,
2015).
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major sporting events, elections are one of the biggest
shows in town and expectations are high.
Elections offer legitimacy to rulers
Because elections give citizens a chance to participate in
decision making, the results of elections appear to reflect
the will of the people. This gives enormous legitimacy to
those who are elected. They are not there because of having
connections, money or ruthlessness, but because voters
chose them. Being seen to be elected is a source of strength
to rulers.
This is the reason why some dictators organise sham
elections. In the former Soviet Union, elections would be
held, and the Communist Party candidates would win
overwhelming victories, sometimes with 99% of the vote.
On the face of it, this had no credibility. Most Soviet
citizens knew the results were fraudulent, and so did foreign
observers. Despite widespread awareness that Soviet
elections were shams, with pre-determined outcomes, the
process nevertheless offered some additional symbolic
advantages to Soviet rulers. The public rhetoric of
communist states was filled with references to democracy.
Some governments make voting compulsory, including Australia’s. Although critics oppose compulsion on the
grounds of individual liberty, compulsory voting can serve
to increase the legitimacy of the government. In Australia,
it is compulsory to attend a polling station and cast ballots
— the penalty for non-compliance is a small fine — but it
is quite legal to spoil the ballot, for example to leave it
blank. Technically speaking, the compulsion is to attend the
polling station, not to cast a valid ballot. However, few
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voters choose this option. Once they are at the polling
station, they go ahead and vote. By participating in the
voting process, they give greater legitimacy to it: they
didn’t have to express a preference, but they did. Collectively, the high percentage of valid votes gives legitimacy
to the electoral process.
Compulsory voting in Australia can be compared to
voluntary voting in the United States, where in many parts
of the country some groups face barriers to voting. The
combination of barriers and apathy leads to low voter
turnout, sometimes less than 50%, reducing the legitimacy
of the outcome. If only half of citizens vote, those elected
have a harder time claiming a mandate from the electorate.
Compulsory voting raises an intriguing clash between
rights and legitimacy. Supporters of individual rights often
say voting should be voluntary. However, when the turnout
is low, this reduces the credibility of the electoral system.
Compulsory voting makes it easy to obtain a high turnout,
giving greater legitimacy to the system. Furthermore, citizens who vote, even when compelled, can feel a greater
psychological commitment to the outcome.
Conclusion
Elections can be thought of as an official channel, namely
as a formal way of dealing with an issue or problem. The
issue is choosing rulers — political decision-makers — and
the related problem is authoritarian rule. When elected
rulers do the wrong thing, citizens can toss them out of
office, at least if the system is sufficiently fair to allow this.
Because elections are seen to provide a proper way of
choosing decision-makers, this can lead to pressures to
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make them fair, including the expansion of the franchise,
removal of discriminatory barriers to voting, and popular
challenges to rigging of elections. One result of these efforts
is to turn elections into an end-stage goal. Rather than elections being seen as one technique for citizen participation
in the decision-making process, they become the only goal
thought to be important.
This brings up the other side to elections as official
channels: they restrain moves for greater participation. One
aspect of this is that elections are normally seen as appropriate for only one domain, called politics. Elections are
seldom used to choose leaders within large organisations —
government departments, corporations, churches, universities, militaries — which are supposed to be meritocracies
but have many elements of autocracy. What is called
politics represents just one arena.
There are various possible ways in which citizens can
play a role in public decision-making, including referendums, forums and random selection of decision-makers.
More fundamentally, the system of rule, with a few at the
top having far more decision-making power than ordinary
citizens, can be questioned. There are various alternatives
that devolve this power to neighbourhoods and workplaces,
but these are usually off the agenda.6

6 For example, Lyn Carson and Brian Martin, Random Selection in
Politics (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999); David Van Reybrouck,
Against Elections: The Case for Democracy (London: Bodley
Head, 2016); Colin Ward, Anarchy in Action (London: George
Allen and Unwin, 1973).
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In this context, elections provide legitimacy to the
system of rule. They restrain moves to give more power to
people at the grassroots.7
Elections, as official channels, thus have a dual role,
both enabling citizen input into political decision-making
while limiting the scope and immediacy of this input.
Elections, in their liberating role, can capture the imagination of those seeking greater freedom from tyranny.
Elections, in their restraining role, limit the prospects for
introducing more participatory alternatives.

7 The best treatment of this is Benjamin Ginsberg, The
Consequences of Consent: Elections, Citizen Control and Popular
Acquiescence (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1982).

8
A miscellany of
official channels
When you start looking, official channels are everywhere,
and so are people’s beliefs that they are the solution to
social problems. Here I’ve collected a few cases to illustrate
different angles and arenas.
Australian banking regulators
In Australia, for decades serious abuses occurred in financial services, such as fraudulently signing customers up for
risky loans, denying insurance claims based on outdated
medical definitions, and charging fees for no service.
Journalist Adele Ferguson played a major role in exposing
misconduct. Whenever her newspaper stories about problems in banking were published, she received lots more
information from whistleblowers and customers. In her
2019 book Banking Bad, she tells about the consequences
of the industry’s ruthless search for profits at the expense
of customers.1 Part of her story is about the failures of the
regulators, especially the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC). From her book, it’s possible to
extract a checklist of methods for a regulator to be ineffec-

1 Adele Ferguson, Banking Bad (Sydney: ABC Books, 2019).
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tual in its nominal job, and for a government to help in
achieving this goal.2
• Seek appointment of tame regulator heads.
Alan Fels, while chair of the Prices Surveillance Authority,
had been effective in using the media to expose companies.
Companies tried to prevent his appointment to head the
Trade Practices Commission (page 41).
• Denounce effective regulators.
The Trade Practices Commission, under Fels, ran an
inquiry, reporting in December 1992. Opponents attacked
its recommendations, saying it was “anti-business and anticompetition” (45).
• Investigate the journalist.
ASIC was slow to slow to respond to problems in the banks,
but after one of Ferguson’s articles appeared, within a day
ASIC considered making an investigation into Ferguson
herself (84–86).
• Take no action.
ASIC investigated the Commonwealth Bank of Australia.
It found problems but took no action (89).
• Delay.
Despite being alerted to serious problems, ASIC took 16
months to launch an investigation (93).
2 For modes of regulatory failure in other countries’ financial
institutions, see Kate Kenny, Whistleblowing: Toward a New
Theory (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2019).
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• Make false promises.
Whistleblower Jeff Morris met with ASIC staff in February
2011 and was assured that someone would investigate, but
four years later nothing had been done (150).
• Do not release criticism of regulators.
A “capability review” of ASIC contained serious criticisms,
especially in an “aide memoire.” The government did not
release the aide memoire (183).
• Go easy.
ASIC reported on banks’ charging fees for no service — a
form of robbery — by suggesting the cause was poor
systems and that all efforts were being made to repay customers (221). In ten years, it initiated no civil proceedings
against financial advisers, made no prosecutions for not
reporting breaches in time, investigated less than half of
“significant” breach reports, and took nearly two years on
average to make decisions concerning customer complaints
about poor financial advice (232).
• Collaborate with the institutions being regulated.
The Australian Prudential Regulatory Agency collaborated
with financial institutions and did not address their misconduct (262–264). ASIC asked the Commonwealth Bank
whether the penalty to be imposed was acceptable (274).
ASIC, when dealing with civil or criminal breaches, often
did deals before finishing its investigations (320).
• Impose inadequate penalties.
Penalties imposed by ASIC did not have a deterrent effect
(288).
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• Use a revolving door.
Many of ASIC’s staff had previously worked at the financial institutions it regulated and afterwards obtained jobs at
those institutions (321).
• When an inquiry seems inevitable, try to limit its impact.
For years, the banks and the Australian government resisted
calls for a royal commission. When, in part due to Ferguson’s exposés, some politicians initiated moves to instigate
a royal commission, the banks urged the government to set
up a commission itself, so it could set limited terms of
reference and choose the commissioner. The commissioner,
Kenneth Hayne, didn’t recommend any changes in the
financial system. Hayne, to address the failures of regulators, gave them more powers and more work, and hoped
they would do better (366–369).
The First Amendment
The First Amendment to the US Constitution is supposed
to protect free speech. It is taken for granted as being vital
for free speech, indeed almost a form of holy writ. Yet it is
possible to question the role of the First Amendment on two
grounds: it doesn’t work, and it’s not necessary.
Does it work? There are many examples in which the
freedom of speech, including the freedom of the press, has
been defended in court using the First Amendment. Less
often noticed are the many cases in which free speech is
restricted, yet the First Amendment provides little or no
protection.
Some US real estate developers have been challenged
by citizen protesters, who write letters and sign petitions
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against developments. To counter the opposition to their
plans, some of these developers sue the protesters for
defamation. This is one common scenario. Legal action for
defamation has been used by police, government officials
and numerous corporations to deter and attack critics.
Imagine you are an ordinary citizen who signed a
petition against a proposal to build a casino. Then you
receive a writ. You are expected to go to court to defend a
legal action for defamation of the developer. This can be
frightening. You might lose lots of money. The result: you
become much more wary about speaking out about the
casino.
Researchers George W. Pring and Penelope Canan
dubbed these sorts of legal actions SLAPPs, standing for
Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation. SLAPPs
were first named in the US, where they had become a
common phenomenon. Pring and Canan reported dozens of
examples involving defamation and other torts.3
The First Amendment protects press freedom. Less
well known is that it protects the right to petition the government. When people sign a petition or make a complaint
about police abuse, they are constitutionally protected. This
means that SLAPPs violate the Constitution.
This means that when you’re sued for speaking out,
you can cite the First Amendment in your court defence.
That’s fine, except that the process may require quite a bit
of time and money. Pring and Canan found that most
SLAPPs were never intended to be successful in court.
3 George W. Pring and Penelope Canan, SLAPPs: Getting Sued for
Speaking Out (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1996).
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They worked by intimidating their targets, even when they
nearly always failed legally.
What should be done about SLAPPs? One solution has
been for US states to pass anti-SLAPP laws. Yes, there are
laws against initiating legal actions that violate the constitutional rights of defendants. When there are anti-SLAPP
laws, these are sometimes effective. Still, it seems that
defending the right to speak in the US can be an onerous
business, requiring time, money and angst. Free speech is
protected on paper, in the Constitution, but this is not much
consolation if it costs too much.
SLAPPs are just one example of the limitations of the
First Amendment. There are lots of other examples. In his
book titled Freedom Spent, Richard Harris detailed several
cases in which constitutionally protected freedoms were
denied, yet it proved almost impossible to challenge this
through the courts. Harris concluded that the freedoms
enshrined in the Bill of Rights are seldom upheld and that
those who make personal sacrifices to push for their rights
guarantee them for everyone else.4
Several US state governments passed laws making it
illegal to defame foods, such as hamburgers. Absurd?
Commentators suggested that such laws would probably be
found unconstitutional, but to do this would require
someone appealing to the Supreme Court. The process
would be onerous and hasn’t been pursued. The laws
remain on the books. They serve as a deterrent.
Speaking out in public is one thing. When you go to
work, or rather as soon as you walk through the factory or
4 Richard Harris, Freedom Spent (Boston: Little, Brown, 1976).
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office door, your ability to speak freely without penalty is
greatly diminished. As discussed in chapter 7, there’s no
free speech at work,5 and workplaces, in this way, are
similar to authoritarian states.6
Speaking freely outside of work can be risky too, if
you value your current job or your future job prospects.
When you make a comment on social media, or post a
photo, it may be visible indefinitely. Criticising your
employer can be way to become jobless. Making political
or religious comments that offend employers is also risky.
What is safe to say depends a lot on the person, the
employer and the circumstances. The main point is that the
First Amendment doesn’t offer much protection to the
ordinary citizen in such circumstances.
So far, the point is that the First Amendment doesn’t
work nearly as effectively as might be imagined. Meanwhile, it provides opportunities for hordes of legal scholars,
lawyers and judges to try to interpret the voluminous legal
commentary on the Amendment. At least this is a pretty
safe way to exercise free speech: talk about constitutional
protection for free speech.
5 Elizabeth Anderson, Private Government: How Employers Rule
Our Lives (and Why We Don’t Talk about It) (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2017); Bruce Barry, Speechless: The
Erosion of Free Expression in the American Workplace (San
Francisco: Berrett-Koehler, 2007); David W. Ewing, Freedom
Inside the Organization: Bringing Civil Liberties to the Workplace
(New York: Dutton, 1977).
6 Deena Weinstein, Bureaucratic Opposition: Challenging Abuses
at the Workplace (New York: Pergamon Press, 1979).
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Adam Benforado, in his excellent treatment of biases
in the US legal system, highlights the limitations of relying
on regulations related to Constitutional protections guaranteed in the Bill of Rights. He concludes:
The complexity of our procedural rules — and the
work we have put into developing them — creates the
illusion of fairness. And that makes it all the more
difficult to address the problems that plague our
system. Ironically, it may be harder to eliminate false
confessions when there is an ineffective set of procedural rules aimed at preventing them than it would be
if there were no protections at all. With elaborate structures in place, it appears that we’ve addressed the issue, and anything that is not barred at the gates is given
little or no scrutiny — it’s assumed to be legitimate.7
The second point is that constitutional protection is not
necessary for free speech in practice. Australia’s constitution does not mention free speech, and there is no bill of
rights or other legislation that guarantees the rights of the
press or citizens. Yet speech in Australia does not suffer
greatly, at least not because of lack of constitutional
protection.
In some ways, Australia is not a good example,
because there are all sorts of restraints on speech. Defamation laws are draconian: they strongly favour plaintiffs, and
defendants have to fork out tens of thousands of dollars to
defend in court. There are oppressive laws concerning
7 Adam Benforado, Unfair: The New Science of Criminal Injustice
(New York: Crown, 2015), pp. 247–248.
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national security that criminalise whistleblowing and
reporting on corruption. There are hate speech laws (which,
however, are rarely invoked and don’t do much to limit hate
speech).
Despite the lack of constitutional or other legal protection, it can be argued that the ability to speak openly in
Australia is not systematically different than in the US. No
one has made a careful comparison. There is a lot of topnotch investigative journalism in Australia, lots of public
protest, and vigorous public debates on a range of issues. In
free speech terms, things are not wonderful by any means,
but they’re not terrible.
Would an Australian bill of rights make a difference?
Undoubtedly, but perhaps the effect would not be nearly as
dramatic as envisioned by advocates.
If there’s no constitutional protection, then how is free
speech, such as it is, maintained? The answer is through
expectations and campaigns. When an academic is dismissed from a tenured position because of their public comments, there are two responses that can be effective. One is
legal action for breaching the terms of employment.
Australian universities, like other workplaces, have enterprise agreements between management and the union, and
breaching these agreements is a basis for court action. The
other effective response is publicity. In prominent academic
freedom cases, there may be considerable media coverage.
The very prospect of adverse media stories is sufficient,
most of the time, to deter university administrations from
taking retaliatory actions.
In 2019, Gerd Schröder-Turk, a mathematician at
Murdoch University in Western Australia, commented on
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television about inadequate standards for admitting international students. The university administration sued him for
loss of international student income due to his comments,
and demanded access to information about his contacts with
journalists. This retaliatory action generated an enormous
show of support for Schröder and free speech, with over
25,000 people, including many prominent academics,
supporting a statement condemning the administration’s
action. The resulting bad publicity for the university, which
would probably hurt student recruitment, provided a warning to any other administration about the likely response to
attempted gags.
There are SLAPPs in Australia. They can’t be
countered by appealing to the constitution, so instead
campaigners use publicity to mobilise support, in conjunction with legal defences.8
The fixation on constitutional protection of free speech
often overshadows other methods for enabling free speech
and public deliberation. A lot of the commentary about the
First Amendment assumes that laws and courts are all
important. They can be important, to be sure, but it is also
important to understand the dynamics of free speech struggles and for more people to engage in these struggles.

8 Greg Ogle, Gagged: The Gunns 20 and Other Law Suits (Sydney:
Envirobook, 2009); Brian Walters, Slapping on the Writs:
Defamation, Developers and Community Activism (Sydney:
University of New South Wales Press, 2003).
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Human rights agreements
The United Nations International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights covers a wide range of human rights, for
example the right of peaceful assembly, freedom from
torture, the right to marry and equality before the law. Most
of the world’s governments have pledged to uphold these
rights. Does this make a difference? According to an
empirical study, a government becoming a party to this
human rights agreement seems to have had little observable
impact on its actions.9 One reason is that there are no
enforcement provisions. The result is that signing up to this
UN agreement may, in many cases, give only an illusion of
increased protection of human rights.
Research ethics review
Some researchers investigate chemicals. Others investigate
archaeological specimens. Some undertake research on
animals. And some investigate living, breathing humans.
For example, medical researchers study surgical techniques, psychologists study mental illness, education researchers study teaching techniques and sociologists study
family dynamics. A lot can be learned about crime, health,

9 Linda Camp Keith, “The United Nations International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights: does it make a difference in human
rights behavior?” Journal of Peace Research, vol. 36, no. 1, 1999,
pp. 95–118. For a more comprehensive analysis, which reveals
many complexities, see Linda Camp Keith, Political Repression:
Courts and the Law (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press, 2012).
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education, leadership, compassion and a host of other
topics.
Social scientists who study humans can use a variety
of techniques, including observation, interviews and
surveys. There are also some less familiar techniques. In
participatory action research, researchers join with
members of the community to undertake projects with a
dual purpose, to promote beneficial change and to learn
about social dynamics. For example, a researcher might
work with former prisoners to see how reintegration into
the community can be fostered.
Some research raises ethical concerns: subjects might
be harmed. In the 1970s and 1980s, a movement developed
to require university research involving humans to be
approved in advance by a research-ethics committee.
In the late 1980s, I interviewed leading Australian
proponents and opponents of fluoridation. I identified individuals I wanted to interview, contacted them and talked to
them in person or over the phone. It was straightforward.
The challenges involved deciding on the purpose of the
research, figuring out who to interview, deciding what to
ask and then using the information gained in research publications. Initially I planned to write a history of fluoridation in Australia. After the first two interviews, I changed
my plans. My interviewees couldn’t remember dates and
actions, but I learned a lot about the way they thought about
fluoridation issues.
By the 2000s, there would be an extra challenge:
obtaining approval from a human research ethics committee
to undertake the interviews. This would involve filling out
an application over 20 pages long (only some questions are
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relevant) and preparing an information sheet for interviewees plus a consent form for them to sign, as well as listing
typical questions that I would ask. Very likely, I would be
asked to make revisions in the application, for example
putting the university logo on the information sheet, and
asked for additional information about what would be done
with interview notes and what to do if interviewees became
distressed. Aside from the time to prepare the application,
the approval process could take a month, or several months.
For one of my PhD students, it took over a year to obtain
approval from two different committees to talk with groups
of youth about community engagement.
Research-ethics review has become standard in nearly
every research field, and seems to be especially important
in English-speaking countries. In the US, the committees
are called Institutional Review Boards (IRBs).
Criticisms of research-ethics review are commonplace. Researchers complain about excessive delays, about
petty bureaucratic requirements, and about the difficulty of
undertaking research on sensitive topics.
Will van den Hoonaard had experience on researchethics committees in Canada, and then had second thoughts
on their value. He undertook an ethnographic study of
research-ethics review in Canada, focusing on the social
sciences.10 He noted that the model for research ethics was
taken from biomedicine and imposed on the social
10 Will C. van den Hoonaard, The Seduction of Ethics:
Transforming the Social Sciences (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 2011).
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sciences.11 Some productive research methods in the social
sciences, for example community-building participatory
research, do not mesh with the biomedical model, and have
gone into decline. Van den Hoonaard says research-ethics
review is “impoverishing the social sciences.”
He found that committees gave certain topics more
scrutiny, or rejected applications entirely: “research on
vulnerable people, students studying children, pedophilia,
Aboriginal research and child or wife abuse, minors, the use
of medicinal (herbal) plants, sexuality, drug users, illegitimate activities, or infidelity among professors.”12
Disturbingly, he observed that the review process did
not make researchers more ethical: “Among all the interviews I conducted with researchers, there was not one who
said that complying with the review process led him/her to
more thoughtful, ethical research, and many saw the
process as torturous.”13
Carl Schneider undertook a comprehensive analysis of
the effect of IRBs in the US.14 His assessment is damning.
He provides numerous revealing examples and offers
cogent arguments showing that the system:

11 For a history, see Zachary M. Schrag, Ethical Imperialism:
Institutional Review Boards and the Social Sciences, 1965–2009
(Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010).
12 van den Hoonaard, p. 262.
13 Ibid., p. 223.
14 Carl E. Schneider, The Censor’s Hand: The Misregulation of
Human-Subject Research (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2015).
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• causes harm (including deaths)
• does not prevent unethical research
• hinders research
• is unaccountable (there are no appeal procedures)
• inhibits free speech
• is ever expanding (from government research to
university research, from academic to postgraduate to
undergraduate projects, from work by scholars to work
by non-scholars)
• provides no evidence to support its mandate
• is highly bureaucratic and procedural
• is erratic (different IRBs come up with different
requirements), and
• undermines ethical behaviour and effective professional controls over unethical behaviour.
IRBs prioritise protecting subjects over all other considerations, even when research benefits subjects, when subjects
are quite willing to participate, and when informed-consent
procedures distress subjects more than they protect them.
The IRB system is based on not trusting researchers,
which in turn undermines researchers’ commitment to
ethical behaviour. A fundamental problem is the reliance on
event licensing, in which a separate application is needed
for each research project, by people who are less expert than
the researchers.
Research-ethics committees are an official channel,
one set up to deal with harms to research subjects. According to critics such as van den Hoonaard and Schneider,
committees often exaggerate these harms, meanwhile
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preventing or distorting research agendas with subsequent
harm to the very groups that may benefit from the research.
Like many other official channels, research-ethics
committees are slow, procedural and deal with technicalities rather than substantive issues. The irony is that the rise
of this bureaucratic empire has undercut traditions of
professional ethics that had been well developed in many
disciplines.
Corporations versus activists
Some corporations become targets for activists. Think for
example of campaigners against smoking, protests against
arms manufacturers and climate-activist blockades against
coal exports. In response, corporations have used various
techniques, from public relations to getting police to deal
with protesters. One of the techniques sometimes used by
corporations is infiltration. Company employees or paid
agents join activist groups and build relationships with
members, thereby gaining information about activist plans
and strategies. The most insightful source about corporate
infiltration is Eveline Lubbers’ book Secret Manoeuvres in
the Dark.15
Lubbers examined the long-running campaign against
infant formula products, such as powdered milk, promoted
and sold in poor countries. Breast milk is nearly always
better for babies: it is designed by evolution to provide the
right sort of nutrition, and also provides protection against
15 Eveline Lubbers, Secret Manoeuvres in the Dark: Corporate
and Police Spying on Activists (London: Pluto Press, 2012).
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disease. However, some mothers cannot breastfeed, so
there is a legitimate role for purchased milk.
Some companies, however, promote infant formula as
superior even in circumstances when breastmilk is better.
In many poor communities, furthermore, the water used to
reconstitute powdered milk is contaminated, making children ill. For decades, activists have campaigned against
sales of powdered milk to poor people in developing
countries.
The campaigners’ primary target has been the company Nestlé. Opponents, a coalition of activists, churches
and health professionals, organised a boycott of the
company’s products. To deal with the opposition, Nestlé
hired various public relations companies. In 1981, Nestlé
hired Rafael Pagan, who set up an operations centre. Pagan
implemented a four-stage campaign. One of his aims was
to create divisions among the opponent groups by building
links with moderate groups. To help achieve this goal, he
set up the Nestlé Infant Formula Audit Commission
(NIFAC), a formal body for receiving public enquiries and
monitoring Nestlé’s commitment to World Health Organisation codes. Lubbers writes,
The creation of NIFAC served as an effective deflection shield for Nestlé. Rather than having to deal with
complaints directly, the company could plausibly
claim that NIFAC was studying the situation.16

16 Ibid., p. 54.
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Some of the groups involved in the boycott, especially
churches, wanted to give the formal process a chance.
Others wanted to continue the boycott. Pagan’s tactic
succeeded in splitting the boycott campaign, at least for a
while.
Lubbers notes an additional benefit to Nestlé of talking
with opponent campaigners: it gave insight into their thinking. “The Pagan case study illustrates that dialogue between
a company and its critics is a vital element of the corporate
counterstrategy and needs to be understood as a tactical
information-gathering exercise too.”17
The Pagan story illustrates how an official channel can
be set up for the express purpose of disrupting effective
campaigning.
Tax havens
Few people are eager to pay taxes, but most appreciate the
services supported by taxation such as roads, schools and
hospitals. Even when people don’t like paying taxes, often
they dislike even more tax avoidance by wealthy individuals and companies.
One of the methods of avoiding or minimising tax is
to put money in a “tax haven,” which is a country or jurisdiction with very low tax rates and high secrecy.18 For
example, a multinational corporation can establish its
17 Ibid., p. 80.
18 Nicholas Shaxson, Treasure Islands: Tax Havens and the Men
Who Stole the World (London: Bodley Head, 2011); Gabriel
Zucman, The Hidden Wealth of Nations: The Scourge of Tax
Havens (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015).
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central office in Switzerland, Hong Kong or the Cayman
Islands and use transfer pricing to reduce its apparent
income in higher-tax places like France and Sweden. A
company that makes a lot of money in France will sell some
of its output to the headquarters in Switzerland at a very low
price. On paper, the French branch ends up losing money,
so tax in France is minimised, while the Switzerland headquarters makes a lot of money, but this is okay because the
tax rate is low.
The existence of tax havens serves wealthy individuals
and companies, preserving and increasing their wealth,
which means taxpayers and governments elsewhere lose
out. What should be done about tax havens?
The problem has been around a long time. You might
imagine that governments around the world would get
together and figure out a way to eliminate them. But they
don’t, because that would mean challenging wealthy
companies and individuals. However, because tax havens
are such an obvious source of unfairness, governments need
to be seen to try to do something about them. So they set up
a process of negotiation. It’s a classic official channel.
Gabriel Zucman, who calculated that the amount of the
world’s “hidden wealth” was over $2 trillion, wrote a book,
The Hidden Wealth of Nations. He has a chapter on dealing
with havens. It could be a primer on the failure of official
channels: regulations set up in the European Union almost
seem designed to fail (and perhaps they were). Zucman
writes,
Fifteen years of negotiations in Europe — the first
discussions began at the beginning of the 1990s — to
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end with this: a directive filled with holes that shows
absolutely no serious will to fight against financial
dissimulation.19
Yet Zucman remains optimistic that something will be
done. He shows the logic of using direct action (trade sanctions and tariffs) against tax havens like Switzerland to
force action against the banks. He assumes that the logic of
the argument will win the day, though he admits that
“Although solutions exist, governments have not been
stellar up to now in their boldness or determination.” Based
on past lack of action, it seems more likely that delaying
actions will postpone the reckoning indefinitely.
Citizen action is a better hope. As Zucman says, “To
turn the page on large-scale fraud, the battle that must be
fought is not just a battle between governments. It is above
all a battle of citizens against the false inevitability of tax
evasion and the impotence of nations.”20
Israel-Palestine
For centuries, Jews in Europe were persecuted by Christian
rulers. This culminated in the Nazi genocide, called the
Holocaust, in which millions of Jews were murdered.
Even before the Holocaust, some Jewish figures were
searching for a homeland where they could be free of
persecution. They were called Zionists, and they mostly
focused on Palestine, the spiritual home of the Jews. After
19 Zucman, p. 72.
20 Ibid., p. 116.
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the Holocaust, the Zionist cause had much greater
legitimacy.
After World War I, the League of Nations gave the
British government a mandate to administer Palestine. Most
of the people living there were Palestinian Arabs. Jewish
immigration caused resentment and resistance among the
Palestinians. Tensions increased after the end of World War
II. To address the conflict, in 1947 the newly formed United
Nations recommended partitioning the territory. A war
ensued between Jews and Palestinians, who were supported
by forces from neighbouring Arab states. By 1949, the
newly formed state of Israel covered most of the former
British mandate of Palestine, and three-quarters of a million
Palestinians became refugees living in neighbouring countries. Some of them wanted to return. This was the basis for
a seemingly intractable conflict.
In 1967 and 1973, Israel fought wars against its Arab
neighbours, in the process occupying more land. The Palestinians remained exiled.
The Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO),
formed in 1964, became the most visible source of
resistance. In line with the concurrent Third World struggles against imperialism, the PLO endorsed armed struggle
and the transformative power of revolutionary violence.
However, this approach did little to advance the cause of
the Palestinians.
As the years went by, Palestinians in the occupied
territories of the Gaza Strip and West Bank increasingly
questioned their prospects of being liberated by an outside
organisation, the PLO, and in 1987 there emerged a popular
unarmed Palestinian resistance from within the occupied
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territories, called the intifada. This resistance involved
boycotts, symbolic protests, self-run schooling and throwing of stones. The intifada could be called unarmed. It was
far more effective than armed struggle in uniting Palestinians and generating international support.21
Eventually, the Israeli government agreed to negotiations with Palestinian leaders in what was called a peace
process, which led to the Oslo agreement in 1993. The
peace process promised to address Palestinian grievances,
and so the intifada ended. However, the Oslo accord did not
actually resolve the longstanding problems.
The conflict continued. There was a second intifada.
There were clashes between the Israeli military and Palestinian groups, with thousands killed, most of them Palestinians. There have been many peaceful protests by Palestinians and Israelis, though international news normally reports
only violence.

21 See for example Souad R. Dajani, Eyes Without Country:
Searching for a Palestinian Strategy of Liberation (Philadelphia:
Temple University Press, 1994); Marwan Darweish and Andrew
Rigby, Popular Protest in Palestine: The Uncertain Future of
Unarmed Resistance (London: Pluto Press, 2015); Maxine
Kaufman-Lacusta, Refusing to Be Enemies: Palestinian and Israeli
Nonviolent Resistance to the Israeli Occupation (Reading, UK:
Ithaca Press, 2010); Mary Elizabeth King, A Quiet Revolution: The
First Palestinian Intifada and Nonviolent Resistance (New York:
Nation Books, 2007); Andrew Rigby, Palestinian Resistance and
Nonviolence (East Jerusalem: PASSIA, 2010); Andrew Rigby, The
First Palestinian Intifada Revisited (Sparsnäs, Sweden: Irene
Publishing, 2015).

194

Official Channels

There is much more that could be said about the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The conflict evokes strong emotions, with views highly polarised. Here, my focus is on the
role of official channels.
Some official channels helped, in particular direct
negotiations between governments of Israel and neighbouring countries. However, for solving the Israel-Palestine
conflict, official channels have been ineffectual. Numerous
resolutions by the United Nations General Assembly have
been ignored by the Israeli government. Most disappointingly, the so-called peace process, including the Oslo
accords, gave only an illusion of providing a resolution.
Rwanda and the UN
Rwanda is a country in central Africa. Small by African
standards, it has a population of about seven million, most
of them Christians: it is the most Christian country in
Africa. Rwanda was previously a Belgian colony. The
Belgians had assigned most of the people to one of two
groups, the Hutu and the Tutsi. There is not all that much
physical difference between them, and many lived near
each other and intermarried. The Belgian administrators, by
relying on Tutsis for administration, laid the groundwork
for ethnic antagonism. On independence in 1962 the Hutus,
the much larger group, took control of the government.
Hundreds of thousands of Tutsis were forced out of the
country. Some of them joined an army called the Rwanda
Patriotic Front (RPF), which launched attacks over the
border from Uganda in the north. In the early 1990s, the
United Nations became involved. It helped negotiate a
truce, and a UN peacekeeping force — soldiers from
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several countries — was assigned to Rwanda. Relations
between the Rwandan government and the RPF remained
tense. The government encouraged racial hatred against
Tutsis.
On 6 April 1994, a plane carrying the president of
Rwanda was shot down by a missile near the airport in
Kigali, the capital. Hutus in the Rwandan government
blamed this on the RPF and immediately launched a
campaign to kill Tutsis throughout the country. Most
Western governments evacuated their citizens. The UN
peacekeeping force remained. However, according to its
mandate, it could not use force except for self-defence.
The commander of the peacekeeping force was a
Canadian, Roland Dallaire. He was appalled at the scale of
the killing. He pleaded desperately for reinforcements, and
for official permission to intervene against the killings.
By chance, at the time the Rwandan government was
a member of the UN Security Council, and Rwanda’s
representative said there was no problem. Instead of
reinforcing the peacekeeping force, the Security Council
ordered that most of the troops be removed.
Despite increasing reports about mass killings,
members of the Security Council were reluctant to label the
events as genocide. The same scenario played out in several
member countries. In the US, the government avoided the
word genocide, thereby avoiding the necessity to intervene.
More than half a million people were killed, both
Tutsis and so-called moderate Hutus. The genocide was
only stopped by the RPF which, after the killings began,
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relaunched its military attacks, eventually overthrowing the
government.22
Disarmament
Massive military establishments, arms races, war: many
people see these as major sources of human misery and
death. What should be done about them? Governments,
heeding popular pressure, have entered into negotiations to
regulate arms, reduce armaments and ban certain types of
weapons. Regulating arms is called arms control, and
reducing armaments is called disarmament.
There has been some progress. There have been
treaties about nuclear weapons, and bans of land mines,
biological weapons and chemical weapons. It sounds positive. The trouble is, this gives only the impression of serious
efforts to eliminate the means for war.
22 African Rights, Rwanda: Death, Despair and Defiance
(London: African Rights, 1995, rev. ed.); Michael Barnett,
Eyewitness to a Genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002); Roméo Dallaire with
Brent Beardsley, Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of
Humanity in Rwanda (New York: Carroll & Graf, 2004); Alison
Des Forges, “Leave None to Tell the Story”: Genocide in Rwanda,
2nd ed. (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999); Jean Hatzfeld,
Machete Season: The Killers in Rwanda Speak (New York: Farrar,
Straus and Giroux, 2005); Linda Melvern, Conspiracy to Murder:
The Rwandan Genocide (London: Verso, 2004); Samantha Power,
“A Problem from Hell”: America and the Age of Genocide (New
York: Basic Books, 2002); Scott Straus, The Order of Genocide:
Race, Power, and War in Rwanda (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 2006).
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For decades, some informed observers — those who
pay close attention to disarmament negotiations — have
been critical of the whole process. Decades ago, Alva
Myrdal wrote a book titled The Game of Disarmament in
which she exposed disarmament negotiations as a sham.23
They gave only the appearance of addressing the problem.
Look for example at nuclear weapons, which have the
potential to kill hundreds of millions of people and devastate the environment. The states with the most nuclear
weapons, the United States and Russia, have reduced the
number of weapons in their arsenals. That sounds promising. However, they have continued to “modernise” their
weapons and delivery systems, making them more effective
for war-fighting. None of the governments that acquired
hundreds of nuclear weapons beginning in the 1960s —
Britain, China, France — have renounced them, and several
other governments have joined the nuclear “club”: Israel,
India, Pakistan and North Korea. The only country to
develop nuclear weapons and then shut down its
programme was South Africa, and that was after the peaceful political revolution that ended apartheid.
In the 1970s, most of the world’s governments signed
the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It was intended to do two
things: to discourage governments that did not have nuclear
weapons from acquiring them, and to prompt nuclear
weapons states to disarm. Basically, the treaty was a
23 Alva Myrdal, The Game of Disarmament: How the United
States and Russia Run the Arms Race (New York: Pantheon, 1976).
See also Johan Galtung, “Why do disarmament negotiations fail?”
Gandhi Marg, nos. 38-39, May-June 1982, pp. 298–307.
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bargain between the nuclear weapons states and the others:
“Look, if you promise not to get any nuclear weapons, we’ll
do our part by gradually getting rid of ours.” The trouble is
that the second part of the agreement was quickly forgotten.
Nuclear weapons states have sat on their arsenals without
any intention of disarming.24 Meanwhile, leaders of these
states try to create alarm about other governments getting
nuclear weapons. Think of the uproar about North Korea’s
small arsenal and about the possibility that the Iraqi or
Iranian governments might obtain nuclear weapons.
The Non-Proliferation Treaty turned out to be a sham.
It might have been effective in discouraging some governments, like Australia’s, from seeking nuclear weapons, but
it has been completely ineffective in promoting disarmament by the major nuclear states.
The implication is not to put any trust in disarmament
negotiations. Governments are the ones that have built up
military systems. In most countries, militaries are more
likely to be used for aggression or repression than for
defence. Why should anyone expect that governments, the
cause of the problem, would also be the solution? Disarmament negotiations are more about regulating military races
than about serious steps towards disarmament.
In contrast, popular movements have made a difference. Lawrence Wittner made a massive historical study of
the movements against nuclear weapons. He found that
when movements were weak, arms races proceeded apace,
whereas when movements were strong, this limited arms
24 Paul Rogers, Losing Control: Global Security in the Twentyfirst Century (London: Pluto, 2000).
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races. He found evidence that governments were influenced
by protest movements, but they never admitted this in
public.25
Here’s what has happened over and over. There is
popular agitation for peace. Leaders in some governments
feel the pressure, so they enter into arms negotiations. This
gives the impression they are addressing the problem.
Unfortunately, the impression is often misleading. This
would be amusing except that so many lives are at stake.

25 Lawrence S. Wittner, The Struggle against the Bomb, 3 volumes
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993–2003).
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Conclusion
When was the last time you saw someone urinating in
public — someone who wasn’t drunk? In Australia at least,
there are laws against it, but laws aren’t the main reason it
has become uncommon. The reason is that public attitudes
have changed. Public urination is considered disgusting.
Laws might be helpful to deal with a few cases, but the main
deterrent is public pressure.
Another example is chewing tobacco. There used to be
spittoons in public venues. No more.
Centuries ago in Europe, there were no flush toilets.
Instead, guests at a castle would find a convenient corner or
use curtains.1 These days, it would be the height of bad
manners for a guest to pee on their host’s carpet. No law is
needed. Social pressure is enough.
Here’s a different example. You receive a call from a
stranger. The voice on the line says there’s a problem with
your Internet connection. Or they have detected some
malware on Windows. Or perhaps the caller talks about car
insurance, roof repairs or some other topic. After you’ve
received a few of these calls, you probably know they are
scams, attempting to get you to provide your credit card
number and password.
1 Norbert Elias, The Civilizing Process: The History of Manners,
volume 1 (New York: Urizen Books, 1978; originally published in
1939).
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Do you hang up immediately? Shout abuse? Listen
politely and say your Internet connection is fine — or that
you don’t have Internet? Ask the caller for a number to ring
back? Have a conversation with the caller and ask whether
it’s a hard job when so many people they call are nasty?
There are laws against scammers, and a few of them
are prosecuted. However, the most important method of
resistance is an informed public. As people become skilled
at recognising scams, scammers have to become more
sophisticated. Fake emails, asking for your password,
become ever more convincing, but gradually most users
become better at recognising scams or taking precautions
like checking with someone knowledgeable.
The point of these examples is that laws, like other
official channels, are not the only way to deal with undesirable behaviours. Cultural change, skill development and
collective action are also important.
What to do about official channels?
Four possibilities are to use them, reform them, oppose
them and ignore them. These are not mutually exclusive:
you might want to use an official channel to show its
weaknesses, and use this evidence to push for reform.
Let’s look first at using official channels. Based on the
experiences of whistleblowers and others, here are three
lessons.
1. When perpetrators are powerful, official channels are
more likely to serve to reduce outrage over injustice. For
example, when there’s a brutal attack on peaceful protesters, and it’s publicised, the government might set up an
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inquiry. Many people think the inquiry will provide justice,
so everything will be okay. The inquiry takes the issue out
of the public arena. It relies on experts, such as lawyers and
doctors, and slows things down. Only rarely does such an
inquiry bring down high-level officials: usually functionaries are blamed. It is even rarer for such an inquiry to foster
systemic change.
2. In deciding whether to use an official channel, look at its
track record. How many complaints about sexual harassment are vindicated? How often do whistleblowers succeed
when they take legal action against their employers?
In many cases, it’s hard to find evidence of an
agency’s track record. You can’t rely on media stories,
because they typically report exceptional cases, like the
whistleblower who is awarded $10 million in compensation. It’s not news when a hundred whistleblowers, in
separate cases, receive nothing or a pittance. You can try to
talk to others who have used the same official channel. That
may not give you an accurate estimate of your chances of
success, but it is better than nothing and can give some
indication of the time, effort and money that will be
required.
You know your case is very strong, so even though
others haven’t succeeded, you think you will. The trouble
is, all the others thought their cases were strong too. Even
when you believe the evidence is overwhelmingly in your
favour, it’s still quite possible you will fail.
3. In deciding whether to use an official channel, compare
it to alternatives, in particular mobilising support and
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developing skills. Think about using an official channel in
conjunction with these alternatives.
One of the biggest traps is to go immediately to an
official channel — whether the police, ombudsman,
experts, politicians or senior management, among others —
without considering alternatives. This is a trap because of
points #1 and #2: the official channel may end up reducing
outrage about an injustice or it may have a bad track record
in dealing with cases such as yours.
How do you make a comparison with alternatives? It’s
not easy, because often there’s insufficient information. It’s
valuable to talk to people who’ve been through it
themselves. For official channels, talk to people who’ve
used them. For mobilising support, talk with people in
activist groups or who have run campaigns. For skill
development, again talk with people who have made this a
priority.
One of the common illusions about official channels is
that they will provide a prompt solution. This only happens
rarely. Even if there is a major government investigation
into a social problem, it may not lead to much change.
Social change takes time. So, when comparing official
channels with alternatives, think long term. Nothing is
likely to provide a quick fix. The fair comparison will
consider the long-term effects of using official channels,
mobilising support and developing skills.
Rather than just using official channels, another option is to
reform them. This might be improving whistleblower laws,
sexual harassment procedures or United Nations processes.
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If laws and processes can be improved, that will help a lot
of people in the long run.
Again, it’s important to compare efforts to promote
reform with alternatives. Furthermore, sometimes the alternatives are roads to reform. When employees become
skilled at anonymous leaking in the public interest, employers and governments may feel impelled to introduce better
whistleblower protection schemes — better on paper, at
least. Massive protests against war provide pressure on
governments to seriously discuss disarmament.
A third option is to oppose official channels. This is
worth considering when they serve as a dangerous façade.
For example, quite a few authoritarian governments run
fake elections, in which opposition movements have no
chance due to corruption in vote counting, hindering of nongovernment parties, preventing opposition figures from
being on the ballot, or arresting them. In some such circumstances, it may be better to denounce the elections as a
sham. Opposing an official channel can help to highlight its
deficiencies, and sometimes to lead to improvements. The
point here is that opposing an official channel is worth
considering as an option.
Finally, sometimes it is better just to ignore official
channels, especially when they don’t work very well.
Rather than spending energy in trying to use them or to
reform them, it can be more effective to look for other ways
to achieve the same goals. Alternatives include finding or
developing ways to address problems directly. This often
involves helping people acquire skills and act together
without relying on someone else to take action on their
behalf.
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Final thoughts
Many people look to authorities for protection. They want
to believe that government agencies, experts, politicians,
courts and upper management, among others, will address
problems. Sometimes they will. My argument here is that
often they don’t or won’t. My central message is not to rely
on official channels. Be sceptical. Investigate performance.
Check out alternatives.
Most of the people working in official channels are
doing their best. To question reliance on official channels
is not a reflection on individuals in the system.
At one level, this advice is obvious. Of course official
channels don’t always work. Nevertheless, belief in salvation from on high is widespread. If one agency won’t help,
then find another. If the government is corrupt, elect a new
government. To counter this automatic tendency to turn to
official channels, it is important to keep in mind other options: developing skills, changing cultures, acting collectively and developing alternatives.

Epilogue
A different perspective
The golden rule: he who has the gold makes the rules
Official channels often give only an illusion of addressing
problems. Rather than relying on official channels and
expecting them to deliver fair outcomes, it is important to
consider alternative options, including developing skills
and changing cultures. That is the argument in this book.
But before concluding, it is worth examining quite a different angle on official channels. Perhaps they serve to maintain the system — not by failing but by succeeding.
In the study of US regulatory systems — especially
systems to regulate commerce, for example railways, electricity and manufacturing — the dominant voice has been
criticism of government interventions on the grounds that
they discourage innovation and entrepreneurialism. This is
the “big government is bad” theme in US political culture,
exemplified by President Ronald Reagan’s comment that
“Government is not a solution to our problem, government
is the problem.”
However, there is another perspective on the regulatory impulse in US politics and economics. According to
some scholars, regulation enables the system to survive,
and gives advantages to big business.1 Without regulation,
1 Classic treatments of the US progressive era include Gabriel
Kolko, The Triumph of Conservatism: A Reinterpretation of
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small businesses could undercut big businesses through
nimble innovation and lower prices. The result would be
ruthless competition, driving down profits. Big business
needs government intervention to thwart competition, in
other words to protect monopolistic and oligopolistic
operations.2
An example is the patent system. Patents are a restraint
on trade, preventing competitors from producing similar
goods for the duration of the patent protection. In a truly
free market, there would be no patents and prices would decline, sometimes precipitously. The cost of pharmaceutical
drugs, for example, would quickly drop to just above the
price of production, just as with generics now.
Regulations, like patents, benefit larger companies,
because complying with regulations takes up a smaller
proportion of their overall expenses. Big companies may
complain about regulations but actually need them to
ensure larger profits. That is why the push for greater
protection of intellectual property comes primarily from the
American history, 1900–1916 (New York: Free Press, 1963) and
James Weinstein, The Corporate Ideal in the Liberal State: 1900–
1918 (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968). For a more general critique of
institutions, including regulatory bodies, see Butler D. Shaffer,
Calculated Chaos: Institutional Threats to Peace and Human
Survival (San Francisco: Alchemy Books, 1985).
2 Economist John Kenneth Galbraith distinguished between two
components of the economic system: the market system and the
planning system. In the planning system, big businesses control the
conditions for surviving and thriving. See for example Economics
and the Public Purpose (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973).
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largest companies in software, publishing, biotechnology
and pharmaceuticals.
From this perspective, ensuring that regulations are in
place and have an effect enables the economic system to
continue to give the greatest rewards to those with the most
power and money.
Another way to look at this is to observe that the rules
governing activities are not neutral but instead are usually
biased in favour of those with the most power to shape the
rules. Progressive income taxes, for example, seem to
penalise those who make more money, but this is in the
wider context of income inequality. If the head of a
company makes ten or a hundred times as much as a shoplevel employee, it doesn’t really matter that the head has to
pay a higher percentage of income tax. (Various forms of
tax avoidance for the rich are an added advantage.) The
rules, in this case, are the various processes that create
inequalities in income. The income distribution is often
treated as natural, as unbiased, rather than the result of
pressures and power plays that advantage some groups and
disadvantage others. It is not part of nature that a doctor
earns more than a cleaner or that a school principal earns
more than a childcare worker.
In this context, regulations help maintain a system
built around inequality, exploitation and unfairness. In
short, the system is rigged even when everyone follows the
rules. Those who benefit most from the rigged system need
regulators to keep upstarts in line.
Consider how this perspective applies to the case
studies in this book. Much whistleblowing, namely speaking out in the public interest, concerns various forms of
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cheating: people or organisations getting an unfair
advantage by stealing, bending the rules and causing harm
without penalty. If there were no such cheating, nevertheless the rules could be biased. Someone who challenges
economic inequality, or who challenges environmental
degradation, is not usually called a whistleblower, but
might be called a reformer or activist. The implication is
that whistleblowing is vital for challenging some forms of
corruption but seldom enough to challenge institutionalised
unfairness and harm.
Imagine that sexual harassment procedures worked
ideally, so in workplaces there was no overt harassment.
However, this would not be enough to challenge power
inequalities associated with organisational hierarchies. Nor
would it get rid of sexual harassment, which regularly
occurs outside of workplaces, for example on the street.
Inequalities in power are vitally important, and enable
harassment.
Getting rid of student plagiarism sounds fine, but this
does not address more fundamental features of schooling
that can undermine learning, including the system of grades
with its associated assumption that learning is a competitive
endeavour and that status hierarchies are legitimate.
Rules governing the editing of Wikipedia are intended
to ensure a good quality product, namely accurate and
useful information. The trouble is that these rules can be
used by editors to promote their own preferences and push
out or discourage others. Following the rules is insufficient
to address this problem.
There are many problems with the system of electoral
politics. In some countries, such as the US, certain catego-
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ries of people are excluded or discouraged from voting.
Many voters may be ill-informed, swayed more by slogans
and attention to personality than by careful consideration of
policies. Campaigners regularly make promises that, when
elected, they do not fulfil. Politicians are influenced by
campaign donations and lobbying. Imagine that all these
shortcomings could be overcome: all citizens are enabled
and encouraged to vote, candidates cannot campaign but
can only provide standardised information about themselves, and the boundaries for electorates are assigned by
an independent body. Even in such an ideal system there
would still be the inherent limitations of representation,
including that a small number of individuals make
decisions on behalf of an entire community.
In these and other examples, ensuring that rules are
followed is worthwhile but not the end of the story. Official
channels can only do so much when the rules underpin a
system that is less than ideal. The implication is that part of
the struggle for a better world is questioning the rules and,
when needed, trying to change them.

Appendix 1
Roles of official channels
Official channels can be understood from various perspectives. Here, I discuss several roles they can play.
• As organisations or processes
• Doing the right thing
• Under attack
• Serving as tools
• Attacking
• As misleading symbols
• As theatre
Many people assume official channels do just what they say
they do: the right thing. That’s good when it occurs.
However, it’s useful to imagine that other things are going
on, and this is where the different perspectives can be
helpful. In practice, many official channels operate differently at different times, or have several different processes
going at the same time. It’s risky to accept or dismiss an
agency on the basis of a single perspective. It can pay to
investigate with an open mind.
As organisations or processes
Official channels can also be understood as organisations,
with internal power dynamics, including dissent, suppression, factions and so forth. In this they are no different than
other organisations. However, people tend to think of
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organisations — some of them, anyway — as unitary
entities, for example when referring to “the government” or
“Canberra” or “they” as if government is a monolithic
whole. It can be useful to remember that not everyone
inside an organisation agrees with the views expounded by
those at the top, and indeed some may be actively trying to
change directions.
Some official channels are more processes than organisations, for example elections. Even so, processes require
people to work together towards an outcome, so there are
some human dynamics, often inside organisations or more
widely through networks.
Doing the right thing
Imagine an organisation that does everything the right way:
it does its job the way it’s supposed to, and the way it says
it does. This is the ideal.
An ombudsman’s office, for example, might deal with
all submissions promptly, efficiently and fairly, according
to publicly available processes and criteria. No special
favours are done, and no one is brushed off without proper
treatment.
When organisations do the right thing, often this
means they are professional and even harmonious internally. Each member does their job well, without interference from ambition or idiosyncrasies or personal vendettas.
There might well be disagreements, even fierce ones, but
these are dealt with in an open and honest manner, using
conflict resolution techniques if necessary. Conflicts are in
the service of performance and improvement, not to their
detriment.
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Ideally, a high-performing watchdog agency has
ample resources to deal with all relevant matters, even with
some spare capacity to handle emergencies or major cases.
However, having ample resources is unlikely, especially
because a high-performing agency is likely to develop a
reputation and attract more “business.”
Even an organisation that is woefully underfunded can
still do the right thing, with the qualification that this is “to
the best of its ability.” Performance needs to be judged in
relation to capacity.
It is natural to imagine that this hypothetical organisation — ethical, efficient and high-performing — will have
a sterling reputation. However, this may not be the case. A
good watchdog agency is bound to offend powerful
individuals and groups, who may attempt to discredit,
hinder or defund the agency. Those who are powerful are
likely to judge an organisation not by how well it is doing
its job but by how well it is serving their interests. Various
means can be used against an effective agency.
Furthermore, no agency should be expected to do
everything well. A more realistic expectation is that it does
some things well, especially the most important things. An
example is a court that makes wise decisions on the most
significant cases.
Curiously, there seems to be relatively little writing
about organisations doing the right thing. Most of the
attention is on problems, shortcomings and failures. There
are relatively few news stories about well-functioning
organisations, and relatively little scholarly attention to
explaining how they do as well as they do.
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Under attack
Sometimes agencies come under attack, for various
reasons, including for doing the right thing. This occurs
when judges make rulings that politicians or people don’t
like, so there is talk about limiting the autonomy of judges,
for example with mandatory sentencing laws.
When a watchdog agency actually does its job well,
this can be threatening to corrupt groups and so there is
pressure to rein in the agency, for example by cutting its
funding, changing its staff, imposing controls over its
powers or even shutting it down.
Indonesia’s anti-corruption body KPK (Corruption
Eradication Commission) has been highly effective, and as
a result has had a high degree of public support. Legislators
have made many attempts to muzzle the KPK.
As tools
Many government-funded agencies are nominally independent. They are required to operate according to legal
mandates. In practice, some agencies operate as tools of
others. An example is a corporate regulator that, instead of
dealing with illegal and unethical business activities,
protects the corporations it is supposed to monitor and
sanction. There’s a body of writing about “captured bureaucracies” and “regulatory capture.”1 These terms refer to
regulatory agencies that serve the interests of the industry
1 For example, Ernesto Dal Bó, “Regulatory capture: a review,”
Oxford Review of Economic Policy, vol. 22, no. 2, 2006, pp. 203–
225.
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groups they are supposed to regulate: the agencies have
been “captured” by the industry.
Also fitting in here are front groups, for example
corporate-funded groups that look like they are grassroots
environmental groups but actually have little or no citizen
involvement. These are different in that they were never
intended to be independent.
It’s not clear whether or how to distinguish captured
bureaucracies and front groups. The origin of the capture
and how the capture operates may be different but the result
is much the same: what appears to be an independent group
is actually serving a master, and the service to the master is
all the more effective the more the group is perceived as
being independent. In both cases, exposure is an effective
way to challenge these groups.
In many cases, there is direct sponsorship, for example
of front groups. However, captured bureaucracies are not
usually formally dependent on the relevant industry group:
there is a process of accommodation, interaction and
sharing of worldviews. Finally, there are instances in which
groups can be “captured” even without any action by the
industry that benefits. The classic treatment is Matthew
Crenson’s The Un-politics of Air Pollution.2 Crenson
documented that a local government body made decisions
in support of the dominant corporation in the area, US Steel,
even though US Steel apparently did nothing overt to influ2 Matthew A. Crenson, The Un-politics of Air Pollution: A Study
of Non-decisionmaking in the Cities (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1971).
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ence the decision-making process. Just by being there, it
seemingly shaped the agenda of the government.
Attacking
Sometimes agencies go on the attack against anyone posing
a threat to the groups they are supposed to regulate. For
example, a police force, instead of pursuing organised
crime, might instead attempt to harass and frame whistleblowers who are challenging organised crime.
As misleading symbols
In many cases, agencies and processes appear to be doing
something when actually little or nothing is happening. This
serves to reassure people.
Courts and prisons give the appearance of protecting
society from transgressions. This occurs in some cases, but
in a very selective fashion. Some sorts of transgressions,
especially some crimes of violence, are treated severely,
whereas others, like massive corporate corruption, are
implicitly approved.3 There are numerous other examples,
including whistleblower laws and other cases in this book.
In many of the cases in which official channels serve
as misleading symbols, they are also serving as tools of
others. In most of the backfire cases, that is the whole point.
After a massacre that causes a tremendous outcry, governments set up investigations as a means of showing that the
3 Thane Rosenbaum, The Myth of Moral Justice: Why Our Legal
System Fails to Do What’s Right (New York: HarperCollins,
2004).

Roles of official channels

217

problem will be fixed, even though not much change may
happen.
As theatre
Official channels sometimes operate as a type of theatre for
observers. One example is royal commissions that seek
publicity, turning the formal part of the investigation into a
show. The New South Wales royal commission into police
corruption, held in the mid 1990s, was able to turn one
corrupt policeman to become an informant, and he covertly
videoed some of his dealings, which had tremendous
impact when broadcast on television. A few of the investigations of the Independent Commission Against Corruption
in NSW have followed the same path (see appendix 3).
However, not every royal commission seeks or
achieves a high public profile and becomes a drama in this
sense. According to Rodney Tiffin in Scandals, only a few
royal commissions go down this road.4
There’s a complication in talking about official channels as dramas, in that nearly anything in life can be treated
as a drama. Indeed, drama is a common metaphor, and one
can point to actors, stages, plots and so forth.
If everything can be thought of in dramatic terms, what
is different about the dramas involving official channels?
One is the outcome, the denouement of the plot, which is
supposed to dispense justice. Another is the plot line, which
is the process of dispensing justice. A key difference
4 Rodney Tiffen, Scandals: Media, Politics and Corruption in
Contemporary Australia (Sydney: University of New South Wales
Press, 1999).
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between different cases is the size of the audience, small in
many instances but occasionally huge. The NSW Police
Royal Commission and Soviet shows trials were intended
to have large audiences, and did. The performers in the OJ
Simpson episodes probably didn’t want a large audience,
but the media ensured that they did.
The next two appendices are case studies intended to illustrate some of the categories outlined above.

Appendix 2
Watching the doctors?
If you live in the Australian state of New South Wales and
you want to make a complaint about a doctor or nurse, the
obvious place to go is the Health Care Complaints Commission (HCCC). It was set up by the state government to deal
with shortcomings in the health professions. According to
its web page, the HCCC “acts to protect public health and
safety by assessing, resolving, investigating and prosecuting complaints about health care.”1
The HCCC is a classic sort of official channel. It is a
watchdog body, aimed keeping practitioners in the health
system under scrutiny.
Here, I quote media reports about the HCCC, especially about its inadequacies. The purpose of this is to
illustrate some of the roles of official channels.
A health watchdog with no fangs
It was April Fool’s Day, 1 April 2004, but the front-page
headline in the Sydney Morning Herald was no joke. The
Herald is one of Australia’s quality newspapers, well respected and not given to scandal-mongering. The unusually
long headline read:

1 Health Care Complaints Commission,
https://www.hccc.nsw.gov.au, 1 March 2020.
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They entered hospital full of trust. Now they are dead
or damaged. And no case was properly investigated.
Not one.
In the centre of the front page was a box titled “16 cases
that demand answers.” The first one read:
A visiting surgeon who was given the okay from the
relative of a patient to perform a mastectomy. The consent form was incomplete and referred to the incorrect
operating site. The wrong breast was removed.
This is the sort of case that the HCCC was set up to deal
with. There was a serious failure of procedures that needed
to be investigated. The problem was that the HCCC wasn’t
investigating properly. The main story began this way:
As many as 16 doctors working at Camden and Campbelltown hospitals face further investigation and
possible disciplinary action after an inquiry found that
the NSW health watchdog had botched investigations
into every complaint it considered.
The interim report, prepared for a special
commission of inquiry by Bret Walker, SC, identified
10 patients whose cases were mismanaged.
They include a woman who lost the wrong breast
in a mastectomy and a patient who broke her pelvis
when she fell out of bed but whose condition was not
recorded in notes.
In all, 70 complaints were examined but Mr
Walker said not one of them was properly investigated
by the Health Care Complaints Commission (HCCC).
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The message was stark. The HCCC, set up to investigate
complaints about health providers, wasn’t doing its job.
Why not? In an accompanying article also on the front page,
a journalist offered a comment under the title “Who put the
muzzle on the watchdog?”
Bret Walker’s interim analysis of the Camden and
Campbelltown hospitals quagmire can be distilled into
one arresting finding: the state’s health watchdog is no
sick puppy. It has long been armed with well articulated jaws and sharp legislative teeth.
The problem at the heart of this shocking human
tragedy is that when it came to pursuing individuals —
in this case 16 doctors and potentially as many nurses
— the old watchdog was disobedient to its legislative
master.
And it wilfully refused to bare its fangs.
The HCCC had been given considerable powers by the state
parliament. It had the power to deal with complaints about
the health system generally and complaints about individual
doctors and nurses. But it decided to treat complaints about
individuals as complaints about the health system. It meant
that the HCCC essentially did nothing about complaints.
And, according to the report by Bret Walker, the HCCC’s
investigations all had flaws.
Another black mark for the HCCC was the case of
Graeme Reeves, a surgeon who carried out numerous operations that maimed or killed patients, targeting women and
babies for unnecessary or excessive operations. In one case,
he removed a woman’s vulva without permission; the oper-
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ation is normally only considered when cancer is present,
but there was none in this case.
In early 2008, Channel 9’s television show Sunday
broadcast three programmes about Reeves titled “Who
watches the doctors?” The programmes exposed Reeves’
behaviour based on numerous complaints. Channel 9’s
coverage was followed by major stories in the Sunday
Telegraph newspaper. As a result of the media exposés,
hundreds more women came forward with complaints
about Reeves.
Where was the HCCC during this time? Before the
Channel 9 programmes, the HCCC had received two dozen
complaints about Reeves. “Who watches the doctors?” put
the spotlight on the HCCC’s inadequate action.2
Reeves was charged with numerous crimes, including
female genital mutilation, and was convicted and imprisoned. The legal system seemed to offer Reeves every
consideration, while his victims received little, but that is
another story.
Reeves, dubbed “the butcher of Bega” — Bega is a
town in southern NSW — is the poster story suggesting the
failure of the HCCC. Reeves’ crimes were extensive and
there were numerous complaints about him, but the health
watchdog did nothing. However, Reeves was only the most

2 For the HCCC’s perspective, see “Review of past handling of
complaints against Dr Graeme Reeves,” Media release, 5 March
2008, https://www.hccc.nsw.gov.au/Publications/MediaReleases/Review-of-past-handling-of-complaints-against-DrGraeme-Reeves.
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prominent of numerous doctors whose misdeeds were
unimpeded by the HCCC.
Was the HCCC a rogue operation? Or was its behaviour typical of medical regulatory bodies?
The Queensland Medical Board
In Sydney in November 2013, Whistleblowers Australia
held its annual conference. One of the speakers was Jo
Barber, a well-known whistleblower.3 She had a background in policing and then obtained a job with the Queensland Medical Board. The QMB is a watchdog body tasked
with dealing with complaints about doctors and nurses in
the state of Queensland. It might be thought of as the
Queensland equivalent of the HCCC.
Arriving at the job, Jo was assigned 50 cases. She
found an office in a state of disarray. For some of the cases
she was assigned, there were boxes of files that went back
several years. These were boxes of complaints and related
material about a single doctor. What this meant, in some
cases, is that numerous patients and family members had
made complaints about a particular doctor, and their
complaints had sat in files at the office for years, nothing
having been done.
Even worse, Jo discovered that the board had no
proper filing system. There was no system for recording
complaints received and the status of an investigation.
3 Jo Barber, “Queensland Medical Board allowed dodgy doctors to
work,” The Whistle (newsletter of Whistleblowers Australia), no.
77, January 2014, pp. 9–10.
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Having been a detective, this level of poor record management was almost inconceivable to her.
After she started going through some of the files, she
was even more appalled. There were records of doctors who
had been harming patient after patient over a period of years
— yet nothing had been done with this information.
Jo estimated that the number of “rogue doctors” — the
ones causing serious harm to patients due to incompetence
or malice — was only one or two percent of the total. Most
doctors were doing a good job most of the time, and their
mistakes were occasional and inadvertent. But a small
number were causing immense damage, and it was easy to
identify them by monitoring complaints.
Jo discovered there was enormous resistance to taking
any action against these rogue doctors. The top managers in
the QMB did not want to disturb the medical profession
through exposures or vigorous prosecutions. The leaders of
the Australian Medical Association in Queensland opposed
exposure and prosecution. Why? Because it would threaten
the public image of doctors as respected professionals.
Jo discovered this when she spoke out about problems.
She suffered reprisals. Luckily, she obtained publicity for
her claims. As a result, she was contacted by dozens of
doctors and nurses from around the state confirming her
claims.
She told about one particular doctor who seemed to be
a psychopathic killer. He would turn off life-saving equipment or in other ways threaten the lives of patients. After
the board received complaints and felt compelled to act,
what did it do? It said the doctor could continue surgical
operations but he was supposed to stay away from a partic-
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ular item of equipment. Who was monitoring this restriction? No one. Jo said this doctor was still practising in
the state.
Medical dominance
It may seem amazing that regulation of doctors can be so
lax. Some insight into the reasons why is provided by
studies in the sociology of professions.
Professions are occupations — like law, medicine,
dentistry and engineering — in which the practitioners
claim a special commitment and mandate. Unlike other
occupations such as farming, carpentry and sales, professions claim a higher status because they are supposed to be
highly trained and to make a special contribution to society.
Lawyers provide adherence to the law, doctors save lives
and engineers make sure bridges don’t fall down.
Because of their special roles, professions claim
special privileges, including control over training and the
ability to restrict the number of practitioners. No special
qualifications are required to be a farmer or a salesperson,
but to become a doctor, it is necessary to obtain a special
degree, pass specific tests and undertake an internship.
Some sociologists say professions are not really so
special in terms of their skills and are not really all that
altruistic.4 Instead, the idea of a profession is a way for an

4 Classic treatments include Eliot Freidson, Professional
Dominance: The Social Structure of Medical Care (New York:
Atherton, 1970); Terence J. Johnson, Professions and Power
(London: Macmillan, 1972); Magali Sarfatti Larson, The Rise of

226

Official Channels

occupational group to obtain greater power and privilege.
Restricting entry to the occupation means higher salaries.
Imagine that anyone could call themselves a lawyer and do
the things that lawyers usually do. Soon the market would
be flooded with would-be lawyers and salaries would drop
precipitously. On the other hand, if no one was allowed to
fix or sell toilets except for a small, highly trained group,
their wages would skyrocket.
In Australia, medicine is one of the most prestigious
and high-paying professions. Entry to medical schools is
highly competitive. At the top universities, studying medicine requires an exceptionally high score on standardised
tests. This indicates that students are extremely keen to
study medicine. Not every graduate has great career
prospects, but specialists — after more training — can do
very well. In 2014, news stories reported that surgeons
earned, on average, more than $350,000 per year, about five
times the average wage.
When occupational groups control their own conditions of work, they can make things cushy for their members — especially those at the top. They get the government
to restrict entry to the occupation. They can also attempt to
avoid scrutiny by outsiders. This is what the Australian
medical profession seems to have accomplished.
There are limits to this process, because various other
groups want to have a say. Governments try to impose
financial controls. Companies seek to influence prescribing
habits. Students compete for entry to medical courses, and
Professionalism: A Sociological Analysis (Berkeley, CA:
University of California Press, 1977).
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universities set up new ones to cater for the demand.
Finally, patients demand accountability for poor performance.
In some countries, doctors are subordinate to the
government. Their salaries are fixed or restrained. They are
employees of hospitals or health systems. An easy way to
determine the independence of the profession is to look at
average salaries. If entry to the profession were much
easier, there would be more doctors and salaries would
drop.
In Australia, the medical profession is relatively
independent, with strong support from the government to
protect the profession from competitors. The result is high
income, high status, restricted entry — and lax oversight.
Entering the vaccination debate
In 2009, the HCCC received an unusual complaint. It
wasn’t from a patient or a relative of a patient complaining
about a doctor or nurse. Instead, it was from a member of
the public, a fellow named Ken McLeod. His complaint was
about the Australian Vaccination Network (AVN), a
citizens’ group critical of vaccination.5
Ken McLeod’s complaint to the HCCC essentially
asked for intervention in an ongoing public debate. Remember that the HCCC was set up to receive complaints about
health practitioners, such as doctors and nurses. Why
5 For more details about this saga, see Brian Martin, “A
vaccination struggle,” chapter 8 in Nonviolence Unbound
(Sparsnäs, Sweden: Irene Publishing, 2015), especially pp. 275–
279 and 292–307.
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should it pay any attention to the Australian Vaccination
Network, whose key members are laypeople who are
engaged in public debate, not acting as health practitioners?
Despite this, the HCCC launched an investigation on the
basis of McLeod’s complaint and another complaint, from
the parents of a child who died of whooping cough.
The HCCC’s rationale was that the AVN was a “health
education provider” and hence was a “health provider” and
thus covered by the terms of the legislation establishing the
HCCC. Whatever the legal niceties, treating citizen
campaigners as “health education providers” in principle
opens up nearly every public debate to the scrutiny of the
HCCC. Critics of wind farms, bicycle helmets, seat belts,
pesticides, nuclear power, fluoridation or climate change
could be considered health education providers, with
complaints made to the HCCC about allegedly false and
dangerous information.
I’ve mentioned here only the critics, although in
principle the proponents of bicycle helmets and the like are
also health education providers. However, the HCCC only
acted on one side the vaccination debate: as an enforcer for
vaccination orthodoxy.
The HCCC demanded that the AVN put a disclaimer
on its website. The AVN already had a disclaimer and,
based on legal advice, declined to post the HCCC’s
disclaimer. Accordingly, the HCCC proceeded to issue a
public warning about the AVN, which received widespread
media coverage.
What is curious here is how the HCCC transformed
itself from an arbiter of good health practice — by making
judgements in response to complaints about doctors and
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nurses — to an arbiter of what is allowed to be said in the
vaccination debate. Given that the HCCC made no claim to
have its own independent expertise concerning vaccination,
what it did was accept the views of mainstream vaccination
experts. The HCCC thus became a means of enforcing
vaccination orthodoxy.
The HCCC’s public warning had no legal force. The
AVN was not forced to do anything in response. However,
the AVN’s reputation was seriously damaged by the
HCCC’s warning. Hence, AVN leaders decided to challenge the HCCC’s jurisdiction in court, arguing that the
HCCC had stepped outside the bounds of its charter in
making a ruling against the AVN.
Normally, it would be quixotic for a small community
group to challenge a well-funded government department
in court. The AVN was only able to do this through the
willingness of its legal team to work for little or no money.
Amazingly, the AVN won the case. The HCCC immediately withdrew its warning.
However, the HCCC and its supporters did not give
up. Instead, they lobbied the state government to change the
law to give the HCCC greater powers. In a meeting of state
parliament, one speaker after another supported vaccination
and praised a bill that would enable the HCCC to legally go
after the AVN.
After state parliament increased the HCCC’s powers,
in a way specifically designed to get around the court
ruling, the HCCC launched its own investigation into the
AVN. It looked through the AVN’s website, seemingly trying to find any statements that conflicted with vaccination
orthodoxy.
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Given that the HCCC itself has no special expertise
concerning vaccination, how did it justify its criticisms of
statements on the AVN’s website? It relied on advice from
three vaccination experts. However, the HCCC refused to
release to the AVN either the names of these experts or their
reports. The AVN was thus put in the position of trying to
justify its statements against the claims of anonymous
experts whose comments were not open to scrutiny. The
judge in this contest was the HCCC, which had launched
the investigation.
The HCCC issued another public warning.6 This time,
however, it received little media attention.
In seeking and gaining expanded powers for the
specific purpose of taking action against a citizens’ group
advocating a minority position in a public controversy, the
HCCC had moved quite a distance away from its initial
premise of handling complaints against health practitioners.
It had strayed from the core business of addressing unethical and dangerous health practice to being an enforcer of
medical orthodoxy.
While the HCCC was spending a huge amount of time
and money in its pursuit of the AVN, a different sort of
story broke in the media. A neurosurgeon, Suresh Nair, was
exposed for clinical failures, with a list of surgery patients
injured. Nair had a cocaine addiction and participated in
orgies during which two prostitutes died. In June 2014, the
Sydney newspaper The Sun-Herald editorialised about
Nair:
6 The warning is dated 10 December 2018. As of October 2019, it
was the central item on the HCCC’s home page.
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This week, [Carla] Downes told The Sun-Herald about
the botched surgery that left her with 27 per cent
impairment. Incredibly, she cannot access the findings
of a Health Care Complaints Commission investigation into her treatment because Nair did not fight the
charges.
The HCCC investigates and prosecutes serious
healthcare complaints. It operates jointly with the
Medical Council of NSW (formerly the NSW Medical
Board) to ensure doctors are fit to practise.
Serious failures in its investigatory processes
were uncovered in the case of Dr Graeme Reeves, the
infamous Butcher of Bega. One newspaper declared in
2008 that the HCCC and the medical board had proved
“by this case alone, their utter uselessness.”
… The Medical Council operates a program to
help troubled doctors continue to work. But on the
strength of the board and the HCCC’s performance in
the Nair case, we can have no faith that doctors on this
program are being properly supervised or complaints
against them treated with rigour.
… As in the Reeves case, the healthcare
complaints system must be held to account. As in the
Reeves case, its handling of Nair was utterly useless.7

7 “Nair’s patients deserve better than bureaucratic silence,” SunHerald, 8 June 2014, p. 33.
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Conclusion
The HCCC is supposed to be a watchdog body, intended to
address abuse, corruption and other problems with health
practitioners, primarily doctors and nurses. However, many
of its investigations were later determined to be flawed.
Furthermore, there had been numerous complaints to the
HCCC about a doctor, Graeme Reeves, who was later found
guilty through the courts; some observers thought the
HCCC’s response to complaints was inadequate. This is
compatible with the HCCC serving as a misleading symbol.
It gave the appearance of protecting the public but often
without much substance.
The HCCC, based on complaints from pro-vaccination
campaigners, then embarked on a different sort of venture,
making adverse judgements against citizen vaccine critics
who, in the normal sense of the word, were not health
practitioners. The HCCC stretched the meaning of “health
practitioner” and then, when thwarted by a court ruling, had
its legal mandate expanded so it could embark on its
vendetta against vaccine critics. In relation to vaccine
critics, the HCCC’s was in the role of attacker.
Curiously, the HCCC seemed far more determined to
act against citizens involved in a longstanding public
controversy than to act on complaints against rogue doctors.
To its critics, the HCCC’s trajectory suggests that it might
better be named the Health Establishment Protection
Commission. In this role it served as a tool of the medical
profession, or rather of the reputation of the medical
profession, by failing to act effectively against egregious
malpractice.
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The HCCC also fulfils other roles. No doubt there are
some instances in which it is effective, doing the right thing.
It also has the role of an organisation with its own internal
dynamics.8
It is wise not to make sweeping judgements. The
HCCC, like most organisations, plays many roles simultaneously. My comments here are based primarily on news
reports, which seldom capture the day-to-day operations of
any organisation. What the news reports do suggest is that
it is sensible not to place too much trust in the HCCC. In
particular, if you know about a dangerous doctor, it would
be wise not to rely on making a complaint to the HCCC.
Even if the HCCC were a model agency, there would
be disadvantages in relying on it, because this would divert
attention away from other ways to address problems in the
health system. One important option is to give patients and
8 According to Kate Aubusson, “Claims against medical watchdog
back up,” Sydney Morning Herald, 23–24 November 2019, p. 14,
“The state’s healthcare watchdog is taking almost a year to fully
investigate serious allegations including malpractice and sexual
misconduct amid rising numbers of complaints and dysfunction
within the organisation” and refers to “months of reports of
bullying and mismanagement within the commission.” “Earlier
this year, a whistleblower told the ABC [Australian Broadcasting
Corporation] about the commission’s ‘dysfunctional workplace
culture’ and an exodus of staff that was affecting its capacity to
assess hundreds of patient complaints. In August, the ABC
revealed the HCCC had hired a convicted sex offender to
investigate patient complaints and a 2017 consultant report in
which some staff reported ‘high levels of bullying’ and ‘extreme
pressure’ on workloads.”
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doctors skills in recognising and dealing with rogue practitioners. Another important option is to try to change the
health-system culture so that good practice is the norm and
exposing and addressing problems is routine. Agencies like
the HCCC are like band-aids. When the problems are deepseated, attention needs to be put on improving skills for
challenging abuses and on changing the culture in the health
system.

Appendix 3
Showtime in Wollongong
The headlines were spectacular: “Shockwaves,” “City’s
darkest hour,” “Black Tuesday.” These were just a few of
the front-page stories in the Illawarra Mercury, the daily
paper in Wollongong. Corruption in the local government
body was big news in Wollongong and throughout the state.
Wollongong is a city with a population of 300,000, on
the eastern coast of Australia 80 kilometres south of
Sydney. In Australia, there are six states and two territories,
and within each state there are local governments called
councils. Each council is run by elected officials called
councillors, supported by paid staff who do most of the
administrative work. One of the key functions of the council
is managing development, including approving new
buildings.
There is considerable scope for corruption in local
government. Suppose a developer buys some vacant land.
It is zoned for single-dwelling housing. However, the
developer can make a lot more money if it is zoned for
higher density housing, such as a high-rise block of units.
Suppose the developer makes friends with a planning
officer working for the council, and the planning officer
approves a change in the zoning. The developer makes a
windfall profit — an undeserved benefit — because the
rezoning served the interests of this particular developer;

236

Official Channels

other developers didn’t buy the land because it wasn’t
worth much until the rezoning.
If the developer provides some inducements to the
planning officer, for example some cash or goods or arranging for tradespeople to fix up a house at no cost, this is a
type of bribe — and is illegal. This type of corruption is
pervasive in Australian local government. In Wollongong,
it was exposed in a dramatic fashion.
ICAC
The key player in this case was the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC), set up in 1989 by the New
South Wales state government. With a budget of $25
million per year, ICAC has extraordinary powers to investigate. It can tap phones, confiscate computers and hold
hearings in which witnesses are compelled to answer.
However, ICAC cannot prosecute or sentence individuals.
Anything said by a witness at an ICAC hearing cannot be
used to prosecute them — except when witnesses lie, in
which case they can be charged with perjury.
ICAC’s efforts are regularly reported by the media,
and naturally enough its biggest successes in exposing
corruption receive the most attention. But behind the
scenes, not everyone is happy with ICAC. In the late 1990s,
the NSW branch of Whistleblowers Australia — the group
based in Sydney — received numerous reports from
individuals who had made complaints to ICAC about
alleged corruption but whose complaints had not been acted
on. Cynthia Kardell of Whistleblowers Australia collected
information from 25 whistleblowers who had complained
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to ICAC. One of them was partially satisfied; all the others
were dissatisfied.
Sometimes going to ICAC was worse than doing nothing. Complaints to ICAC were supposed to be confidential,
but in those days ICAC would refer them back to the
government department involved, sometimes thereby
revealing the identity of the whistleblower and opening
them to reprisals.
ICAC is a typical official channel. In these instances,
it gave the appearance of providing justice, namely acting
against corruption, but from the perspective of many
whistleblowers it was a toothless tiger. It provided the
illusion of a solution. From the point of view of most
whistleblowers, ICAC was a misleading symbol, promising
justice but in practice seldom delivering any.
Years later, I happened to talk with a former ICAC
commissioner, who told me that they received so many
complaints that only two or three percent could be
addressed. That figure fit perfectly with the cases collected
by Whistleblowers Australia. Going by the percentages, out
of 25 complaints, ICAC would probably have the capacity
to act on one of them, or perhaps none.
Imagine that ICAC had made this information public,
with a statement saying “If you make a complaint to us, it’s
unlikely we’ll be able to act on it. We may refer it to your
employer, so watch out in case your identity is exposed and
you are subject to reprisals.” With this sort of honesty in its
self-description and information for potential complainants,
ICAC would no longer be a misleading symbol. It might
still be a symbol of justice against corruption, but one
perceived more realistically, and perhaps even more
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sympathetically. On the other hand, this might not serve the
state government if citizens demanded more action against
corruption.
The Wollongong corruption scandal
In its investigation of corruption in Wollongong Council,
ICAC became a form of high drama. The stage was its
hearings, the players were ICAC officials and Wollongong
identities called to testify at the hearings, and the audience
was the entire population, at least those who bothered to
watch the news. I refer to this as high drama, because every
part of life can be interpreted in terms of a metaphor of
drama, with stage, performers and audience. Most of
ICAC’s investigations were fairly limited in terms of
audience: only those with a special interest in the topic paid
much attention. The Wollongong Council saga played to a
much wider audience.1
ICAC set the stage through its investigations,
conducted covertly, collecting evidence of corruption.
Someone or several people had alerted ICAC to corruption
in Wollongong, but who, when and what are not known
publicly. ICAC proceeded by tapping telephones and then,
in a spectacular intervention, raided Wollongong Council,
confiscating computers and other materials. This public
action generated headlines and created apprehension
among many individuals who believed they might be
1 My account here draws on my much more comprehensive
treatment, “Corruption tactics: outrage management in a local
government scandal,” Resistance Studies Magazine, 2012,
https://www.bmartin.cc/pubs/12rsm.html.
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targets of ICAC. The raid served as advance publicity for
the main show: public hearings.
Two factors seemed to move the Wollongong corruption scandal from a routine investigation to high drama:
colourful actors and sex. Beth Morgan was a senior planner
at Wollongong Council, in a position to influence approval
of development applications. She dealt with applications
from two developers while having sexual relationships with
them, and received benefits from them, for example
extensive renovations to her house at no charge. She aimed
to leave her position at the council and set up her own
consulting business. Forging connections with developers
was in her interest, even without the direct favours
involved.
This core story of sex in exchange for benefits drove
media interest in the ICAC hearings, which were open to
the public. But there was much more. Wollongong Council’s high-profile general manager, Rod Oxley, was in the
spotlight for his close connections to developers, in violation of rules for recording meetings and the like, and for his
support for development applications seemingly in violation of rules on height, space and other requirements.
Elected politicians were also implicated. Several of
them had dealings with developers and were claimed to
have been paid for their support for development approvals.
Tying all this together was the so-called “Table of
Knowledge.” At a small table outside a modest kebab shop,
various developers, council staff and councillors would
meet over breakfast. This became a symbol of the improper
relationships that were alleged.
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In addition, there was a bizarre side story. Two “con
men,” who had been in prison for fraud, approached several
of the key figures in the drama, pretending they worked for
ICAC or had influence with ICAC. This was after ICAC’s
raid on the Council, collecting computers and paper files,
but before the hearings. Beth Morgan and others paid
hundreds of thousands of dollars to Ray Younan and Gerald
Carroll in the hope of escaping ICAC scrutiny.
This complicated saga, involving developers, council
staff, elected councillors and con men, made for colourful
media stories. The usual type of development-related
corruption in local government is tawdry: an elected councillor has investments, or gains benefits from a developer,
and makes decisions serving their own interests. The
Wollongong case of this had the added features of sex, the
Table of Knowledge (a symbol of corruption), several
levels of government, and con men.
The public hearings turned this juicy story into high
drama. ICAC called various key figures to testify. Some
were honest council workers who gave their professional
views about whether projects complied with regulations.
Others called to testify knew they were targets of ICAC.
Their actions might be judged as corrupt, so many of them
started off by lying about what they had said or done. This
was risky, because lying to ICAC was perjury and could
lead to criminal sanctions.
The ICAC hearings involved the ICAC Commissioner, Jerrold Cripps, presiding and an ICAC lawyer, Noel
Hemmings, examining witnesses. This was not a court in
which witnesses were represented by their own lawyers.
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Instead, the witnesses were on their own, on stage in front
of everyone present, including media.
A typical examination of a witness went like this.
Hemmings would ask some specific questions, such as “Did
you ever have a conversation about using Mr Gilbert’s
computer?” Thinking that no one would know about a
private conversation, the witness answered “No.” Then
ICAC played an audio recording of a conversation, showing
in stark terms that the witness was lying. After this, the
witness would try to come up with some explanation — for
example, “You had asked me, I believe a question that I did
not understand correctly. By playing the tape I have heard
now what you were asking me” — anything except
admitting to lying to the commission.
This was dramatic material. For weeks, the public
hearings generated numerous headlines and feature stories
in the local Wollongong media and also in media in Sydney
and the state. For a time, the very word “Wollongong”
became a way of referring to corruption.
This was one of ICAC’s finest hours. By dramatising
the corruption scandal, ICAC achieved one of its key goals,
to raise awareness. No doubt the hearings provided a
cautionary tale for the numerous other councils throughout
the state where corruption was a possibility or a reality.
At the conclusion of the hearings, the main act of the
drama was over. The remainder of the play was less exciting and showed another aspect of how official channels
work — or don’t work. After the hearings, ICAC produced
several reports. This staged approach to reporting helped
maintain interest in the issue, but nevertheless it was slow
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going. The reports took months to prepare, and meanwhile
interest died down.
There was one dramatic outcome. ICAC recommended that the state government dissolve the council,
namely dismiss the elected councillors, and replace them
with administrators for a period of time until a new election.
The government acted on this recommendation promptly.
This was an act of political expedience. Wollongong
Council had been run by the Labor Party, and some of the
Labor politicians were the ones targeted by ICAC. If there
had been an immediate new election, most likely Labor
would have been soundly defeated. The state government
was also a Labor government, so by installing administrators, the risk of local electoral defeat was postponed.
The installation of administrators angered local citizens, especially those who had been campaigning for
honesty in government. ICAC’s hearings had generated
huge support for reform, but apparently this reform was to
be implemented from the top, by administrators, without
significant citizen input.
ICAC could be criticised on another ground: it had
pulled back from pursuing the extent of corruption associated with the Wollongong affair when it involved state
politicians. Noreen Hay was a well-known Labor member
of state parliament representing one of the electorates in
Wollongong. Her name came up in the course of ICAC’s
inquiry, but ICAC declined to name her as a “person of
interest,” meaning they would not investigate her. She
incorrectly represented this as meaning she was cleared.
Similarly, a well-known Labor powerbroker who worked
for Wollongong Council, Joe Scimone, was one of ICAC’s
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key targets. He was appointed to a high-paid job in a state
government body, but ICAC declined to investigate the role
of state politicians in the appointment.
ICAC thus did a much better job in exposing corruption in Wollongong Council than in pursuing higher level
political corruption. This might be simply because inquiries
need to be limited, because otherwise they could go on
forever, pulling in figures from all sorts of connections. In
other investigations, ICAC has gone after state politicians.
Looking at ICAC as an official channel, it’s possible
to see several roles.
• In dealing with whistleblower complaints, ICAC was
primarily a misleading symbol. It gave the promise of
providing justice, but because it could act on only a small
percentage of complaints, the promise was more symbolic
than substantive.
• In investigating and exposing corruption in Wollongong, ICAC was doing the right thing.
• In its public hearings into corruption in Wollongong
Council, ICAC was high drama. The hearings, designed to
attract media attention, served to put corruption in the
spotlight. High drama achieved one of ICAC’s purposes.
Members of the public throughout the state were alerted to
the potential of corruption.
• In the aftermath of the hearings, ICAC reverted to
being a misleading symbol. ICAC’s subsequent reports
took a long time to prepare, while media and public interest
declined. The investigation led to few prosecutions and
even fewer convictions.
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In terms of challenging corruption, ICAC’s most useful role
was in exposing the problem, stimulating changes in
Wollongong Council and removing some of the most
serious transgressors. On the other hand, by appearing to be
the saviour, ICAC undermined citizen action against
corruption: it seemed that the solution to corruption was
official action. ICAC did not recommend or stimulate
measures for greater citizen involvement in local decisionmaking. The challenge for citizen campaigners was how to
make use of official channels such as ICAC without having
their own agency removed.
Whatever ICAC’s limitations, its efforts were unwelcome in some quarters. In 2017, ICAC’s funding was cut,
causing it to reduce its number of full-time investigators. In
a comment criticising the funding cut, barrister Geoffrey
Watson, who had worked as counsel assisting ICAC, wrote:
In June 2016, then premier Mike Baird made two
consecutive announcements. His first announcement
was he and his government had “zero tolerance” for
corruption. This was a strong, positive sentiment for
which he could be admired. But his second announcement was he intended to inflict massive funding cuts
on the ICAC.
Baird never got around to explaining how he
could reconcile these two apparently inconsistent
propositions.
Just as a matter of timing, the funding cuts were
made shortly after the ICAC had exposed numerous
members of Baird’s party as committing election fund-
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ing “irregularities.” It is hard to imagine the funding
cuts were completely unrelated to the ICAC’s work.2
This was another role for ICAC: coming under attack. The
government’s message seemed to be that watchdogs should
be seen but not heard.

2 Geoffrey Watson, “Brace yourself for a return to the bad old
days,” Sydney Morning Herald, 22 November 2017, p. 20.
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